Dr. Bo Tang

Current facets (Pre-Master)

East China University of Politics and Law, Shanghai

PhD-degree: September 2, 2004
Promotor: Prof. Dr. J.W. Winter
Thesis: The Legal Structure of Corporate Governance in Public Held Corporations & Improvement of Chinese Company Law

Tang Bo (1964) obtained BA majoring in law from 1983 to 1987 and LLM in economic law from 1990 to 1993 at East China University of Polities and Law (ECUPL). She participated in the Master Class held by the China Holland Education and Research Centre (CHERC) in Erasmus University Rotterdam in the summer of 1999 and later stated her Ph.D. project. sponsored by CHERC, on Legal Structures of Corporate Governance in Public1y Held Corporations. An associate professor in economic law and commercial law of ECUPL, Ms. Tang has been actively involved in teaching and research in the field of securities law, futures law and law of negotiable instruments. She has published books and papers in these fields. She is now the vice-dean of economic law college of ECUPL, the councilor of Financial Law Subcommittee of Shanghai Law Society and a lawyer.

Research topic: “ The legal structure of corporate governance in publicly held corporations & improvement of Chinese company law”

I began my teaching career in a university ten years ago, involving security law, future law and law of negotiable instruments in my research and published some books and articles in related areas. I have fully recognized after years of my teaching and research that the creation and development of the securities markets in China has played a very important role in greatly promoting reforms on economic systems in China. The consequence of this role has attracted a lot of attention all over the world. The emerging securities markets in China, however, inevitably have met with a number of problems. The majority of listed companies in China were transformed from former state-owned enterprises, which automatically inherited the problems of their predecessors. One critical problem is the improperness of companies’ ownership structure. Other shortcomings are the severity of “insider control”, the hyperplasia of the internal and external mechanism upon which companies operate healthily.