



Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy

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Editorial

The present issue of the ESJP sounds off the second year of its existence. Having been a part of the editorial board from its very conception, I am aware of the sheer amount of work that has been put in over the past two years. Many have contributed to each issue. First of all, we owe our gratitude to the staff of the faculty of philosophy, who not only continue to guarantee the quality of our publications by way of their excellent reviews, but also submit the very best work delivered by students. The sheer number of submissions testifies to their enthusiasm, and we are grateful for it. Second, the willingness on the part of authors to critically revisit and oftentimes rewrite their very best work is a sign of the ambition and the professional attitude that characterises students of our faculty. It also shows the eagerness on the part of students to publish in the ESJP. These shows of support have been instrumental to every issue published thus far. They inspire us to make the most out of the journal. Looking forward, we will continue to improve the quality of our publications and aim to appeal to ever-new audiences.

Our ambition to provide a podium for the best work of faculty students has been underscored by the faculty itself. On Friday the 28th of June, a committee appointed by the faculty dean, prof. dr. J.J. Vromen, awarded the Pierre Bayle Trophy to Daan Gijsbertse, thus singling out his essay 'Vervuld leven na de dood van God' as the best of 2012. The committee, which consisted of dr. F.A. Muller, dr. G.H. van Oenen, dr. A.W. Prins and dr. P. Schuurman, considered six possible candidates, namely the essays that were published in the second and third issues of the ESJP. For such an award, congratulations are in order. Daan Gijsbertse is certainly a deserving winner: his essay proved to be able to stand out amongst excellent competitors. We are grateful to the members of the committee for their work, and to the faculty for supplying the financial means that made the award possible. The Pierre Bayle Trophy will be a feature of every July issue, so that each publication from the present issue onward will be eligible.

On a more personal note, I would like to thank prof. dr. J.J. Vromen, dr. P.J.J. Delaere and dr. F.A. Muller for being on our supervisory board, and Ceciel Meiborg for her help with our website. It remains to thank our editors Thijs Heijmeskamp, Myrthe van Nus, Lydia Baan Hofman, Patrick Feddes, Jasper van den Herik and Dennis Prooi for all of their hard work. I would also like to thank Jasper van den Herik and Dennis Prooi for their work on the layout. For Dennis, the fourth issue was his debut, but he has shown himself to be a valuable addition to the editorial board in many ways.

Julien Kloeg
Editor-in-Chief

About the Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy

The Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy (ESJP) is a double-blind peer-reviewed student journal that publishes the best philosophical papers written by students from the Faculty of Philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Its aims are to further enrich the philosophical environment in which Rotterdam's philosophy students develop their thinking and to bring their best work to the attention of a wider intellectual audience. A new issue of the ESJP will appear on our website (see below) every July and December.

To offer the highest possible quality for a student journal, the ESJP only accepts papers that (a) have been written for a course that is part of the Faculty of Philosophy's curriculum and (b) nominated for publication in the ESJP by the teacher of that course. In addition, each paper that is published in the ESJP is first subjected to a double-blind peer review process in which at least one other teacher and two student editors act as referees.

The ESJP highly encourages students to write their papers for courses at our faculty with the goals of publishing in our journal and appealing to a wider intellectual audience in mind.

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In this issue

The fourth issue of the ESJP features contributions that combine themes from various courses in novel and promising ways.

In ‘Respecting Preferences’, Julien Kloeg develops the challenge that preferences pose to theories of justice. He argues that accounts of gender justice rightly consider social mechanisms as part of their analysis, but that the ‘Normative Hierarchy View’ of preferences should be avoided in normative contexts. This sheds light on the relationship between considerations of autonomy and societal impact as a feature of theories of justice.

In ‘The Metaphysical Case against Luck Egalitarianism’, Willem van der Deijl argues that theories of justice should be more attentive to what their normative theories imply about the metaphysical issue of free will. He argues that the group of theories known as luck egalitarianism, which requires a particular account of moral responsibility, is only tenable if its adherents are also libertarians about free will.

In ‘De hybride en zijn ritme’, Monique Goense argues that the hybrid nature of reality cannot be captured by the binary concepts of subject and object. She argues that Deleuze & Guatarri’s concept of rhythm provides a solution and develops the latter into a plea for rhythmic thought and life. This essay is written in Dutch.

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Respecting Preferences

Gender Justice and the Normative Hierarchy View

Julien Kloeg

Theorists of justice have to steer between two rocks. On the one hand, there is the intuition that an individual's morally permitted preferences should be respected: it is not justifiable to intervene with them. On the other hand, such preferences are the result of formation processes, which are notoriously vulnerable to manipulation. Does justice demand respect for preferences that produce or perpetuate injustices, suffered either by the individual herself or by others? In this paper, I will investigate this problem in the context of the ambiguous tenet of neutrality. The field of gender justice has extended Rawlsian theories of justice in order to account for structural factors, such as socialisation. Some theorists have argued that the justice-inhibiting character of some preferences implies that the first intuition should be rejected in favour of the second in some cases, which leads to the conclusion that some preferences are like obstacles standing in the way of justice and should thus be reformed. I will call this the 'Normative Hierarchy View' and argue that it is problematic. It presupposes a certain attitude with respect to those who hold the preferences, which forecloses a politically salient kind of respect. Furthermore, at the more general level, there are at least two major problems with the kind of objectification that is at stake in those accounts: it requires a reduction of practical reason to theoretical reason and is incompatible with the criterion of publicity.

In order to illustrate what is at stake in this paper, I will give an example. We do not even have to leave behind the comfort of our own home in order to encounter the central problem. There is an unjust social tendency, deeply ingrained in modern societies, to view women as being ultimately responsible for housework and childcare, even on top of a full-time job. The men in the family are often prepared to 'help out', but this very phrase suggests that the tasks are not divided evenly. Many women take on a

'second shift' as a result, in effect working two full-time jobs: one as a professional and one as a 'housewife'. This was analysed as a case of injustice in an influential book on the subject (Hochschild & Machen, 2012). I will assume throughout this paper that such situations are indeed unjust.

Let us now imagine a woman who is aware not only of this fact, but also of the sexist history that helped to produce both the tendency and the corresponding behaviours. She may still feel that it *is* in fact ultimately her responsibility to do housework and to take care of the children, so that she will prefer to do all of the work herself rather than 'delegate' it: she may consciously embrace the motives already suggested to her by the social mechanism as her own, and provide legitimate reasons for her preference. Surely, her preference is morally permissible. But there is another side to this story. Decisions such as the one I just described help to perpetuate the unjust social tendency, even if the latter did not motivate the woman in question. Her decision will emphasise the normalcy of viewing women as bearing ultimate responsibility for household and childcare tasks, which means that it will become increasingly difficult for women to take on other roles within the household. Social scientists refer to such mechanisms as forms of entrenchment. What should a theorist of justice do? On the one hand, she will reason that the woman's preference should be respected; on the other hand, she will theorise that it produces injustices insofar as it further entrenches unjust role patterns (in this case) that permeate society. This is clearly a problem, since none of the two intuitions that underlie these responses can be said to automatically trump the other.

In order to treat the problems that arise from these conflicting intuitions, some theoretical background is required. A short consideration of the Rawlsian ideal of neutrality will be followed by a general introduction

to gender justice, considered here as an extension of Rawls's project. The idea is that social mechanisms are more important to justice than the latter appreciated. Some versions of this account embrace the Normative Hierarchy View. Such a view presupposes an objective attitude with respect to preferences, which I will contrast to Ian Carter's notion of opacity respect. The political relevance of the normative hierarchy will be demonstrated by reference to the ascription of false consciousness, which is a prime example of the objective attitude at work. I will also provide two arguments against assuming the objective attitude in political philosophy, both of which build on the work on Immanuel Kant. These arguments will be aimed against the reduction of practical reason to theoretical reason and show that the problematisation of particular preferences is not compatible with the criterion of publicity. In closing, I will propose an alternative view, which does not zoom in on particular preferences, but limits itself to maximally enabling reflexivity.

1. A Dilemma for Theorists of Neutrality

The importance of respecting preferences was established in Rawls's foundational work for contemporary theories of justice. John Rawls's conception of justice includes what he calls the 'priority of the right over the good' (Rawls, 1999: 27-28). Rawls argues that for a society to be just, every individual participating in that society should be free to choose her own version of the good life, as well as the means to attain it. The function of the just society is not to steer the preferences of its residents into any particular direction, but rather to make sure that each resident enjoys equal opportunities to attain whichever goals she chooses. This includes a fair division among citizens of primary goods, that is to say, resources that anyone with what Rawls calls a rational life plan would prefer to have more of rather than less (ibid.: 54-55). What plan an individual chooses, however, is entirely up to her. The Rawlsian approach towards the good life, then, has neutrality as its watchword as far as justice is concerned.

Most contemporary theoreticians have joined Rawls in his plea for neutrality, although many have tried to extend it to domains they thought to be neglected by his theory. For the purposes of this paper, I will like-

wise assume that neutrality is a necessary criterion for principles of justice. However, it should be appreciated that 'neutrality' is a versatile term, which can be applied on many levels. Even for Rawls, neutrality with respect to people's notion of the good necessarily entails a negative attitude towards some states of affairs. For instance, since he is committed to religious neutrality, he will have to condemn theocratic political regimes as essentially unjust. More generally, while neutrality may seem to be a safe option and is sometimes associated with a kind of passivity, principled neutrality entails the denial that any positive argument can be made to decide the issue. In other words, to be neutral as a matter of principle between positions x and y is equivalent to the claim that there can be no philosophical grounds to justifiably prefer x over y , or vice versa – and thus to oppose any claim to the effect that such grounds have been discovered. To the theorist of neutrality, the implication of a non-neutral theory is that it would unjustly allow differential treatment of citizens on the basis of their conformity to the preferred ideal. The supposedly neutral party can thus be expected to wage war anyway, and not only on far fronts. Insofar as the theorist's goal is to bring about social reform in her own society, the elements of that society that do not conform to her political virtue of neutrality are likely to be experienced as obstacles standing in the way of justice.

This may lead to a somewhat paradoxical situation. What if the perceived obstacles include the preferences of an agent belonging to the society in question? In that case, it is unclear what it would mean to be truly neutral. If we take respect for individual preferences to be our most important value, then even preferences that produce or perpetuate injustices will have to be allowed. Thus, neutrality with respect to the aforementioned kind of preferences could lead to a non-neutral and hence unjust society. If we leave the condition of moral permissibility to one side for a moment, it is clear that the above is relevant in blatantly racist cases, for instance: preferences to the effect that members of some ethnic group are to be denied adequate schooling are obviously problematic in the context of justice. The reverse is also true: neutrality with respect to the requirements of justice requires that some preferences be treated non-neutrally. In this case, a certain feature of the just society is deemed more important than respecting all preferences equally, which would presumably be justified by reference to the effects of certain preferences upon society. For example, if racism

is unjust, we will deny card-carrying racists the opportunity to set up a system of education that is based on their specific ideology. This involves withholding from specific groups the right to educate according to one's own principles. In this sense, it constitutes a violation of neutrality.

