



From TAFF'26 (Santa Marta) to Just Transition (COP 31 Turkey) and beyond

Report on event June 16th, 2026

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Key insights

Discussions during our event suggest

On TAFF'26 & '27:

- The strength and effectiveness of the TAFF conference and preparation processes depended significantly on its ability to convene diverse actors and to translate diverse participation and 'non-traditional' knowledge, perspectives and proposals, into meaningful influence over analyses, priorities, outputs, and implementation pathways on phasing out fossil fuels. If the rationale for and strength of TAFF'26 was the creation of a fossil-fuel free space to generate ideas and momentum that can feed into existing climate governance initiatives like COP, TAFF'27 processes must focus on maximising these.
- A central challenge therefore is not only participation itself (though resource barriers affecting participation certainly exist), but ensuring that equitable participation visibly shapes governance outcomes in ways that advance ambitious, socially just, and politically durable fossil fuel transition strategies.
- This post-TAFF'26 event demonstrates the added value to deliberation on the law and policy of fossil fuel phase out within TAFF and other climate governance processes, of interested constituencies (e.g., like the academic and NGO sectors) collaborating together to share ideas and perspectives in a thoughtful fashion. Such processes should be recognised and supported as an integral part of national-level preparation for TAFF '27.

Geopolitics, law and governance:

- TAFF processes and other climate governance initiatives that address fossil fuel phase out must recognise and carefully navigate tensions between national shorter-term domestic political cycles and fossil fuel industry interests, and the momentum and pace of progress necessary to address FFPO legal and policy commitments.
- International human rights, the ICJ Advisory Opinion (2025) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Advisory Opinion on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights (2025) are invaluable anchors and frameworks to aid navigation of evolving political challenges and private fossil fuel interests, and should be more central in the pathways and outcomes of the TAFF process.
- TAFF processes and other climate governance initiatives should seek to remove legal barriers to a just climate transition, including ISDS mechanisms that are often deployed to challenge climate policies and deter regulatory action.

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List of acronyms

COP	Conference of the Parties
COP30	30th Conference of the Parties
COP31	31st Conference of the Parties
ECA	Export Credit Agency
ECT	Energy Charter Treaty
EU	European Union
EUR	Erasmus University Rotterdam
FFPO	Fossil Fuel Phase-Out
FfD4	Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IISD	International Institute for Sustainable Development
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISDS	Investor-State Dispute Settlement
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
NAS'26	Netherlands National Climate Adaptation Strategy 2026
NDBs	National Development Banks
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
SMART	Santa Marta Action Repertoire
SPGET	Science Panel for Global Energy Transition
TAFF	Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels
TAFF'26	First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels (2026)
TAFF'27	Second Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels (2027)
UN	United Nations
WHO	World Health Organization

1. Background: From TAFF'26 (Santa Marta) to Just Transition (COP 31 Turkey) and beyond

As the global climate agenda advances from COP30 in Belém to COP31 in Antalya, the recent [international conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels at Santa Marta \(April 2026\)](#), co-hosted by Colombia and the Netherlands, was a critical diplomatic juncture on pathways to a more equitable and meaningful “Just Transition.” Convened amid intensifying debates ahead of COP 31, the meeting included notable institutional innovations including dedicated chapters for academia, trades unions, parliaments and sub-national entities, as well as a pre-assembly of Peoples, and an Indigenous peoples dialogue. Though these developments signal a shift towards a more plural and participatory deliberative approach to climate diplomacy, gaps remain. The absence reference to the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 23 July, 2025, for example, raises key questions about the recognition and integration of human rights and international legal obligations within transition pathways. Yet, conference outcomes (including the formation of three follow-up work-streams, a ‘Science Panel,’ along with a further international conference (TAFF’27) next year) may offer a crucial window to shape the normative, legal and institutional agenda towards a fossil-free, more equitable ‘Just Transition.’

Against this backdrop, we convened a workshop on June 16th (13:00 – 17:30) bringing together over 50 academic researchers, policymakers, and NGO representatives engaged on law, governance the fossil fuel transition and phase-out (FFPO).¹ The workshop aimed to

- Share knowledge, reflect on and analyse the significance of TAFF’26 event to international efforts on a progressive transition away from fossil fuels
- Identify opportunities for engagement with emerging (TAFF’27 and other) policy processes, and in particular, where scholarly engagement may be most helpful
- Contribute to ongoing preparations for the next COP31 and the next international conference (TAFF’27).

This report captures reflections on these, and related, topics, shared by contributors (panellists and keynote speaker) and participants at the workshop. We hope this report may be a resource for those interested in the TAFF conferences as an emerging initiative of deliberative governance on fossil fuel phase out (FFPO), and to related legal, governance and knowledge initiatives that have potential to progress and hasten the transition towards more equitable, non-extractive, socio-ecological and politico-economic futures.

Section 2 contextualises and critically examines the processes and outcomes of TAFF’26. Section 3 presents reflections and concerns on the possibilities from the three Work-streams² identified in the TAFF’26 Final Statement³. The report concludes with recommendations for the preparations and process for the next TAFF’27.

The methodology for this report and the June 16th 2026 workshop are contained in the Appendix.

¹ The event operated under Chatham House rules, and this report follows that ethic.

² See section 4 of this report.

³ We approached the TAFF’26 Final Statement as the clearest expression of ‘what’s next’ at the time of our event (June 16th). Subsequent to the event, the Conference’s Final Report has been produced. The contents of this document do not engage with information in that Final Report.

2. TAFF'26 – context and significance

Under the co-hosting roles of Colombia⁴ and The Netherlands,⁵ TAFF-‘26 brought together 57 countries and more than 1000 stakeholders to discuss how ‘just, orderly, and equitable transitions’ away from fossil fuels could be achieved.⁶ Santa Marta has been praised for its innovative methodology, one that - compared to previous multi-lateral summits - took a more participatory approach, delivered in sequenced stages, that encouraged contributions and participation from several sectors of civil society.⁷ This approach, termed ‘methodological funnel’ by TAFF’26, included eight stages building on each other: gathering written contributions from registered organizations; a technical synthesis of received proposals; scheduled virtual dialogues between different participating sectors over two days; the drafting of preliminary position papers by each sector; in-person dialogues at Santa Marta; a selection of spokespersons from each chapter; participation in a ‘High Level’ segment; and a co-host drafted conference ‘key takeaways’ document.⁸ Several months later a conference report was issued.⁹

Rather than producing negotiated political outcomes (like other summits such as the COP), the TAFF organisers framed the event as focused on creating momentum, structure, and political clarity for future actions, reflected in the varied conference outcomes.¹⁰

Santa Marta – key outcomes

In addition to announcing a further TAFF conference next year (TAFF’27), to be co-hosted by Tuvalu and Ireland, the immediate TAFF ‘26 outcomes include

- The establishment of a TAFF connection group of Colombia, the Netherlands, Tuvalu and Ireland.¹¹
- The establishment of a Science Panel for Global Energy Transition (SPGET)
- Three workstreams on:
 1. ‘Roadmaps’ (connected to the SPGET¹² and NDC Partnership)¹³
 2. ‘Macroeconomic dependencies and financial architecture (together with IISD)¹⁴
 3. ‘Producer-consumer alignment for fossil fuel transition’ (supported by the OECD)

4 While Colombia seeks to position itself as a climate leader from the global south, its economy and local livelihoods continue to depend on fossil fuel revenues. Santa Marta itself is a historic port city with an economy inextricable from coal exports.

5 The Netherlands (a global north nation that has greatly subsidised and historically served as a tax haven for fossil fuel companies) plays a central role in maintaining an international legal mechanism, investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), that allows ‘companies to bypass domestic courts and challenge climate and energy policies, regulatory reforms, and even efforts to enforce accountability for social and environmental harm’. Bart-Jaap Verbeek, Fernando Hernandez, Investor protection blocking climate action,’ SOMO, 15th April, 2026. Available [here](#).

6 <https://transitionawayconference.com/report>

7 Details of the process and the sectors can be found on the TAFF [website](#)

8 ‘Co-host Takeaways on the First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, Santa Marta, Colombia,’ 20 April 2026. Available [here](#).