One aspect of neutrality as an element of justice calls for the sacrifice of another aspect in both of these cases, so that we are faced with a dilemma¹. I believe this tension between different versions of neutrality is an urgent problem for theories of justice that are built around this concept, and one that has not been addressed thus far. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that theorists of justice have either relied fully on the intuition that an individual should be free to hold any morally permissible preference, or focused entirely on the role of societies in the formation of preferences. Theorists of justice have not explored the problems that result from these opposing directions of research. But while it is true that preferences have a highly personal character and should be respected, it is equally true that they have a deep and lasting impact on society.

Before I investigate potential ways to resolve the tension, two qualifications should be made. First, in order to be paradoxical, the problematic preference needs to be politically relevant. Clearly, a desert hermit with strong religious views does not pose a problem. He is entitled to hold any belief. In fact, a Rawlsian version of a just society would provide him with the primary goods needed to support his way of living. However, the problem is only avoided in this case because of the hermit's isolation from the rest of society. His convictions and preferences, as well as the actions that follow from them, are moral, not political. The problem only arises when the non-neutrality has an effect on the wider society. This is so in the case of what I will call a politically relevant preference.

Second, it is not hard to think of cases in the realm of religious convictions and preferences that have far-reaching consequences for society. It is surely unjust to force any individual to kneel before the extremism of others. However, religious extremism is sufficiently openly violent to have been prohibited by law in most countries. I will not argue for a particular position on the relation between law as a societal-corrective device and questions of justice. However, since we are speaking of cases where the theorist aims for social reform, it is clear that we need not discuss prefer-

ences that are already on the social agenda to the extent that they have been criminalized².

At this point, it is possible to doubt the existence of preferences that simultaneously satisfy the criteria of political relevance, legality and non-neutrality. Does contemporary politics effectively silence certain groups, for instance? There is certainly no lack of groups who claim that they are being systematically disadvantaged in this way. While the status of some groups may be under siege by parties on the extreme sides of the political spectrum, legislature itself does not seem to allow for differential treatment. However, the latter qualification above does allow for a proviso. While every person is formally an equal participant in society, it does not follow that society actually treats all of those who participate in it fairly. Consider, for instance, the mentally ill, children, and women. While legislative mechanisms are in place to safeguard their interests (a sceptic might add 'or to keep up the appearance that their interests are taken seriously'), there is a variety of ways in which these mechanisms could fail to lead to the desired result. Perhaps the interests of these groups are misrepresented; perhaps the legislature is adequate in itself, but not enforced properly, etc. Thus, while 'women's issues' are undeniably on the social agenda, that fact is in itself not incompatible with unjust treatment of women. For the groups mentioned and perhaps many others, the case could be made that the real problems have not been adequately dealt with³.

In fact, many theorists explicitly make this case, particularly those operating in the field of gender justice. There is a substantial literature on this subject. Moreover, gender justice theorists have attempted to articulate a way out of the dilemma concerning us here. For these reasons, I have chosen to engage myself exclusively with gender justice rather than with, for instance, mental illness justice.

2. Gender Justice and the Normative Hierarchy View

Inequalities stemming from gender issues were not addressed by the theories of justice devised by Rawls and his followers. Still, the field of gender justice is currently active in criticizing particular features of contemporary society, with many theorists advocating some kind of social

reform (e.g. Gheaus & Robeyns, 2011). The underlying theories of gender justice claim to address injustices that are neglected by ‘classical’ theories, particularly ‘inequalities within the family around the domestic division of labour, especially over child care and other forms of caregiving’ (Brighouse & Wright, 2008: 360). Two further claims have to be made in order to substantiate the need for a gender justice account, the first being that such inequalities are unjust and the second that they are the product of mechanisms that are not given proper theoretical weight in other theories (and that gender justice is able to do so). I will assume the truth of the first claim. The second is central to my purposes here.

The Rawlsian tradition has often been understood in terms of two core attitudes: endowment-insensitivity and ambition-sensitivity (Kymlicka, 1990: 76-85). The endowments, or, more generally, the resources one starts out with in life should not affect one’s entitlements either positively or negatively, whereas the projects that one chooses to pursue during one’s life will mean that one will be entitled to either more or less. In the standard example: if two people start out with two identical plots of land in identical circumstances, the one who cultivates it the most and thus earns more is entitled to her profits. Rawls’s original statement of this distinction is that he aims to correct (only) inequalities that are due to factors he deems ‘contingent from a moral point of view’ (Rawls, 1999: 14). People’s autonomously chosen preferences do not fall into this category, while preferences that are for instance the direct result of growing up in conditions of extreme poverty or affluence would presumably qualify. Gender justice claims that there are important factors that are not captured by this dualism of endowment versus ambition. Of particular importance are processes of preference formation inherent in society. Consider the following case:

[T]he woman involved possesses reasons for acting as she does [i.e. sacrificing her career, JK], and she is fully and vividly aware of the way in which her desires and dispositions have been influenced by processes of socialisation. She rejects the idea that women are primarily responsible for children, but she has a deep desire to devote herself exclusively to raising her children. She acknowledges that socialisation has shaped her very identity, including her deepest needs and desires, to the point of conceding that she may not have had those desires but for her

socialisation. But she still reflectively endorses those needs and desires as her own. [...] It would not seem just to require her to bear the full cost of her decision to look after her children personally, for that would fail to give proper weight to the profound effect of sexist norms and images.’ (Mason, 2000: 242)

These are the elements that are thought to be missing from classical theories of justice: the social mechanisms that shape preferences, such as socialisation and the norms that not only guide such processes, but also assume institutional form and thus an action-guiding and limiting character, partly determining the choices of those for whose lives the norms are of importance. Anca Gheaus gives an example of an injustice that may result from the latter in the context of a discussion about the glass-ceiling effect. It concerns statistical discrimination in labour market situations. As the author explains, ‘if enough women put less time than most men into advancing their careers because they dedicate their time to meeting essential needs of [their] nearest and dearest, it may be reasonable for potential employers to expect *any* woman who has needy dependents to do so’ (Gheaus, 2012: 9; emphasis in the original). Because of the limited knowledge of any employer, this applies whether the woman under consideration accepts the relevant norms or not. What is crucial in such cases is that for the affected groups, ‘access to some central components of most, if not all, individuals’ idea of a good life’ is rendered ‘excessively, and unequally, costly’ (ibid.: 10) by gender norms. This inequality constitutes an injustice.

We now have a general picture of what is at stake in theories of gender justice. Indeed, I can do no better than a general picture, as gender justice is characterised by its internal divisions. In order to specify the kind of gender justice I will have in mind in this paper, I will proceed to summarise the kind of analysis that is characteristic of it.

The central point is that there is a dimension to human existence that escapes classical theories of justice. Preferences like those of the career-sacrificing mother described above may seem innocent and indeed legitimate enough, but because of the gendered society in which her decision to devote herself to raising her children is situated, we should not just ask whether or not she is free to live according to her preferences, but inquire into the wider social effects. Her lifestyle choice ‘has a direct impact in raising the

costs the woman would have to pay in order to (re)join the labour market (if she stays at home), or to engage in a more successful career (if she works part-time); it also has an indirect effect on the costs other women will have to pay for access to the labour market by validating, and thus entrenching, gender norms, including those that lead to unconscious and statistical discrimination of women' (Gheaus, 2012: 21). Therefore, from the viewpoint of gender justice, the costs of a 'gender-neutral' lifestyle should be lowered relative to gendered lifestyles as much as is possible (ibid.: 16, 21). For the purposes of this paper, gender neutrality as an ideal can be thought of in quite general terms as the extension of the Rawlsian idea of neutrality to domains that Rawls never theorised on: in this case, the specific problems raised by relations between the genders.

This kind of analysis fulfils the criteria established in the first section: it is deemed problematic that formation processes exert influence over the preferences women come to hold in ways that lead to injustices. This fulfils the criterion of non-neutrality on some level, because neutrality with respect to preferences is sacrificed here for neutrality on the level of the just society. Furthermore, the decision of the career-sacrificing mother is a prime example of a politically relevant preference because of its entrenching effect. Secondly, it is morally and legally unproblematic. Finally, the authors discussed strive for some kind of social reform.

This way of theorizing is one way of resolving the tension that was signalled at the very beginning of this paper. If we are serious about creating a (gender-)neutral society, it follows that some preferences, namely those which can be explained by reference to formation processes of a particular kind, are not worthy of the same respect as other preferences. Notice that this is true for the arguments presented here only in a very subtle way. They do not implore us to remove individuals with certain preferences from society: they only implore us to remove them from the *ideally just* society. Nevertheless, it does follow that their preferences are, in the earlier sense, like obstacles standing in the way of justice. It would be better (from the viewpoint of justice, at least: there may be overriding reasons to be addressed in other domains) if they were not there⁴.

Let us assume for the sake of the argument that the effect of norms on preferences is sociologically observable. This hardly seems a problematic

assumption: in fact, we may wonder whether *any* preference would exist without such formation processes. As the literature on gender justice suggests, preferences are not 'given' in any sense – rather, they are produced and are self-reproducing because of their entrenching effects. These two dimensions of preferences correspond to a view of them as respectively having been caused and themselves being the cause of other (similar) social phenomena. Gender justice theorists think of preferences in these terms: because they were formed in a certain kind of society, they were decisively influenced by some pre-existing form of sexism and will perpetuate gendered practices at the expense of women in the future. There are preferences that do not have this unjust kind of structure or impact: on that basis, we can establish a normative hierarchy of preferences. Morally permitted preferences that have justice-inhibiting qualities are on the 'wrong' end of the scale; those that are neutral with respect to justice are somewhere in the middle; and those that promote justice are to be found in the higher regions of the scale. I will refer to this view of preferences as a feature of some theories of gender justice as 'the Normative Hierarchy View' (NHV). For the sake of clarity, I will recapitulate its main points. A proponent of NHV subscribes to the following tenets:

- i) Preferences are subject to formation processes;
- ii) Preferences have a societal impact;
- iii) It is possible for a particular morally permitted preference either to (a) have unjust societal consequences, (b) to be neutral with respect to justice or (c) to be justice-promoting;
- iv) When it has unjust societal consequences, the preference itself is like an obstacle standing in the way of justice;
- v) Thus, justice requires that the societal impact of preferences with unjust societal consequences be altered. This is to be done by social reform aimed at influencing particular formation processes.

The normative hierarchy itself groups preferences together on the basis of their consequences in terms of justice. It maps them onto a normative scale. This is needed because in order to effectuate the right kinds of social reform, it will first have to be known how particular preferences 'rank' when seen from the point of view of justice.

3. A reconsideration of Strawson-objectivity

The establishment of such a hierarchy with a view to promote one kind of preferences at the cost of another kind presupposes the assumption of a certain attitude towards the individuals that hold them. Peter Strawson has considered the question of proper attitudes in normative contexts, namely in the context of morality and free will. He distinguishes between the attitude of 'involvement or participation' and 'what might be called the objective attitude' (Strawson, 1974: 9). I will first briefly describe Strawson's account of these 'reactive attitudes' and then try to incorporate it into political philosophy.

Strawson's objective and participatory attitudes are types of reactions to behaviour: 'the compulsive behaviour of the neurotic' and 'the tiresome behaviour of a very young child' (Strawson, 1974: 10) call for a kind of distance that leads us to judge these kinds of behaviour differently: this is what he calls objectivity. If an individual is a neurotic or a child, as in these examples, this serves to qualify the extent to which she is subject to blame. It is as if, by assuming the objective attitude, we relieve her of some of the duties that usually attach to human existence.

My concern is political rather than moral. Although Strawson's original concept of objectivity may indeed be proper in the context of social policy as opposed to the personal realm, I will attempt to reinvent his distinction in such a way that it applies within the political realm itself. This implies, for our purposes, that there are policy situations where the objective attitude should not be assumed. The altered version of Strawson-objectivity I have in mind will draw on Ian Carter's (2012) introduction of the notion of the objective attitude in the context of political philosophy, as well as on his proposed alternative. It is this political notion of the objective attitude that will be applied to the dilemma I started out with. To recapitulate: the ideal of neutrality is ambiguous in the context of preferences. In particular, theorists of justice have to choose between neutrality with respect to preferences on the one hand, and neutrality as relevant to the just society on the other. We have seen that NHV solves the dilemma by preferring the just society to have equal respect for preferences: in other words, if particular preferences are obstacles standing in the way of justice, then they should be reformed.

This idea of the desirability of reform casts those whose preferences would be reformed in a certain light. It should be clear that I do not advocate that policymakers should view the objects of their policies in the same way they view their friends. Nor will I comment on the perception any theorist has of her own work, as either an 'objective' or intersubjective contribution to science or philosophy. The point is rather that to assume the objective attitude with respect to individually held preferences is to conceive of them as matters to be 'cured or trained', so that we can at most 'pretend to reason' with those who hold the preferences insofar as we view them objectively (cf. Strawson, 1974: 10). This is the common denominator of the moral and the political use of the concept 'objective attitude': in the case of the neurotic or the child, we recognise that their subjectivity only problematically allows for the usual judgments of blame. I will argue that NHV likewise problematises the subjectivity of individuals.

Three steps are to be taken in order to evaluate what the consequences of Strawson's distinction are for our case. First, the argument that I will develop presupposes that NHV is characterised by the objective attitude. Second, I will proceed to investigate and assess Ian Carter's explicit rejection of the objective attitude in the context of political philosophy. Third, I will proceed to what is perhaps the most (historically) significant instantiation of Strawson-objectivity in the context of politics: the ascription of false consciousness. The comparison between particular versions of gender justice and Marxism will serve to highlight some important features of the political variety of Strawson-objectivity, as well as reveal some problems.

To establish that NHV does indeed assume an objective attitude, I need to consider the way it conceives of the preferences it deems problematic. It seems clear that with respect to structurally biased preferences, NHV attempts to supply reasons in order to reform such preferences, and to remove the elements of society that have produced them. Because this applies to some, but not all preferences, we are left with a normative hierarchy. Curing and training is all that can be done. In this analysis, preferences are constituted by their history in such a way that even the reasons that are supplied in support of them are seen as derivative of social mechanisms. We can surely not say that those who hold preferences on the 'wrong' end of the scale are given a fair hear-

ing on this account. If we consider preferences to be comprised of both their content and their history, then, indeed, NHV is characterised by an objective attitude towards them.

This leads me to consider a contrasting account of how political philosophy should approach preferences. Carter (2012) argues that respect of the kind that is needed to ground egalitarianism is possible only if there is no concern for ‘internal constraints within particular agents’: from the point of view of institutions, we should only consider the ‘outward dignity’ of individuals. That is to say, in order to ascribe ‘dignity as an agential capacity’ to any individual we do have to establish whether a minimum of empirical conditions obtain, but not *to what degree*⁵. An example is in order here. Let us suppose that for an individual to count as equal to all others, she will have to possess rationality. It would now suffice for an individual to possess rationality above a certain minimum in order to be treated as an equal. This cut-off point is necessitated by the fact that going beyond this, that is, trying to account for *degrees* of rationality, leads to the conclusion that there is no basis to view all individuals as equals (Carter, 2012: 559, 558, 541ff.). After all, not all individuals are created equally rational. In order for egalitarianism to be justified, then, individuals should be granted the right to ‘conceal’⁶ features of themselves (for instance, to what degree they are rational, above a certain minimum) from policymakers. Carter goes on to reflect on the virtue of a certain kind of political blindness:

‘The ethical commitment not to expose agents to [a problematisation of their subjectivity, JK] is illustrated by the high value that political liberals place on liberty in the negative sense of the term. Negative liberty is normally thought of as the absence of constraints that originate “outside” the agent. Positive conceptions of liberty, by contrast, take into account constraints that have their origin “inside” the agent —constraints like weakness of the will, the endorsement of distorted or illusory value perspectives, or the propensity to make choices that are irrational and/or influenced by various alien forces. As a result of their focus on the external conditions of freedom, liberals are often accused of short sightedness, of being “blind” to those less obvious internal constraints on freedom that are visible only to the more penetrating eyes of the advocate of positive liberty. But the blindness is deliberate, the lack of penetration a conscious [...] stance.’ (Carter, 2012: 558-559)

In order to see how this affects our investigation of gender justice, we need only to consider that the analysis required by NHV is precisely of the ‘internal’ kind, bearing on particular preferences. It does not seem unwarranted to assert that the gender-problematic preferences fall into the category of ‘endorsement of distorted value perspectives’. Thus, we could apply Carter’s analysis to contend that in order to apply a normative scale to an individual’s preferences, we would already have to withhold from them the respect they are due. Carter (2012: 559) calls this kind of respect ‘opacity respect’ and remarks that ‘adopting [...] what Strawson called an “objective attitude”’ is a violation of it. Indeed, it seems clear that seeing certain people as objects in need of repair is a problematisation of their subjectivity and that on Carter’s account, there are good reasons to resist such an attitude in the context of political philosophy.

One may object that this analysis departs from a very particular notion of respect. Carter thinks it is required in order to provide a sound basis for egalitarianism, but perhaps his argument is flawed, or there are other such bases, or perhaps egalitarianism is best avoided. We should recognise, however, that it is plausible that opacity respect is a salient kind of respect, as it is possible to argue that political relations could in general be described as requiring opacity respect. To give some examples of this: we do not expect the state to form judgments as to the degree in which we are capable of, for example, casting sufficiently informed votes, making rational decisions, adopting the right goals, choosing the right partners, having children at the most suitable moment in our lives (cf. Carter, 2012: 554 f.). The state’s occasional failure to respect its boundaries has provoked Elizabeth Anderson into exclaiming: ‘How dare the state pass judgments on its citizens’ worth as workers and lovers!’ (Anderson, 1999: 305). The importance of such a demarcation between the domains of competence of the individual and those of the state is entirely consistent with the Rawlsian framework assumed by this paper, and with liberal political philosophy more generally. Of course, this is precisely the reason why some gender justice theorists would reject Carter’s account: liberalism will not do. However, the discussion of Carter does show that many ‘common sense’ views on political relations and perhaps the basis of egalitarianism itself depend, to some degree, on a rejection of Strawson-objective attitudes. What remains to be seen is what an application of Strawson-objectivity in the context of politics would entail.

Like the Strawson-objective attitude, opacity respect requires a certain kind of distance. The two kinds of distance in play, however, are very different from one another. While Strawson-objectivity concerns treating individuals in a way that partially robs them of their humanity, opacity respect ignores certain features of human beings as a matter of principle in order to treat them as fully human, a trait they have in common with all other humans. Especially when applied to my case, that of preferences, a remarkable reversal can be seen: the Strawson-objective attitude starts out with the observation that particular preferences lead to injustice. Hence, justice requires that such preferences be reformed. The distance required in order to exercise opacity respect, by contrast, refuses to take particular facts about individuals into consideration, because it values the conclusion that all are, in fact, equal for political purposes. While Carter's attempt to provide a solid basis for egalitarianism provides a useful contrast to Strawson-objectivity, an example from politics itself will shed further light on its political variety. By presenting it, I want to highlight the applicability of the concept, and also to discuss a case of Strawson-objectivity that is politically problematic.

A particularly political hierarchy of preferences was established in the context of Marxism. The concept of false consciousness was invoked in order to explain why some had heard the objective truth of Marxism, but had not been persuaded by it. In this way, the ascription of false consciousness is part of ideology critique⁷, of which Peter Sloterdijk (1983: 54) has stated that it necessarily entails an 'objectification' of the opponent. This is so because in order to engage in ideology critique, we have to provide an explanation for the opponent's position that operates behind her consciousness, thus stripping her of her subjectivity. After all, one is never *consciously* helpless to fend off the influence of an intruding ideology, so that someone will have to point it out to us that we are in its grasp, though purely rational means may not suffice in such cases (cf. Kloeg, 2011: 7f.). In the context of gender justice, we may say that someone who spends enough time under the influence of gender-biased media is likely to take on a gender-biased position herself, even without her knowing it. If such influences exist, then rational argumentation will not be sufficient to counteract them. Again, we can at most 'pretend to reason' with such a person, and will finally resort to 'curing or training' her (cf. Strawson 1974: 10)⁸. Clearly, then, the ascription of false consciousness is a prime example of the objective attitude, and one history

has shown to be quite problematic. Again, to invoke this kind of explanation is to cast 'dissenters' in a certain light. There are at least two major arguments to be made against such an approach.

4. Moral personality

Carter's account described above presents us with an argument from egalitarianism, which establishes the conclusion that a politically salient kind of respect is violated if we assume a Strawson-objective attitude. In this section, I will develop arguments to the effect that human moral personality exceeds any set of statements of fact about human beings, building on the work of Immanuel Kant. These arguments combine well with Carter's view that moral personality supervenes on empirical qualities (we have considered rationality), which offers a way to make empirical science relevant for political philosophy. I want to have my cake and eat it too: empirical science is indeed relevant, but moral personality still needs to be distinguished from empirical matters. The two sets of arguments do not depend on each other, but should be viewed as complementary objections against Strawson-objectivity in general and NHV in particular.

My strategy consists of two parts. First, I will consider the reduction of practical reason to theoretical reason. Political philosophy is not just a description of what is the case in the world, but is inherently normative. It therefore seems that more than just (empirical) statements of fact are relevant in this context. NHV incorporates empirical facts too directly, or so I will argue. Second, I will proceed to consider this reduction in the light of the criterion of publicity, which states that principles of justice should be able to generate their own support if they were made public.

4.1 The reduction of practical reason to theoretical reason

There is a difficulty stemming from an all too direct use of empirical data concerning preference formation in the context of practical philosophy. I have already considered an elaboration of the case of a career-sacrificing mother who 'possesses reasons for acting as she does', but is not to be held fully accountable for her decision, because of the influence of sexist norms

and images (Mason, 2000: 242). Such an analysis suggests that if structural factors could be made to impact the mother's decision differently, she would be more likely to decide differently as a result. She would presumably also offer different reasons in support of her way of life. In other words, the reasons she offers vary with the kind of structure that shaped them. Her reasons do have causal power in the sense that her behaviour can be explained in part by reference to them, but it is very possible to regard the content of her reasons as having themselves been caused by structural factors.