9 Report – 1st Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, June 2026, Co-hosted by Colombia & The Netherlands, 24-29 April, 2026, Santa Marta, Colombia (TAFF’26 Report). Available [here](#).

10 <https://www.sciencespo.fr/chair-sustainable-development/news/santa-marta-explained-what-happened-at-the-first-conference-on-transitioning-away-from-fossil-fuels/>

11 This will connect with the COP 31 Activation Group 4: Transitioning away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly and equitable manner.

12 The Science Panel for the Global Energy Transition (SPGET) was launched as an international scientific body intended to advise policymakers on the energy transition, supporting countries in transitioning away from fossil fuels. Complementary to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), SPGET will help develop 1.5°C-aligned roadmaps and address legal, financial, and political barriers.

13 Launched in 2016, the NDC [Partnership](#) is a global coalition of 140 countries and 120 institutions that supports the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to advance climate action and sustainable development.

14 International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), a think tank on sustainable development.

Our event discussions focused mainly on the TAFF ‘process’ and outcomes,¹⁵ with an eye to the possibilities offered by another TAFF conference in 2027, considering the institutional pathways and mechanisms announced in the TAFF Final Statement.

The brief welcome and introduction provided context and background to the first TAFF conference, recognising it as a milestone in its creation of a fossil-free diplomacy space, one that recognised and sought to facilitate the participation of diverse sectors of civil society. It happened within a shifting legal, governmental and political landscape, at multiple levels, including the evolving aftermath of the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on states’ obligations to tackle climate change,¹⁶ preparations for the next COP31, the forthcoming EU revision of the climate action regulation and proposals to comprehensively address the phasing out of subsidies, and (for the Netherlands) consultations on the recently launched Netherlands Climate Adaptation Strategy (NAS’26).¹⁷

3. Reflections on TAFF’26 conference process and organisation

This section captures reflections on the TAFF’26 conference process and organisation, and is structured thematically.

Conference process - inclusion and representation

People recognised that the conference was organised under pressing time and resource constraints, and welcomed and recognised that even within those constraints, TAFF’26 clearly aimed at and experimented with a more deliberative and participatory process, in a fossil-fuel ‘free’ space. Some felt it set a precedent in re-thinking ‘multilateralism.’ Several people recounted experiences there that reflected positive experiences and benefits from this process. These innovations had a tangible positive impact on the range, depth and quality of the discussions, and on the experience of the event as a notably more inclusive deliberative governance space.

However, we also discussed a tension between, on the one hand, the aim and the promise of the conference process, and the gap between these aspirations and challenges in participation, representation, and transparency in decision-making. These challenges were experienced more by participants from civil society sectors and researchers that are frequently distant from participation and decision-making in international governance events, and who were from/representing majority world regions and perspectives. This was visually evident in the ‘optics’ of the conference, where prominence (and thus epistemic authority) were unevenly allocated, reflecting the predominance of white, Western and male voices, particularly within academic panels and expert discussions. Planning for TAFF’26 (and climate governance more generally) needs to think and act more deliberately to connect with and centre knowledges and lived experiences of Indigenous peoples and other communities that experience the problems we are trying to address. This will be especially pertinent for the proposed Scientific Panel.

¹⁵ Note that at the time of the workshop, the Final Conference Report was not published, and neither were details of the three Workstreams. We used the ‘Takeaways’ statement and the TAFF website as the primary sources for our event.

¹⁶ International Court of Justice, Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (Advisory Opinion) [2025] ICJ, 23 July 2025. Available [here](#).

¹⁷ (Draft) National Climate Adaptation Strategy (NAS’26), available [here](#).

Transparency in translating issues raised into conference outputs and future agenda

The overarching reflection of TAFF'26 was that, despite it being organized hastily, it contributed positively to the wider climate governance landscape, signalling that other models of deliberative governance are possible and are uniquely productive. It reflected and responded to the immense urgency of providing spaces that constructively facilitate broader discussions of the possibilities and practicalities of just transitions away from fossil fuels. Its potential to positively impact COP and other multilateral processes addressing fossil fuel phase out, was keenly appreciated.