The picture thus painted requires that we think of individuals, their particular preferences and the reasons offered in support as products of structural features of their environments. Of course, the theorist of justice is also in the business of offering reasons, albeit in a more theoretical and systematized fashion. It is surely the latter characteristic of her reasoning to which a theorist would point if asked why her arguments should be accepted at all: science can offer us a larger perspective, thus increasing our understanding of the world. But what if her scientific arguments clash with the morally permitted preferences of individuals? The only 'scientific' response is to reduce the domain of their practical reasoning to underlying societal patterns that can be empirically observed. We could wonder whether such a reduction has normative consequences. Immanuel Kant has argued that even complete predictability of an agent's conduct would not be a sufficient condition for the rejection of freedom, conceived of as a practical postulate:

'If it were possible for us to have so deep an insight into a man's character as shown both in inner and in outer actions, that every, even the least, incentive to these actions and all external occasions which affect them were so known to us that his future conduct could be predicted with as great a certainty as the occurrence of a solar or lunar eclipse, we could nevertheless still assert that the man is free.' (Kant, 1788/1949: 204-205)

Thus, Kant hammers home the point that there is a difference between the theoretical and the practical perspective. The most radical consequence of his view that *Sein* (the constitution of reality) occupies a different realm

than *Sollen* (moral obligation) is that we may not infer an instance of the latter from any particular matter of fact⁹. For our purposes, it would follow that whether or not structural factors can reliably predict an agent's choices, we should still consider her to be free in the practical sense needed to apply normative criteria. In the words of Rawlsian liberalism: to uphold such an image of the free agent in the face of what might seem to be watertight empirical explanations of behaviour is 'political, not metaphysical'¹⁰. We should conceive of other people as being able to act freely: if not, then we deny they have a capacity to act morally, i.e. to make their own choices, thus robbing them of their dignity. Kant puts it as follows: '[M]orality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in himself [...]. Thus morality, and humanity as capable of it, is that which alone has dignity' (Kant, 1785/2008: 73).

There is another conclusion to be drawn here. It follows from Kant's well known formula that 'no agent should ever be treated solely as a means, but always also as an end in himself' (Kant, 1785/2008: 65) that it is immoral to view the actions of particular individuals, let alone human agency in general, as being determined by external causes, or as heteronomous, rather than by their own autonomy. This is so because the heteronomous human being cannot be said to possess dignity, at least according to Kant.

There is surely a sense in which he was right. From the perspective of justice, reducing practical reasoning to a set of empirical conditions is a *carte blanche* to fans of paternalism, who are free to explore the consequences of a human species incapable of being an end in itself – so that a human being is now merely a means. To forego the category of autonomy in political philosophy in this way¹¹, while at the same time continuing to formulate substantive normative guidelines (as ends) is to turn the tables on the idea of neutrality. For if we would demand compliance to these normative guidelines, we would deny those affected by them the opportunity to relate to them in a meaningful way. Instead of heeding their words of protest, we would have to tweak them into compliance, as Strawson might have put it. Thus, the right to determine the meaning of a good life, which was, according to Rawlsian neutrality, the prerogative of individuals, has now been transferred to those in a position to

manipulate others. Politics has been transformed into social engineering and solutions to problems of injustice will have to be phrased in terms of the latter¹².

At this point, one may object that I am presupposing that the political philosopher has a particular role to play in society. This may or may not be warranted, the critic continues, but in this case it is problematic because it is not the role that gender justice theorists themselves see as properly theirs. My earlier claim that Strawson-objectivity is not concerned with the view any theorist has of her own work now seems problematic. In order to reply to this line of criticism, I will give an overview of possible conceptions of the role of political philosophy and consider whether any of them affects my argument, and if so, in what way. We should begin by remembering that proponents of NHV see some preferences as problematic and advocate the solution that they be reformed in some way: but how should we understand this call for reform? The three possible conceptions I will consider are to be understood in terms of the role political philosophy has to play in relation to public debate.

The first conception of the role of political philosophy is that it should overrule public debate completely. No matter what the prevalent values of a given society are, philosophy should tell us, for every political problem, what the best solution is. It is clear that my argument works in this case, because political philosophy would completely ignore the autonomy of individuals. Potentially, it would oppress and manipulate them. In another vocabulary: this approach is completely top-down.

The second is that political philosophy should clarify or regulate public debate. In both of these capacities, political philosophy is able to judge public debate and function as a kind of referee. Thus, while the philosopher does recognise its value, she simultaneously places herself outside of it. This a hybrid form, which recognises that political philosophy cannot supply all values, but still sees it as its task to comment on the way values have been shaped within a given society. This conception, like the first, would phrase the solution to societal problems in terms that presuppose Strawson-objectivity. The political philosopher enjoys a privileged position and knows best as a result.

The third is that the political philosopher should ‘merely’ participate in public debate, that is to say, consider herself to be on equal footing with any other participant (‘all votes to count as one’). This approach is completely bottom-up. Would it make my argument problematic? The intended impact of a philosophical position should be distinguished from its contents: and I think that in this case my argument is justifiably applied to the contents regardless of the intended impact. Even if we conceive of NHV as nothing but a template for discussion, its contribution to any actual discussion would still consist in a reduction of the practical reason of some individuals to theoretical reason. This is equally true for all three conceptions.

I have by no means provided a complete overview, but I think the above considerations make it plausible that my argument does not depend on theorists’ views on the role of political philosophy in society.

A further point should be made here. In some cases it seems perfectly legitimate for a gender justice theorist to advance reasons why particular preferences should be reformed. Let us imagine a theorist speaking at a conference in an attempt to convince her audience to be mindful of the unwanted societal consequences of some morally permitted preferences. She may well point to particular kinds of preferences as examples. I readily concede that this kind of setting evades my argument, but only because of a change of scenario: the theorist at the conference is not discussing the just society, whereas this is precisely the point of NHV. The latter requires that particular preferences be identified and grouped together on the basis of their consequences in terms of justice. If a preference is identified as having unjust societal consequences, NHV prescribes social reform. At this point, we should recognize that advocating political measures (such as social reform) is not on a par with exchanging arguments with individuals. Gender justice theorists generally recognize this distinction: it is no coincidence that they phrase their solutions in terms of social reform. In particular, NHV does not advise us to argue with every individual whose preferences have unjust consequences. This is understandable, because in some cases the willingness of an individual to accept conclusions may itself be influenced by preference formation processes: I have already pointed out that according to NHV the reasons offered by individuals will vary

with the kind of structure that shaped them (reasoned arguments are insufficient when gender-biased media exert decisive influence, to recall an earlier example). But it also means that NHV assumes a Strawson-objective attitude and is thus susceptible to my argument.

4.2 The criterion of publicity

The criterion of publicity requires principles of justice to be able to generate their own support if they are made public: if the general population resists the principle, this tells us that the latter does not really promote justice. The criterion was introduced into political philosophy by Immanuel Kant (1795/1984) and is also a component of Rawls's theory of justice. Let us assume that it is indeed a criterion for principles of justice. Strawson-objective attitudes in the context of justice are then problematic. To invoke an objective explanation for a set of preferences and then to claim that the composition of the set should be altered requires not only the reduction put forward in the previous paragraphs, but also a normative scale that orders preferences in terms of their desirability. If we assume that individuals are born into different sets of circumstances, and display a wide variety of preferences, there will be individuals whose way of life is to be found at the wrong end of that scale. No matter how they react, they will incur costs as a result. Either they will switch lifestyles when confronted with the scale, thus having to live in ways that they are not optimally suited for because of their past lives, or they will have to come to terms with the higher price tag henceforth attached to their preferred way of life. Perhaps an example will serve to make this clear: an individual may have a strong preference, say the idea that motherhood and the pursuit of a career are compatible, and have invested a lot of time and effort into a lifestyle that is built on this idea. Its rejection would thus require that she forfeit her investments and, additionally, invest additional resources into a new way of life. This may entail re-education and a switch from one social group to the other, for instance. If she does not choose to reject the idea, she will likewise incur costs when the scale is applied.

Perhaps even more crucially, there is also the matter of principles. Those who do not already live 'neutral' lives would be exposed to treat-

ment that can be compared to the examples that Wolff (1998) describes as instances of 'shameful revelation'. While it can be humiliating to have to reveal that one lacks talents others have, it is surely no less humiliating to have to admit to oneself (let alone to others) that one's preferences go against the interests of other groups. Let us revisit the idea of the compatibility of motherhood with the pursuit of a career. It would surely be an immense blow to the values of those living in modern Western societies, whether they are themselves mothers or not, if such a preference turned out to be the dubious product of prior circumstances. More generally, assuming that the causal link between an agent's environment and her preferences is tenable, such an instance of shameful revelation would signify that the way the individual (say, the mother pursuing a career) has been brought up was wrong, that at least many of the influences that she internalized have led her astray. Like the talents we lack, the circumstances into which we are born are not the product of our choices. It may be more meaningful to insist on the reverse claim that our circumstances selected many of our characteristics for us. If this holds for those preferences that are of great importance to us, and it is subsequently declared that our preferences are harmful to society, this is likely to be somewhat of a shock. Any institution that would attempt to justify such a position would surely meet with resistance of those who are affected. Imagine what a letter from the Equality Board¹³ on this subject might say:

To those who do not already live as prescribed by recent policy measures: we feel sorry to inform you that the way you choose to conduct your life, as well as your preferences more generally, can ultimately be explained by reference to the environment in which they were shaped, and that this has proven to be an influence that leads you to prefer ways of life that lead to social injustices. Perhaps your upbringing was wrong, or perhaps you were exposed to other corrosive influences. We would like to emphasise that you cannot be blamed for the way you turned out. The EB will endeavour to provide you with opportunities to eradicate the older influences in favour of better ones as soon as possible. We will also provide specially tailored schooling for your children in order to compensate for the influence your current lifestyle has to date exerted on them, and perhaps will continue to exert on them in the future.

Many people would be enraged if such a letter were to fall on their doorstep, whether or not their lifestyle actually conflicted with the principles embraced by their government. The point is not only that we would feel humiliated if addressed in such a manner ourselves, but also that no one should be treated in this way. No government would dare to send a letter like this, no matter how carefully worded. So perhaps its officials would try to keep their measures quiet. They would have to depoliticise their own actions, treating the results as anonymous forces rather than the result of reasoned political decisions. The very fact that they could not be made public may lead us to pursue several lines of argument. We could follow Rawls, and reason that a political structure that embraces principles unfit for publication is unstable because the principles will shape society in ways that do not correspond to citizens' wishes in this respect, thus leaving them with a disincentive to participate in social cooperation on a state-level (Rawls, 1999: 15, 153-158), perhaps preferring to form fringe groups directed at political reform. To put it more simply, we should not expect those who have been exposed to this kind of measure, whether explicitly or only by perceiving their effects, to cooperate with the political actor responsible for them as if nothing had happened. Kant (1795/1984: 50) takes an even more principled stance, stating that 'all actions relating to the right of other human beings are wrong if their maxim is incompatible with publicity'.

Again, it seems that these arguments have some force. The objective attitude is typically assumed in cases where we feel a certain kind of reaction is called for. Revealing cases where the objective attitude is appropriate are Strawson's examples of the neurotic and the young child. If we are indeed to approach individuals with certain sets of preferences in a similar way, it seems that both Rawls's and Kant's arguments obtain. Whether policymakers would be quiet about the objective attitude they assume or not, the latter would indeed count as a disincentive to participate in social cooperation, and referring to the general population in such terms would indeed seem to constitute a wrong. This is all the more apparent if we remind ourselves that the preferences under consideration are morally uncontroversial.

I think these arguments show that the problem presented by preferences cannot be solved by NHV. More generally, every theory of justice that depends on the assumption of an objective attitude will have to ward off these very arguments, cashed out in a way that depends on the specific theory at issue.

5. The search for alternatives

We should thus avoid Strawson-objectivity when thinking about justice. In the context of moral philosophy, this attitude is akin to 'keeping one's distance' as a means to suspend harsh judgments on those who we feel cannot be held responsible for their actions. In political philosophy, the requirement to keep one's distance, that is to abstain from judging factors internal to the agent, actually precludes the kind of diagnosis that would be needed in order to assume an objective attitude. If we start by assuming that some particular preferences need to be fixed, reformed, and the like, we run into the objections envisaged in this paper.

If my account is convincing, we are left to wonder what alternatives to pursue. Preferences seem to pose a fundamental challenge to 'classical' theories of justice, as was recognised by the gender justice theorists I discussed: but if their accounts can, in turn, be justifiably argued against, as I have tried to do, then it seems we have reached an impasse. Surely it is not desirable to return to a theory of justice that takes individual preferences at face value? It seems intuitive that the (empirical) observations that motivate gender justice should affect our thinking about social reforms, particularly if we are political philosophers. Is there a third way?

I believe that Carter can point us to a possible solution. He advocates 'an indirect pursuit of equality', which he takes to describe practices that aim to make the distribution of resources (very broadly construed: I will use the ability to make informed decisions as an example shortly) as equal as possible 'without assessing the degrees to which individuals [currently] possess' the relevant resources (Carter, 2012: 562). We need only refrain from such assessment if the resources are of the 'internal' kind (ibid.). The focus should be on 'other goods, the distribution of which is in some way empirically correlated' to the distribution of the resources under

consideration (ibid). Institutions should try to create circumstances that will generally foster the positive freedom of individuals, while abstaining from the identification of particular constraining factors. The amelioration of societies should thus be based on considerations of a general nature (cf. ibid.: 559). To give an example of how this works: if a policymaker wants all citizens to be equally able to make informed decisions, her first step should not be to assess the degrees to which each individual is capable of doing so currently. Instead, she should try to establish empirical correlations. Let us assume empirical studies find that adequate schooling generally enables one to make informed decisions. In that case, the policymaker should aim to provide adequate schooling for all citizens in order to achieve her original goal.

I am here advocating that Carter's approach to distributive questions be applied to the case of preferences. By taking this route, we can do the extremely valuable empirical work of establishing correlations, but without using the particularities of the data to directly inform our theory of justice, which would imply the assumption of an objective attitude.

The empirical work would surely (need to) shed light on preferences and formation processes. But we need to be careful when drawing the normative consequences from such information, because preferences are indeed of the internal kind. An indirect pursuit of justice is called for in response to the societal impact of preferences. Such a pursuit should not begin by seeing certain kinds of morally permitted preferences as problems to be solved, but theorise instead on considerations of a more general nature. At present, I can do no more than offer my own intuitions and give some examples as to how the alternative approach might work. Further research has to be done in order to substantiate what now remains a somewhat speculative proposal.

The ability to reflect on one's preferences will generally enable one to take the societal consequences of one's preferences into account, while also mediating the influence of antecedent formative processes. Intuitively, if more individuals would possess this ability, society would become more just, because it is precisely the ease with which societal consequences are overlooked and the self-perpetuating force of formative processes that lead to the kind of injustice I have considered throughout this paper.

This intuitive link between the ability to be reflexive and just outcomes, if convincing, should motivate us to seek out empirical correlations. Consider, for instance, the courses on comparative religion that are sometimes taught in schools. The realisation that there are other profound religions enables someone who has been raised in a strictly Christian environment, for example, to reflect on beliefs and practices that would otherwise have been taken for granted (or rejected out of hand). A similar course could be offered as part of a social science curriculum: one that covers different ways of seeing the relations between the genders in a fair and balanced way. Someone who has been raised in a gender-biased background may take pause to reflect: the most important thing is that she will be able to do so. We have seen the concept of distance at work in both Strawson and Carter: the ability to assume a (reflexive) distance towards one's own preferences is the third branch on that tree.

None of this is to say that preferences that have been reflected upon are in any way better than other preferences, or that reflection should be made obligatory. I have been describing the merits of an ability, not of an actual practice. Nor am I assuming that everyone will be completely convinced by the cause of gender justice, or by any other position, for opposing positions will also be expounded. After all, the student who was raised as a Muslim or an atheist will also learn about Christianity, and the feminist student will also learn about more traditional ways. Finally, it is not possible for earlier formative processes to be cancelled out entirely, so that they will continue to exert some influence. But, given that the resulting preferences are morally permissible, why would we want to cancel out entirely the processes that produced them?

The point is that the ability to reflect on one's preferences allows one to take on a more neutral perspective with respect to the preferences themselves. It is precisely the kind of neutrality that Rawlsians and gender justice theorists alike embrace as their political ideal: seeing beyond one's own particular interests and taking alternative points of view equally seriously. This kind of approach would avoid the charge of objectification because no one is deciding on the relative (de)merit of any given preference. Instead, I am recommending that the freedom (not) to adopt any preference be enlarged to the highest possible degree by presenting as

many alternatives as possible in a fair and balanced way. I think we can hope to solve the second shift and career-sacrificing mother cases only by maximally enabling 'second shifters', career-sacrificing mothers and all those who help to shape the lives of both (for instance, those who share a household with them) to reflect on the preferences involved and the resulting ways of life.

Of course, there are many ways to incorporate this account into a theory of justice, so that the sketch presented in this section is by no means a full-fledged theory. While this paper did not set out to develop a complete theory of justice, my hope is that it has cleared the way for other papers to do so. One of the most important remaining tasks is to provide a precise definition of reflexivity and to develop the intuitions and hypothetical empirical correlations that I have put on the table.

At this stage, however, I find it likely that an adequate theory of justice would involve some kind of unconditionality. The theory could not proceed in terms of the identification of individuals and their differential properties (including preferences) in a direct way, imparting benefits to the group on the 'right' side of the threshold, and not the other. A popular move is to compensate only those disadvantaged individuals who are not themselves responsible for their disadvantaged position. However, it is not up to theories of justice to make such distinctions of responsibility¹⁴, which does not preclude that such distinctions may be of value in another way.

Conclusion

Preferences are a problem for theories of justice, because they are personal and deserving of respect on the one hand, and have a deep and lasting impact on society on the other. In response to the ensuing dilemma, proponents of NHV have argued that justice requires the reform of particular preferences, namely those that can be found at the wrong end of the normative hierarchy. According to my analysis, this presupposes Strawson-objectivity: individuals are seen as having preferences that need to be cured or trained. Ian Carter's notion of opacity respect supplies an alternative, so that Strawson-objective accounts of intuitions may be countered by invoking Carter. He argues that the kind of diagnosis required in order to

assume such an attitude already requires a violation of a politically salient kind of respect. Furthermore, at the more general level, there are at least two major problems with the kind of objectification that is at stake in those accounts: it requires a reduction of practical reason to theoretical reason and is incompatible with the criterion of publicity.

While NHV is an attempted solution to problems that are very real, I have concluded that its stress on the societal impact of preferences leads its proponents to forego the personal aspect of preferences. I have argued that autonomy should not be sacrificed in this way. It is also clear, however, that the (empirical) observations that inspired the accounts of gender justice reveal striking injustices. As a possible way out of this impasse, I have taken Carter's argument that equality should be pursued indirectly and applied it to preferences. I have concluded that particular preferences should not occupy theories of justice, but that in general, we should pursue justice indirectly by maximally enabling reflexivity. What this entails in specific cases will depend to some extent on the notion of reflexivity that is adopted.

Preferences need to be addressed by theories of justice – but addressed with much care.

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Editorial note:

Since this essay was written by a member of the editorial board of the Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy, it was subject to a more extensive review procedure. For more information, see <http://www.eur.nl/fw/english/esjp/submissions>.

Notes

1. The dilemma is similar to the potential conflict between fairness and respect as described by Wolff (1998, 2010), and with the so-called 'liberal paradox' of whether or not to tolerate the intolerant. However, in our case, respect does not essentially apply to the status of persons, but to their preferences. We will see what exactly this entails in the context of our discussion of gender justice.
2. In the next paragraph, I suggest there is a gap between an issue's being on the social agenda and its being effectively counteracted. However, we should also note that there may be preferences on the societal agenda that have been criminalized, for instance, the criminalisation of homosexual acts and relationships. This entails that even though the social status of a preference is an important heuristic device, we have to be able and willing to re-examine cases where we have intuitions or reasons to think that a given preference requires philosophical examination.
3. Perhaps, as suggested by the idea of 'repressive tolerance', the popular illusion that feminism has accomplished its goals itself contributes to the continued subjection of women, because their position in modern societies is no longer seen as problematic.
4. That is to say, the preferences as they are (including their history in terms of gender formation processes) are an object of criticism for 'extended' theories of justice. I will speak of 'preferences' in this sense for the remainder of the paper.
5. Carter uses the notion of 'range properties': for an explanation of the kind of property he has in mind, see Carter (2012: 548-550) and Rawls (1999: 443).
6. Carter insightfully compares this to Thomas Nagel's (2002) notion of concealment as a basic human need.
7. Similarly, some feminists find an explanation for its only partial success in the fact that society is shaped and continues to be shaped in ways that counteract the basic tenets of feminism, so that even most members of the group whose interests it represents have internalised justice-inhibiting norms and acquired justice-inhibiting preferences.
8. Another way to look at it would be as follows: if we come to the conclusion that her position is wrong, but are unable to convince her by our arguments, then there must be some factor that is inhibiting her judgment. This kind of analysis is characteristic of the ascription of false consciousness, but not of the assumption of the objective attitude in general.
9. Moore (1903) is the canonical work in the later tradition; for a dissenting view, see Searle (1964). I will assume throughout this paper that there is in fact a difference between *Sein* and *Sollen*.
10. See Rawls (1993).
11. Autonomy may, of course, enter at a later stage, such as Rawls's 'reflexive equilibrium' (1999, e.g. 18-19 and 42-45). My contention is specifically that it should be part of considerations of justice itself.

12. Compare the following analysis of the 'expert state': 'Everything transpires as though the [just] law could be read in the open book of society's statistics or on a world map' (Rancière, 1992: 253).

13. The letter is inspired by similar ones composed by Anderson (1999: 305), which inform citizens that they were selected for compensation because of their lack of talent, disability, or ugliness. Anderson speaks of a 'State Equality Board', but we may equally think of an institution or an association of citizens.

14. Compare Wolff's (2010) criticism of Anderson (1999) in the context of the capability approach.

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The Metaphysical Case against Luck Egalitarianism

Willem van der Deijl

Luck egalitarianism is the name of a group of theories of justice that subscribes to the idea that a just society compensates for brute luck, but does not compensate for bad outcomes that fall under the responsibility of the agent himself. Notable defenders of versions of the theory are Dworkin (2000) and Cohen (1989). It has been argued that this conception depends on a libertarian account of free will. However, Carl Knight (2006) has argued that luck egalitarianism is also a plausible view under compatibilist accounts of free will. In this essay I argue that defenders of this view fail to distinguish between what Scanlon (1998) calls attributive and substantive responsibility. Compatibilist accounts of free will and responsibility provide an understanding of the former but not the latter concept, while the latter is the relevant one for justice. Consequently, if the libertarian position on free will is wrong, luck egalitarianism collapses into outcome egalitarianism. I argue that, in Dworkin's terminology, the distinction between brute luck and option luck will turn out arbitrary, or irrelevant, for justice under Scanlon's distinction.