However, people noted an identifiable discrepancy between the three workstreams released by the co-hosts post the TAFF'26 conference, and the workstreams around which TAFF'26 attendees organized themselves and their deliberations in Santa Marta.¹⁸ Similarly, the co-host summaries and the people's summit contributions read like they spoke about two very different conferences. Participants at our event expressed the strong concern that issues and proposals made in the various deliberative processes would not be reflected in the final conference report. This led to deeper questions regarding transparency, accountability, and the mechanisms through which participants contributions and inputs are translated into official 'outputs' by conference process leaders, organisers and decision-makers. It raises a worry that the adoption of more inclusive and deliberative governance practices may not result in outputs that reflect the content and quality of the discussions within those forums, if the approach of the organisers is to implicitly guide outputs towards pre-defined, or more politically 'palatable' narratives. One widely recognised example of this discrepancy was the exclusion of the wide recognition of the significance of ISDS as a powerful barrier to fossil fuel transition in the final 'takeaways' document. Another example was the reduction and 'flattening' of the range of issues in the 'key takeaways' statement associated with workers, workers communities and the labour rights of workers most affected by FFPO within the conference process.¹⁹

Geopolitics, law and governance for FFPO

The positive leadership and guidance of Colombia for TAFF'26 was widely recognised as key to the success of TAFF '26. However, the results of the country's recent elections demonstrates how politically vulnerable such leadership can be. It is important that the TAFF processes and climate governance initiatives that address FFPO recognise and carefully navigate tensions between national shorter-term domestic political cycles and fossil fuel industry interests, and the momentum and pace of progress necessary to address FFPO legal and policy commitments.

While Colombia's leadership contributed greatly to the impact and outcomes of TAFF'26, the fact that their longer-term commitment may change after their recent elections was recognised as revelatory of two factors for progressing FFPO within climate governance forums. The first is the significance of domestic politics on a state's commitment to mobilise and progress the FFPO agenda, and role

¹⁸ This discrepancy is acknowledged by the conference report itself, which states on page 22 that 'there is a clear division between the report back [the contributions of participants during the conference and its preparatory sessions] and suggested future work [next steps, additional partners, and linkages to other processes]'.

¹⁹ For example, recognition of gender dimensions highlighted were excluded, as was recognition that 'greening' employment and industrial strategies does not automatically imply fairer conditions of employment, eco-responsible industrial development models and worker participation in decision-making on FFPO processes.

of interest groups at the national level in influencing a state's position and agenda on climate governance. The second is the cumulative effect on cycles of climate governance negotiations and bargaining over time, of the behaviour of aggregations of states with minimalist commitments to FFPO, augmented by the influence of aggregated interest groups with similar aims. TAFF'26 offered a unique opportunity to break with existing climate governance negotiation dynamics that were widely recognised as stuck. A question post TAFF'26, (and thinking ahead to COP31 and TAFF'27) is how to transmit and build on the wider and deeper agenda for FFPO articulated at TAFF'26, and the momentum it created within and between different groups, in forthcoming climate governance negotiations at several forums and levels. Key here is the need for sectors (like NGOs, academics, trade unions etc.) to continue to connect together and share intelligence, research and strategic thinking.

All outcomes from the TAFFs conferences need to be benchmarked against the contents of international law, as clarified by international courts and tribunals, particularly by the International Court of Justice in *Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (Advisory Opinion) [2025] ICJ, 23 July 2025*²⁰ and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in *Advisory Opinion OC-32/25 on the Climate Emergency and Human Rights*.

We noted that fossil fuel sector is connected to many areas of governance like food production, oceans etc. This offers opportunities to channel TAFF'26 ideas and debates into those arenas. Two pathways were identified as examples, including governance forums in these sectoral arenas (e.g., the WHO Assembly - health), and governance institutions at different *jurisdictional levels* e.g., within cities, regions or at national level. We recognise that opportunities exist to connect 'islands' of innovation and resistance across these sectors and levels.