1. Introduction

Responsibility of choice plays a crucial role in a number of theories of distributive justice. Among these is luck egalitarianism, which states that a just society compensates for brute bad luck, but not for any event which falls under the responsibility of an agent¹. There is something very appealing about the idea that if a person makes a fully informed voluntary choice of action, all the consequences that result from it are his to bear. This has both a positive and a negative component. If a person decides to start his own company which subsequently develops into the most successful

company in the world, he is entitled to fully enjoy the fruits of his fortune. Similarly, if a person decides to use all his money to buy lottery tickets and loses, luck egalitarianism holds that a society does not have any duty to compensate this unfortunate person for his bad luck. Dworkin (2000) makes a useful distinction in this respect. 'Brute luck' is the kind of luck over which we do not have control. For instance, a person born with a handicap does not have control over his condition and its consequences, while a person who gambles all his money and loses has bad 'option luck': the kind of luck over which one does have control. Dworkin argues that in a just society brute luck is compensated for but option luck is not.

By making justice relative to what people choose to do Dworkin centralizes a complicated concept. The concept of choice has been elaborately discussed and criticized in the literature on free will. There is a generally accepted idea in both the literature on free will as well as the literature on distributive justice that the matter of whether we have free will and moral responsibility has great consequences for the field of distributive justice. G.A. Cohen, for instance, argues: 'Someone might say that to make choice central to distributive justice lands political philosophy in the morass of the free will problem' (Cohen, 1989: 934). I agree with Cohen that this is the case. In the free will literature, authors often think about the consequences their claims about free will have on matters of justice. Oddly enough, in the literature on distributive justice, the free will debate is referenced much less. For instance, Saul Smilansky (1997; 2003) and Sung-Hak Kang (2003) note that that political philosophers have downplayed the importance of the free will concepts in their debates. This is particularly odd in theories in which choice plays a crucial role, such as luck egalitarianism. The motivation behind this neglect appears to be that

the issue of free will is a metaphysical issue while distributive justice concerns itself only with practical issues. This essay, however, takes up the gauntlet and discusses the importance of the free will debate from the perspective of distributive theories of justice.

A few authors have discussed what kind of freedom is required for certain distributive theories of justice in which choice plays an important role. In particular, Carl Knight (2006) and Richard Arneson (2004) have defended luck egalitarianism from counterarguments related to the free will debate. I will argue that they have done so inaptly. The main counterargument against luck egalitarianism is that skepticism about free will (the hard determinist position) is plausible and seems to imply that outcome egalitarianism is the most plausible theory of justice (e.g. Smilansky, 1997). On the other hand, Knight argues in his paper ‘The Metaphysical Case for Luck Egalitarianism’² (2006) that the luck egalitarian position goes very well together with the compatibilist position in the free will debate (a similar view is defended in Arneson, 2004). It is against this claim that I will argue in this essay. I argue that the difference between option luck and brute luck is irrelevant to distributive justice for both hard determinists and compatibilists. I will argue that Arneson and Knight do not take the distinction between attributive and substantive responsibility seriously (Scanlon, 1998). Knight discusses this distinction, but does so inappropriately. It follows from my argument that if you are a luck egalitarian, your position will collapse into outcome egalitarianism if you are not a libertarian about free will. In other words, the distinction between brute luck and option luck that Dworkin makes is incompatible with the combination of egalitarianism and determinism. There may be good other moral reasons why we should allow responsibility-based inequalities to subsist. However, given determinism, these cannot be justified from the egalitarian starting point.

In this essay I shall first review the positions in the free will debate and explain the problem hard determinism poses for luck egalitarianism (Section II). This will make apparent what the close relation is between metaphysics and political philosophy. Secondly, I will take a closer look at Knight’s claim that luck egalitarianism and compatibilism are compatible (Section III). I will then introduce Scanlon’s distinction between attributive

and substantive responsibility, after which I show that while determinism is plausible with regard to some notions of free will and moral responsibility, it is quite another matter whether determinism is also compatible with desert-entailing versions of moral responsibility and free will. Thirdly, some counterarguments by Knight (2006) will be considered, and I will argue that they do not help his case in light of the arguments presented in this essay (section 4).

2. Hard determinism and egalitarianism

	Determinism is <i>incompatible</i> with free will	Determinism is <i>compatible</i> with free will
Determinism is (likely) <i>true</i>	Hard determinists	Compatibilists
Determinism is (likely) <i>false</i>	Libertarians	(Indeterministic compatibilists: a rare position)

Table 1: A taxonomy of the free will debate.

There are a number of positions in the free will debate (see table 1). The first divide is between those who believe that determinism is true and those who believe that it is not. The second divide is between those who believe that determinism is a threat for free will (incompatibilists) and those who do not think so (compatibilists). There are roughly three positions within the debate. Firstly, there are those that believe that determinism is true and people have free will, such that for all decisions a person makes, he could have chosen otherwise (e.g. Kane, 2007). This position is called the libertarian position in the free will debate (not to be confused with the position in political philosophy due to, among others, Robert Nozick). The second position has been called the hard determinist position. Those who hold this position argue that as a result of the way we understand the

world as a causal, determined, system, there is only one possible course of action an agent can take. This implies that the freedom we ascribe to agents is an illusion. In short, there is no free will such that for every action an agent undertakes, he could have done otherwise. Both the libertarians and the hard determinists hold that free will and a deterministic world are incompatible (the second divide), but disagree on the plausibility of the determinism thesis (the first divide). The third position, that of compatibilism, holds that whether we have a free will, and the related matter of whether we can be held morally responsible for our deeds, does not depend on the truth of determinism. According to them, even though determinism is (likely) true, the concept of free will is compatible with a deterministic worldview. I will now discuss hard determinism in more detail with the purpose of showing how it undermines luck egalitarianism.

2.1 Hard determinism

Hard determinism subscribes to both incompatibilism and determinism. The classical version of hard determinism takes determinism to entail that the state of the world as it is today is a closed function of the state of the world as it was yesterday and all the causal laws of nature that work upon it. Humans do not fall outside of the causal system of natural laws. This thesis worries many, as it seems to leave no room for spontaneity or free agency, and thereby creates a concern with regards to the possibility of moral responsibility. Generally, by moral responsibility we mean to say that a person is to blame if he does something wrong and praiseworthy if he did something right. However, if determinism is true a person could not have done otherwise because the laws of nature determine his path of action as much as they determine the flow of a river. If we blame a person, we often mean to say: 'you should have done otherwise, and because you did not, you are to blame'. The hard determinist maintains that because the first part of the sentence is undermined by determinism (a person could not have done otherwise), he is not to blame for his actions.

This can be illustrated as follows: consider two people who both have similar, peaceful backgrounds and both go off to college. At their first college party they both get offered a sniff of cocaine. One decides to

take it while the other decides not to. The cocaine sniffer unfortunately becomes addicted, ends up being expelled, and loses everything, while the other does well in college, graduates within four years and manages to get a good life for himself. Is the cocaine sniffer responsible? Yes, our intuition says. After all, he was fully aware of the risks of the drug, and knew he could get expelled for its usage. At the same time, his fellow college freshman remains clean. This seems to imply that another path could have been chosen. At the same time, the difference between the cocaine sniffer and his clean friend could be explained by differences in character. Some people are sensitive to peer pressure and impulsion. Others are prudent decision makers, and can inhibit themselves much better. Prudence is not something one chooses to have. One may choose at some point to start making prudent decisions. However, whether this occurs at all, and whether one can implement one's choice depends on the way a person is, mentally. And this, in the end, seems to be a product of both genes and environment, neither of which are under the person's own control.

Modern determinists often maintain that the threat to free will does not lie in the fact that everything is perfectly determined. After all, quantum mechanical randomness is radical indeterminism at a fundamental level, but it does not provide any reason why the coke sniffer could have chosen otherwise in a morally relevant sense. The real threat is posed by the implication that we are part of the causal universe as much as everything else. Scanlon (1998) calls this thesis the Causal thesis³. One way in which the threat of the causal thesis to responsibility has been phrased, due to Galen Strawson (1994), is to say that any character trait that is important to decision making is either given (by nature and education) or chosen. However, if it is chosen, there are other character traits that caused this decision. This creates an infinite regress: all choices depend on character traits, depend on character traits depend on character traits... However, at the end of this regress, there cannot be said to be an non-chosen, uncaused self that truly has chosen the character one has and can be held responsible for the choices that it makes. Therefore, when I refer to hard determinism, I do not mean that no laws of nature are probabilistic. What is important is that we are part of a causal system.

2.2 Egalitarianism and determinism

In this essay I shall use Arneson's (2004) definition of luck egalitarianism. While Dworkin himself did not like the label much, I think Arneson's description is very helpful. According to Arneson, luck egalitarianism is egalitarianism plus what he calls luckism. Egalitarianism as Arneson describes it either means that those who are worst off should get priority (prioritism) or that the aim should be to make everyone as equally well off as possible. For Rawls, Dworkin and Cohen there are reasons why inequalities should be allowed. Rawls relates this to efficiency-considerations that will benefit the group in society that is worst off (his famous difference principle; Rawls: 1971). Dworkin and Cohen relate this to responsibility. For Arneson this relates to responsibility and luck: 'Luckism is the idea that the strength of any moral reasons there might be to alter the condition of some individual for the better or for the worse (if the latter, this is to be done for the sake of improving the condition of other individuals) can be amplified or dampened by some factor involving an assessment of individual responsibility.' (Arneson, 2004: 2). The luck egalitarian position is that all bad luck should be compensated for, except if a person is responsible for it himself. Both Dworkin and Cohen support a version of this view. Their views differ in that Cohen believes opportunities should be equalized, whereas Dworkin believes that differences in resources due to 'brute luck' is the relevant unit to be equalized (however, Dworkin does believe that ambitions, even if they are due to luck, should play an important role in income distribution; Dworkin, 2000).

It should be noted that there is an important relation between the egalitarian belief in equality and luckism. Egalitarianism is often motivated by the idea that much of what determines a person's life (e.g. his place of birth and the genes he is born with) falls completely outside of the responsibility of a person and is therefore, in Rawls's words, 'morally arbitrary'. There are no moral reasons why a person who has had bad luck should suffer its consequences. This is what I take to be the core of egalitarianism⁴. I shall refer to this fundamental motivation of egalitarianism as the Egalitarian Proviso. Both luckism and the Egalitarian Proviso say that what falls outside the scope of one's responsibility should not affect a person. Crucial though is that luckism provides a deviation from the position that equality is always

good. A very unequal society may be fully just according to the luck egalitarian, if the inequalities are due to choices for which the involved citizen is fully responsible. It is the claim that responsibility is a relevant criterion for distributive justice that is crucial to the luck egalitarian.

How do hard determinism and luck egalitarianism relate to one another? Luck may be a somewhat ambiguous concept, but in its simplest form, luck is the opposite of what someone is responsible for. Susan Hurley (2002) argues in favor of this definition (and calls it thin luck). Hard determinism holds that whatever action a person undertakes, it is always a product of causes outside of him, and he is not responsible for any. He cannot do otherwise. For the hard determinist anything that happens to a person ultimately falls outside the scope of his responsibility. Smilansky (1997: 156) words it as follows: 'if people lack the sort of self-creating ability which only libertarian free will might have provided us with, then ultimately everything - including a person's choice - must be viewed as arbitrary, and cannot ultimately be seen as up to the person.' The way a person is, if we take the hard determinist's words for it, 'is as brute luck as it gets' (Ibid.). In other words, within the hard determinist's worldview there is no room for responsibility and everything is luck. In our example: whether someone is prudent or not is luck in its purest sense to the hard determinist. Therefore, whether someone has a good life as a college graduate or a bad one as a drug addicted college drop-out will turn out to be a matter of luck too.

To be fair, Dworkin (2000) did not define option luck in terms of responsibility, but in terms of deliberate action, and brute luck as luck that could not have been anticipated. The distinction itself is not undermined by hard determinism, but its moral relevance does seem to be affected by this. The distinction between brute luck and option luck only seems to be morally relevant if, in case of option luck, a person could have done otherwise. A gamble may be deliberately chosen, but if a person can only accept the gamble, being unable to do otherwise, the fact that the choice was deliberate does not appear to be morally relevant. In fact, making distributions sensitive to deliberate choice, if determinism is true, is in conflict with the Egalitarian Proviso, which maintains that all consequences of bad luck should be compensated for. If everything that happens to a person,

including his personality, is a product of luck, then losses incurred through irresponsible action should be compensated for.

Another way to phrase the problem is by means of Dworkin's distinction between endowments and ambitions. The latter are properties for which one is responsible, while the former are a matter of luck. However, if we take determinism seriously, ambitions and endowments are not different in any morally relevant sense. One way to phrase it is to say that ambitions are also endowments. According to Dworkin, distributions should be endowment-insensitive and ambition-sensitive. If ambitions are seen as a subset of endowments though, it is easy to see that this statement leads to contradictions.

The relation between egalitarian justice and hard determinism appears to be twofold. Firstly, hard determinism argues powerfully that much of a person's position in life is due to moral luck and therefore arbitrary. According to Kang (2003), who downplays the importance of the free will debate for political thought, it is undeniable that determinism gives very strong support for egalitarian justice. It is even the case, he argues, that much of the force of egalitarianism is drawn from the determinist position, and little of it would still be convincing if determinism were false. The Egalitarian Proviso states that what a person is not responsible for should not negatively affect his life. Determinism seriously diminishes the scope of what we can be responsible for. Therefore, egalitarianism as the view that our society should be as equal as is possible (or feasible) seems to combine very well with the idea of determinism.

The second relation between hard determinism and egalitarianism is that hard determinism urges any egalitarian to become an outcome egalitarian, as it denies the moral significance of responsibility. While many (or perhaps all) egalitarians will accept that much of a person's life happens due to luck, Cohen and Dworkin do not accept that everything that happens in our lives falls outside the scope of our responsibility. This urges them to believe that redistribution should be limited to giving everyone equal opportunities (for Cohen), and correcting for brute luck (for Dworkin). Acknowledging that hard determinism is true implies that no one is morally responsible for his actions, and therefore all that happens to a person is luck. Combined with the Egalitarian Proviso that bad luck should be

compensated for, this view would collapse the luck egalitarian view into outcome egalitarianism. In other words, it would make luckism an empty criterion for justice. Also, it would make Cohen's thesis incoherent with the Egalitarian Proviso (see Smilansky, 1997). After all, equal opportunities will almost certainly have better consequences for the prudent. And these are, in the hard determinism view, simply the lucky. In short, hard determinism compels one to become an outcome egalitarian.

3. Does compatibilism offer reassurance?

Despite the above, luck egalitarianism has a very strong intuitive appeal. For many, the argument made above may not seem so worrying. After all, its argumentative force against luck egalitarianism depends heavily on the truth of hard determinism. While this view is certainly not outdated, it is certainly not mainstream either and remains a somewhat controversial position in the free will debate. Luck egalitarians have found reassurance in an alternative view: compatibilism (e.g. Knight, 2006; Arneson, 2004). This view holds that while determinism is plausible, it certainly does not follow from determinism that free will does not exist and responsibility is impossible. In this section I will discuss the claim that compatibilism offers an escape from the threat that determinism poses to the concept of responsibility and see whether this can save luck egalitarianism.

Central to many versions of compatibilism is the idea that the option to do otherwise is not necessary for responsibility and moral appraisal. This view was introduced by Frankfurt (1969). The idea is this: if it is possible to ascribe to a person a desire that is truly his (in Frankfurt's framework: he wants it and he wants to want it, and he may even want to want to want it), and a person takes the desired course of action, we can say that this person is responsible for this action. If it is something that we approve of we may say 'well done', or we may say 'this person is a very good person', without being wrong: even if determinism were true. This view of responsibility relates to action ownership: if an action truly falls under a person's desires, truly belongs to a person, such that we can say that it is typical behavior of his, we can attribute responsibility to him. There are several accounts of how responsibility can retain meaning in a

deterministic world. An important version of compatibilism is developed by Peter Strawson (1962). He argues that what we call moral responsibility is the idea that we see people such that their actions make it appropriate that we hold a *reactive attitude* against them. A reactive attitude is an emotional response to moral behavior, and moral judgment is holding such a reactive attitude from a third person perspective. Even if determinism is true, he argues, it still makes sense to hold someone responsible for doing something immoral (e.g. killing someone), in the sense that you change your attitude towards him. Compatibilism seems to provide us with some great instruments to fight off the worries raised by determinism. Such, for instance, is the position of Carl Knight (2006).

3.1 Scanlon's account

Scanlon (1998) sheds some light on the discussion of moral appraisal, desert and responsibility in the compatibilist account. Firstly, he makes an important distinction between two types of responsibility that often get mixed up, particularly in political debates. A person can be said to be attributively responsible for an action if he is subject to moral praise or blame for this actions. This relates to both Frankfurt (1969) and Strawson's (1962) account of responsibility. If a person truly owns an action, it is truly attributable to him: he can be said to be attributively responsible for it. A person is substantively responsible for an action if a person cannot complain about its consequences, because it was his own choice. This is the kind of responsibility we apply to those who did not buy car insurance and complain about the fact that they have to pay the full costs of the repairs when their car breaks down. Similarly, it is the kind of responsibility we apply when someone works hard for an achievement, and we feel that this achievement is thus well-deserved. According to Scanlon these two types of responsibility need not necessarily coincide. In particular, one can be held attributively responsible if one is not substantively responsible for an action.

This is exemplified in Scanlon's (1998) analysis of the well-known Frankfurt cases (1969), for instance, the willing addict. Frankfurt establishes the willing addict as a famous counterexample to the view that responsibility requires the opportunity to do otherwise. An addict takes

drugs because he cannot do otherwise: he is, after all, addicted. The willing addict truly wants to take the drug. Even if he were not addicted, he would take the drug. In other words, even though he could not do otherwise, the action is truly his: the taking of the drug can be attributed to him, and not just to his addiction. In Scanlon's terminology, the willing addict is attributively responsible for taking the drug. But Scanlon would also argue that because he could not do otherwise, he is not substantially responsible for it.

Scanlon argues that if the causal thesis is true, this should have no effect attributive responsibility. This is what many compatibilist accounts have taught us. However, substantive responsibility, according to him, implies that the person in question could have acted otherwise, but did not do so. The attribution of substantive responsibility to people, therefore, is undermined by determinism. In case of the willing addict, Scanlon argues that the fact that he is not willing to do otherwise should not have as a consequence that he forfeits the community's duty to aid him. Similarly, if determinism is correct, it means that we can never do otherwise. In other words, we can never be substantially responsible for our actions. On Scanlon's account, this implies that moral appraisal is still appropriate, but that we can never say that a person has brought about his own fate, *and therefore* has forfeited our duty to help him. In his own words: 'In this respect our attitude toward those who suffer or are blamed should not be "You asked for this", but rather "There but for the grace of God go I"' (Scanlon, 1998: 294).

Scanlon's distinction between attributive and substantial responsibility clarifies the disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists about free will. According to Scanlon (1998), attributive responsibility may be compatible with determinism, but this is not the kind of responsibility that is relevant to questions of justice. Note that Dworkin's distinction between option luck and brute luck is about something similar to attributive responsibility. On Scanlon's account the relevance of Dworkin's distinction is irrelevant with respect to what a person deserves or does not deserve, if determinism is true. Again, if determinism is true, people cannot be said to have substantive responsibility. And it is substantial responsibility that is relevant to defend the moral non-arbitrariness of luck egalitarianism. The

idea that responsibility of choice justifies inequalities rests on the idea of substantive responsibility, and not attributive responsibility. The fact that we can ascribe an action to an agent, such that he is attributively responsible for it, should have no consequence for what his due is, if there is no way he could have done otherwise. In Scanlon's account an agent may be attributively responsible for an action, while, as he could not have done otherwise, its consequences should be seen as luck. The difference between substantive and attributive responsibility is that substantive responsibility is desert-entailing, while attributive responsibility is not. Now, a version of responsibility that is not desert-entailing does not seem to be of much importance for distributive theory. Thus, compatibilism may offer us many useful tools to save the moral terminology in a deterministic world, but compatibilistic freedom cannot give us desert-entailing responsibility. The difference between the accounts is worded nicely by Fleurbaey (1995: 40): 'Even if a compatibilist account may provide grounds for moral attitudes of praise and dispraise, it is more questionable whether it could justify differences of welfare or advantage between people.' In short, Scanlon's account of responsibility states that attributive responsibility is compatible with determinism, but is not desert-entailing, while substantive responsibility may be desert-entailing, but is not compatible with determinism. Compatibilism in the free will debate may provide us with attributive, but not with substantive responsibility. Compatibilism can thus not provide any desert-entailing version of responsibility, which is required for luck egalitarianism.

4. Knight's defence of luck egalitarianism

In fact, Knight (2006) considers Scanlon's distinction, but does so inadequately. Knight presents two reasons why Scanlon's conclusion with respect to substantive responsibility need not worry the luck egalitarian. The first is that praise and blame may be enough to justify responsibility based inequalities. The second is that libertarianism may still be correct.

Knight's first argument is that it seems implausible to him that praise and blame can be disconnected from substantive desert-entailing responsibility. According to Scanlon, it does not follow from the fact that a person has conducted praiseworthy behaviour that it would be just to reward him.

Similarly blameworthy behaviour does not imply that it would be just to punish. This sounds implausible to Knight. He argues that it would be highly counterintuitive to shake the hand of those who act maliciously. 'Assuming that such persons are, determinism notwithstanding, responsible for their behavior, it may well strike us as wrong to subsidize their reprehensible choices.' (Knight, 2006: 183). This argument can be understood in two ways. I shall discuss the two interpretations briefly.

Firstly, this argument can be understood as an argument in favour of intuitions versus metaphysical conclusions. In this case, we can say that while Knight's premise about our intuitions is surely correct: not making the wrong-doer pay may be counter-intuitive. However, the implicit premise underlying his argument is surely false: if our intuition goes against a metaphysical conclusion, the metaphysical conclusion is to be rejected. The point of drawing on arguments from the free will debate for the distributive justice discussion is exactly that it may show us that some of our intuitions may be wrong. Moreover, the intuitions for the luck egalitarian case are far from unambiguous. Anderson (1999) famously summarized a large number of counter-intuitive examples that highlight that the luck egalitarian is very uncompassionate if he meets a person in need who has not been particularly prudent in his decision making.