4. Discussions on the proposed TAFF Workstreams

Breakout sessions centred on the areas outlined in the three TAFF Workstreams.²¹

Workstream A: Roadmaps

“This workstream will aim to connect countries with the Science Panel on the Global Energy Transition and the NDC Partnership. It will help countries develop roadmaps and align them with their NDCs. It will also facilitate co-operation between countries willing to provide and receive support for implementation.”²²

This breakout session explored how national and international roadmaps, NDCs, and climate mitigation plans towards transitioning away from fossil fuels should and can be inclusively created by states in partnership with civil society. The discussion opened with a simple question: what is a roadmap, and how do you make one inclusive?

Three themes emerged from that starting point.

The first was structure, purpose and scope. Participants agreed it is important to clarify this on several fronts: the ‘destination’ of the roadmap, what concrete and tangible components are needed to address problems that are multifaceted, systemic and locally specific, and whether roadmaps should be more technical, practical and achievable, or more aspirational. On the question of direction, there was broad agreement on one thing: just start. The knowledge already exists on what the problems are, why the energy transition should be just, and proposed solutions. The rest can be worked out along the way. Participants saw TAFF as filling an implementation gap that complements the COP process rather than competing with it.

The second theme was inclusivity. Participants discussed how to bring in civil society, countries in the Global South, and states dealing with militarization or political and climate insecurity, along with the question of common but differentiated responsibilities for the transition.

The third theme, and a major part of the conversation, was implementation and monitoring, including the practical and technical components needed to make roadmaps work. Participants pointed out that existing policy instruments, practices and deliberative tools could be adapted here, to measure progress honestly, ensure transparency, and uphold democratic process and human rights.

Key Takeaways : Workstream A

- Roadmaps should lead towards a defossilised economy – net zero, overshoot and market solution narratives are not equitable solutions to the climate crisis.
- Roadmaps should be based on differentiated responsibility and provide for compensation and financing for Global South states with fossil fuel dependent economies.

²¹ “Channelling our collective power: three workstreams will be established, focused on identifying concrete opportunities and channels for cooperation to overcome fossil fuel dependencies in preparation for the second conference. Workstreams will remain open and flexible, allowing countries to join or lead, supported by existing initiatives and drawing on experts and members of the Santa Marta process as needed.” Co-host Takeaways, 30th April 2026, 3-4. We noted that the descriptions of the Workstreams was high-level and vague.

²² Ibid.

- Roadmaps should be ambitious, while also including clear and measurable steps towards defossilisation of the economy against which progress can be measured.
- The process for development of roadmaps as well as the content of roadmaps should be inclusive, transparent, respect human rights and be free from influence of the fossil fuel lobby.

Workstream B: Macroeconomic dependencies and financial architecture

“Together with IISD we will look for the necessary expertise to help leverage collective capacities to support the necessary changes in financial systems, unlock finance and investment flows required for the transition, and determine who needs to be involved. This workstream will include a focus on debt constraints, as well as on financial incentives and subsidies.”²³

The discussion held focused mainly on:

- Overall, being clear-eyed about the well-documented limitations of the current roles, policies, practices of different financial actors (public and private), and of their governance, and the need to propose a mix of clearly described *cessation, reform, and invention* models at the heart of proposals on the current financial architecture.
- Several problematic dimensions to governance of the financial sector were raised. As example, the overwhelming focus of central banks legal mandates on maintaining financial markets stability means that they’re ill-equipped to consider and guide finance pathways that are entirely necessary but will cause ‘instability’ as a result of pursuing necessary change. Meanwhile, the decision-making, lending and insurance practices of very influential public financing actors like multilateral development banks (MDBs), and Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) respectively, continue to remain opaque and largely unaccountable to communities affected by their work.²⁴ Governance processes within and of both of these sectors are not equal to the task to decoupling from fossil fuels at pace. MDBs are perceived to be too slow in their ability to change and too connected to extractive capitalist models of development to prioritise alternative pathways of economic development.
- Meanwhile, examples of innovative funding streams such as Funds targeting particular groups or communities (e.g., Indigenous peoples, or sectors (e.g., aviation levies, fossil fuel trading levies)) already exist, that can be scaled up. Furthermore, could the aims of finance policy goals in the Sevilla Commitment²⁵ be benchmarked to the financial sector more tightly?
- Recognising the interlocking dimensions of different legal and governance systems and the negative effective of their cumulative reinforcing dynamics is key. Examples included the operation of the current patent system;²⁶ approaches to ‘Blending’ and ‘de-risking’ private finance using public finance (e.g., via multilateral development banks, national development banks, Export Credit Agencies etc.);²⁷ the prohibitive

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ A repeated comment was the perception that banks are ‘going backwards’ in their approach to financing.

²⁵ The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), was held in Sevilla in 2025. The Sevilla Commitment is the outcome document from that conference. See Sevilla Commitment Outcome Document adopted at the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, Sevilla, Spain, 30th June – 3rd July 2025 (A/RES/79/323), available [here](#).

²⁶ Which makes the pursuit of more diverse, non-raw material extractive development pathways more challenging to navigate, more expensive and difficult to pursue.

²⁷ This increasingly embeds and entangles public finance into extractive, private profit maximisation-oriented and extractive models of development, reducing its potential to innovate and support new pathways for economic development.

financial burdens of ISDS claims on states; the emphasis on loans as a source of climate finance and the risks additional loans pose to exacerbating already heavy sovereign debt burdens, along with the presence and opacity of conditionality on aid and on loans. A systems-wide financial governance approach is needed, that recognises these links.

- We especially noted the failure of current approaches to ‘green’ financing to generate new legal and business models of community-owned (e.g., co-operatives; or dedicated loan instruments to support community-led initiatives), or community benefit-centred development initiatives. We observed that fossil fuel industry incumbents and their spin-off companies have a significant competitive advantage over new entrants. This is because ‘green’ financial incentives such as tax breaks or concessional loans are blind to the nature of legal ownership of beneficiaries. Thus, given their knowledge of the legal and governance contexts and inherited competitive advantage, corporate ‘green’ or ‘renewable’ energy spinoffs of the long-established fossil fuel industry appear to be a significant beneficiary of these provisions. The prominence of this profile of ‘green’ energy actor was perceived to limit innovation, leading to slower and more minimalist results of dedicated ‘clean’ energy strategies.²⁸
- The challenge of articulating and maintaining a dedicated focus on climate/environmental justice within a financial sector derived from and reliant upon an export-oriented, extractive model of economic development was raised.²⁹ This is becoming more pressing in a context of diversion of ‘social’ funding to fund security and defence policy priorities, along with cuts to ODA and to public funding for the NGO sector that research, works with and advocates along with affected communities.
- Reform of the taxation system, at national and international levels, to generate revenue for clean energy investment and to transition to fossil fuel free development.³⁰ The irony and the missed opportunity of taxation of the fossil fuel industry generating massive windfall profits as a result of the war was keenly noted. Phasing out subsidies, tax credits and other financial incentives for the fossil fuel sector would free up revenue for clean energy investment. Political will demonstrates this is possible – as example, the EU’s elevation in urgency, and the lack of constraints on national defence spending was contrasted with the EU’s approach to national level funding necessary for FFPO.

Key Takeaways: Workstream B

- The existing fragmented, markets-stability centred approach to financial governance needs to be urgently reformed, replacing it with a joined-up approach that recognises and addresses the interlocking nature of different financial activities from generating revenues from taxation of fossil fuels and patents governance, to sovereign debt and international development finance, to Export Credit Insurance and ISDS.
- In addition to reform of corporate law to better regulate their impact on ‘sustainability,’ new legal models of democratically owned, accountable, community-centred ownership and benefit initiatives need to be at the heart of all financing measures,

²⁸ Another more perverse outcome from this market profile described was where profits from subsidiary renewable energy companies that receive public financial incentives (e.g., tax breaks) can be freely transferred back to the parent fossil fuel company, thus adding to the value of the parent fossil fuel company.

²⁹ “You can make the energy system greener, but how to make it more just?”

³⁰ Several examples were given of innovative ideas that are not being taken up e.g., windfall taxes on fossil fuel profits, financial transaction taxes, removal of fossil fuel subsidies, green tax incentive reforms etc.

especially those publicly financed via development aid, MDBs, NDBs, Export Credit Agencies etc.

- Central banks need to develop sharper, forward-focused regulations to cease financial actors' investments in fossil fuel projects.

Workstream C: Producer-consumer alignment for fossil fuel transition

"Supported by the OECD, this workstream will engage with other experts to work towards mapping opportunities and ways to connect fossil fuel producers and consumers, that supports the decarbonization of trade balances, advancing progress toward a fossil fuel-free trade system. Aside from economic diversification, this workstream will consider how to make transitions people-centred and territorially grounded, therefore tackling the revenue exchange problem, while advancing energy sovereignty."

This breakout session focused on discussing the role of the trade/investment sector within transitions away from fossil fuel, and the 'energy sovereignty' debate.

The discussion focused on four main themes:

1. Clarifying the purpose of the workstream
2. The power dynamics present between consumer-producers, and how the system perpetuates them.
3. The importance of engaging with supply-side policy.
4. Foregrounding the justice dimension to energy transitions.

Discussions around the purpose of the workstream focused on defining its components and problematize the dichotomy 'producer-consumers'. For example, are States consumers? Do corporations also count as consumers? The corporation question also extends to the regulation of their behaviour to ensure meaningful accountability, recognised as a challenge. There were also questions around the scope of this workstream: are we focused simply on value chains, and implementing specific actions around value chains, such as decarbonization, or are we focused on a broader system? A contiguous question is whether a workstream focusing on consumer-producers relationship does risk to sideline the human rights of citizens, indigenous and local communities in the context of the energy transition. If economic relationships are only framed as consumer-producers, not only power imbalances may be overlooked, but also the rights and roles of other (often vulnerable) actors in society, which are typically impacted by investment and trade, may be missed. Trade and investment relations extend far beyond a consumer-producer relation. In this context, the fact that the new workstreams differ from the themes identified for the Santa Marta Conference was also mentioned as problematic, as now the question of 'realigning international legal frameworks to support the just transition from fossil fuels' is less visible. The group found that this theme may now be cutting across the new workstreams. The discussion of the role of trade and investment agreements seem particularly pertinent to workstream #3.

One important dimension of this workstream would then be how trade agreements can be reshaped in ways conducive to the TAFF goals. There was also a discussion as to what extent ISDS belonged within this workstream's scope and this group concluded that ISDS probably falls within this workstream for various reasons. For example, ISDS is considered key to engaging with supply-side policy, an important component to help align interna-

tional economic law with climate. Building on a wealth of scientific studies, the Academic Chapter of the Santa Marta Conference emphasized that ISDS is a key legal barrier to the just energy transition and recommended governments to start by '[e]xplicitly recognis[ing] that ISDS is a barrier to the just transition away from fossil fuels and the urgent need to address it collectively, in light of States' obligations on climate change as outlined in the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion.'³¹ The recommendation of the academic chapter resonated with this group. ISDS has been widely deployed by fossil fuels corporations to claim stellar compensations from governments, making more costly climate action. By contrast, civil society is not able submit claims against companies that wrong them, as has often happened in the context of hydrocarbon extraction. This relates to the justice component of just energy transitions, where the importance of climate governance meeting the demands of local communities emerged in the discussion along with other considerations. In the view of this group, working on the legal systems that form a barrier to a just transition should remain an important component of this workstream.

We also discussed the more institutional component of the workstream. The OECD is mentioned as the main actor to support this workstream. The group raised questions about whether the OECD, given its membership and institutional mandate, is the most appropriate body to lead work on consumer–producer relations and the advancing a fossil-fuel free trade system and decarbonized value chains. It considered that the legitimacy and inclusiveness of such a process would be strengthened through greater representation of Majority World perspectives, including meaningful participation by civil society and relevant UN Special Rapporteurs and bodies representing diverse constituencies. This would help ensure that the perspectives and interests of those most affected by the transition are adequately reflected.

Key Takeaways : Workstream C

- As a group comprised of civil society and government:
 - There was certain criticism towards the framing of the workstream around the producer-consumer alignment, which was considered reductivist.
 - A framing around decarbonizing value chains that does not produce inequalities is better.
 - More emphasis on the supply side climate is considered essential.
 - In the current phrasing (transition/people centred etc)
- Workgroup has a focus on trade relations which overlaps with other workstreams.
 - Foreground rules that lock us into intensive fossil fuel economies and be explicit about working on both trade and investment agreements. This would make it easier to reimagine different kinds of trade and investment relations.
- This work stream would be supported by the OECD.
 - The group questioned whether the OECD is the most appropriate institution to lead work on consumer–producer relations and the transition away from fossil fuels and would see the inclusion of civil society as well as UN rapporteurs (e.g. UN Rapporteurs on Climate and Human Rights) and/or bodies more representative of majority world and diverse constituencies as an important improvement.

³¹ Santa Marta Action Repertoire (SMART) Summary, Insights from the Synthesis Report workstream of the Academic Dialogue to the Santa Marta conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, 27 April 2026 (Action 12).

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Appendix:

Methodology for the event and for this report

The June 16th 2026 event was initiated by Dr Siobhán Airey (EUR), who, along with Dr Stephanie Triefus (Asser Institute), Marija Pop Trajkova of the Humanity Hub (the Hague), and Professor Alessandra Arcuri (EUR), aimed at the organisation of a ‘strategic reflection’ event on the process and outcomes of the Santa Marta conference. The Humanity Hub had already organised a pre-TAFF’26 event, and the June 16th event built on the relationships and dialogue that had already been initiated. Siobhán sourced funding from the SHIFT COST Action.³² Stephanie sourced funding from the Netherlands Network of Human Rights,³³ and the Humanity Hub offered space and refreshments at minimal rates. Inde Yuen (student assistant) offered some logistical and communications support. Like the original TAFF, this event was organised at short notice, drawing significantly on already existing trust and goodwill between participants, organisers and others.

The June 16th event was organized in two parts: a closed session with invited event guests and a session open to the public. The closed session included a panel of people that attended TAFF in Santa Marta followed by a workgroup session structured using three workstreams established in TAFF’26 processes. The open session included a public summary of the discussions within the three workstream groups, followed by a second panel, focused on post-TAFF’26 governance possibilities.

This report was researched and compiled from data collected and substantially refined by the workshop rapporteur Dani Garcia-Caro Briceno, and using notes from Workstream note-takers Ysabella Goedhart, Puck Koster, and Estephany Leon Rodriguez. Siobhán edited and also contributed to this report.

Programme for the event

Programme		  
14:00 - 14:15	Welcome and Introduction	
14:15 - 15:25	Panel Discussion <u>Contextualising</u> Santa Marta (2026) for fossil fuel phase-out	
15:30 - 16:30	Examining the three TAFF ‘Workstreams’	
17:15 - 17:35	Reflections on the path(s) ahead Prof. Elisa Morgera, UN Special Rapporteur on climate change	
17:35 - 18:45	Panel Discussion TAFF26 to TAFF 27, and TAFFs to COP 31 and beyond	
18:45 - 20:00	Networking Drinks	

³² Shift Cost Action website [here](#).

³³ Both Stephanie and Siobhan are members

PANEL DISCUSSION

Reflecting on Santa Marta (TAFF 2026)



**Dr. Stephanie
Triefus**



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Dr. Daniel Chavez



Transnational Institute
& University of the
Basque Region

**Dimple Sokartara-
Pamudji**



Mondiaal FNV

**Fernando
Hernandez**



Head of Trade &
Investment Policy,
Both ENDS

Josephine Ris



Senior policy
officer Energy
Saving, Ministry of
Economic Affairs
and Climate

PANEL DISCUSSION

TAFF26 to TAFF 27, and TAFFs to COP 31 and Beyond



Dr. Siobhán Airey



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**Prof. Alessandra
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Prof. Elisa Morgera
UN Special Rapporteur on Climate Change

This event was co-organised by Erasmus School of Law, T.M.C. Asser Institute, and the Hague Humanity Hub and funded by the SHIFT COST Action Network and the Netherlands Network for Human Rights Research.



For any follow-up on this report, please contact.

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