Secondly, Knight's argument can be understood as a consequentialist, or paternalistic, argument: while it may not be the fault of the imprudent that he has acted imprudently, rewarding him for bad behaviour may encourage this kind of behaviour. Therefore, we should not do it. It is notable that Scanlon, while arguing for his distinction between two kinds of responsibility, also considers the great value of deliberate choice. Encouraging people to choose and be held accountable for their choices has many advantages. Scanlon (1998) argues that being held accountable for your own order in a restaurant ensures you get the dish that most accords with your taste. I think this is a very important consideration, but it diverges from the statement that responsibility based inequalities should subsist because they are just. It is rather a statement about efficiency. This may be an important consideration for questions of distribution. Rawls' (1971) Difference Principle is a famous example of a distributive rule that takes into account efficiency concerns. He acknowledges that inequalities

may be efficiency enhancing and that rather than striving for a completely equal society, inequalities should be allowed if they benefit the worst off. However, luck egalitarians do not make responsibility central to their account because of efficiency concerns, but because they believe that it is just in itself. Knight may argue that choice is important for efficiency, but does not thereby also show that it is just.

Knight's second argument is that even if Scanlon is right, and compatibilism cannot provide us with an account of substantive responsibility, it need not imply that luck egalitarianism is wrong. After all, luck egalitarianism would still be substantially different from outcome egalitarianism if libertarianism were correct. This is surely correct. However, it needs to be acknowledged that the libertarian position in the free will debate is not a very plausible one⁵. It is particularly striking that Knight himself writes that the critique that luck egalitarianism draws upon a libertarian position in the free will debate is 'particularly damaging' (Knight, 2006: 174). The plausibility of the view notwithstanding, Knight is right to assert that luck egalitarianism remains to be a substantive view if one maintains a libertarian position in the free will debate⁶.

5. Conclusion

In this essay I have discussed the relation between luck egalitarianism and the free will debate. There appears to be a widely held view amongst luck egalitarians that while their notion of luck is tightly linked to the concept of free will, their position is not dependent on the libertarian position in the free will debate (Arneson, 2004, Knight, 2006). They argue that while hard determinism may be a threat to their view as a substantive theory that is different from outcome egalitarianism, compatibilism offers a way out. However, I have argued that this argument does not distinguish between Scanlon's two accounts of responsibility. While compatibilist accounts offer satisfactory accounts of attributive responsibility, compatibilism cannot deliver substantive responsibility: the desert-entailing kind. The conflation of these two concepts has confused the argument.

The consequence of this argument is not that luck egalitarianism, as a distinct theory from outcome egalitarianism, is implausible. While the

libertarian position in the free will debate is unpopular, it still has some defenders. Both Arneson and Knight therefore claim that we should regard the issue as unsettled. Hence, we should not draw any drastic conclusions from the debate. On the other hand, in the more plausible case that libertarianism is false, the point made in this article has as a consequence that the 'luck' in luck egalitarianism should disappear. In this case, luckism becomes an empty concept, and luck egalitarianism collapses into outcome egalitarianism.

The luck egalitarian project was a clear and principled divergence from the outcome egalitarian project. The conclusion that luck egalitarianism collapses into outcome egalitarianism if determinism is true, may therefore not be a welcome conclusion to the luck egalitarian. Finally, though he may rest assured that much of what he has argued for in terms of justice may still be relevant in terms of efficiency, and could therefore still be an appealing political idea.

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Notes

1. Another group of theories in which responsibility plays a crucial role are theories that use the capability approach. While these will not be discussed in this essay, many of the considerations will apply to those theories too.
2. It is this title that has inspired mine.
3. For this reason, hard determinist might be a bit of a misnomer. Free will skeptic would perhaps be better suited. For reasons of tradition and clarity, I shall stick to hard determinism.
4. Some other evidence of can be found in the definitions of G.A. Cohen and Larry Temkin. Cohen puts it as follows: 'a large part of the fundamental egalitarian aim is to extinguish the influence of brute luck on distribution' (Cohen, 1989: 931). Similarly, Larry Temkin writes: 'In particular, I believe egalitarians have the deep and (for them) compelling view that it is bad—unjust and unfair—for some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own.' (Temkin, 1993: 101).
5. For an attempt at a knock-down argument against libertarianism see Strawson (1994). This is a much debated paper, which I think has not been convincingly rebutted so far. However, it has not convinced all, as there are still some who argue for libertarianism in the free will debate (see Kane, 2007). We have to conclude that Strawson's argument remains controversial.
6. However, if we take Kang's (2003) argument seriously, much of the force of egalitarianism is lost if determinism is false.

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De hybride en zijn ritme

Vorbij het onderscheid tussen subject en object

Monique Goense

1. Introductie

Genetisch gemanipuleerde gewassen, klimaatverandering, algoritmische beurshandel, gekloonde schapen, drones, het vogelgriepvirus. We delen onze wereld met de meest vreemde wezens. Wie zijn deze wezens? Hoe beïnvloeden zij onze leefwereld? En hoe gaan wij met ze om? In *We have never been modern* stelt Bruno Latour (1993) dat onze huidige manier van denken, die wij geërfd hebben van de moderneren, tekort schiet wanneer wij deze vragen willen beantwoorden. Hij constateert dat het moderne denken in het teken staat van een scheiding tussen natuur en cultuur. De natuur zou volgens deze visie bestaan uit brute materie die gehoorzaamt aan de wetten van de causaliteit, terwijl de cultuur geleid zou worden door normen, ideeën, taal, rituelen, enzovoorts. De vreemde monsters, die Latour hybriden noemt, laten zich echter niet indelen in één van deze domeinen, omdat ze de werelden van subjecten en objecten, van mensen en niet-mensen, met elkaar vermengen. Hoe moeten wij ons tot deze, steeds complexer wordende, monsters verhouden? Aangezien het moderne denkkader ons niet in staat stelt deze vraag te beantwoorden is er behoefte aan een nieuw denkkader. Een kader dat ons in staat stelt de hybriden te denken en ons zodoende kan helpen met het beantwoorden van de vraag hoe te leven in een in toenemende mate hybridiserende wereld.

In het zevende hoofdstuk van haar boek over ritme vraagt Marli Huijzer zich af of het concept ritme ons hierbij misschien zou kunnen helpen: 'Zou het begrip ritme een denkruimte kunnen openen voorbij het onderscheid tussen natuur en cultuur? Is ritme misschien "een heel fijn weefspoeltje dat de hemel, de industrie, de teksten, de zielen en de morele normen met elkaar heeft verweven"?' (Huijzer, 2012: 129). Geïnspireerd door Latour stelt Huijzer dat natuurlijke en culturele ritmes altijd in elkaars

verlengde ontstaan en dus innig met elkaar verweven zijn. Natuurlijke en culturele ritmes, zegt zij, vloeien in elkaar over en veranderen elkaar. Wij leven in een hybride wereld, die we onmogelijk kunnen opdelen in een zuiver natuurlijke en een zuiver sociale pool (ibid.: 117). Toch staat het Westerse moderne denken in het teken van het maken van dit onmogelijke onderscheid. Het is geobsedeerd door het ontwarren van het hybride weefsel van de wereld. Deze zuiveringsoperatie is bepalend geworden voor ons denken en heeft ons een kunstmatig beeld van de werkelijkheid ingeprint door het rijke, hybride weefsel van de wereld te reduceren tot twee lege abstracties: natuur en cultuur. Deze abstracties zijn de beginpunten geworden van waaruit wij de wereld zijn gaan verklaren.

Abstracties kunnen echter nooit iets verklaren, maar vragen zelf om een verklaring, stelt Gilles Deleuze in navolging van Alfred North Whitehead (Deleuze, 1994: 7). We moeten niet vergeten dat abstracties nooit a priori gegeven zijn, maar door ons geconstrueerd worden, in antwoord op concrete situaties. Hoewel we volgens Whitehead zonder abstracties niet kunnen denken, waarschuwt hij ons ook voor de gevaren die ze met zich mee brengen. Abstracties verleiden ons er toe ze los te koppelen van de concrete omstandigheden waarin ze zijn ontstaan, waarna we ze gaan beschouwen als modellen die ons vooraf aan de werkelijkheid zijn gegeven en van waaruit we de werkelijkheid kunnen verklaren. De werkelijkheid wordt dan enkel nog gezien in zoverre zij overeenstemt met deze a priori abstracties. Abstracties die een dergelijke transcendente status verwerven vergiftigen ons denken (Whitehead, 1968: 39). Bij Whitehead heet het door Latour besproken onderscheid tussen natuur en cultuur de bifurcatie van de natuur¹. Deze bifurcatie is bij uitstek een voorbeeld van een toxische abstractie, die ons denken op het verkeerde

spoor zet. In dit essay wil ik aanhaken bij Huijers vraag en onderzoeken of het concept ritme weerstand kan bieden aan het abstracte onderscheid tussen natuur en cultuur, door een denkruimte te openen die hieraan voorbij gaat. Dit zal ik doen met behulp van het elfde plateau van Deleuze & Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*, waarin zij een 'muzikale metafysica' uiteenzetten, waarin het concept ritme wordt ingezet om na te denken over de wijze waarop levende wezens zich tot hun omgeving verhouden. Daarbij laten zij zien dat er een ritmisch continuüm bestaat tussen menselijke en niet-menselijke soorten.

Waarom er behoefte is aan een nieuw denkkader

Alvorens te onderzoeken welke mogelijkheden het concept ritme biedt om voorbij het subject-object onderscheid te denken, is het van belang te expliciteren wat de urgentie van dit onderzoek is. Daartoe zal ik een aantal vragen proberen te beantwoorden: wat is het subject-object onderscheid, waar liggen zijn wortels en waarom is het problematisch? Hiervoor zal ik te rade gaan bij Latour. Zoals ik in de introductie al even aanstipte, stelt Latour dat ons denken sinds de moderniteit wordt gedomineerd door het strikte onderscheid tussen natuur en cultuur; tussen de wereld van de objecten en de wereld van de subjecten. Hij legt de oorsprong van dit denken in een zeventiende-eeuws debat tussen de natuurfilosoof Robert Boyle en de politiek filosoof Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes en Boyle roepen op exact hetzelfde moment een nieuw domein in het leven: Hobbes het domein van de politiek, waarin representatie een kwestie van het volgen van de juiste procedures is en Boyle het domein van de empirische wetenschappen, waarin representatie een kwestie is van de juiste weergave van een bepaalde stand van zaken. Wetenschappers menen dat het hun taak is om de natuur te vertegenwoordigen. Zij weren inmenging van de politiek omdat deze de objectiviteit van de wetenschappelijke onderneming zou aantasten. Politiek wordt hiermee een zuiver menselijke aangelegenheid (Latour, 1993: 15-29).

De scheiding tussen wetenschap en politiek impliceert een breuk tussen de wereld van de objecten en de wereld van de subjecten. Latour meent dat deze breuk bij Boyle en Hobbes nog fragiel is, omdat de gemeen-

schappelijke oorsprong van beide werelden in de discussie tussen de twee filosofen zichtbaar blijft. Hun opvolgers zullen deze werelden echter steeds verder uit elkaar drijven en hun gemeenschappelijke wortels aan het zicht onttrekken, tot het punt waarop er sprake is van twee zelfstandige domeinen. Latour situeert deze definitieve breuk in de filosofie van Kant, wiens Copernicaanse wending de mensen voorgoed van het *Ding an sich* zal afsnijden (ibid.: 56). Object en subject ontmoeten elkaar alleen nog in de ervaring van het subject, in dat wat Kant het fenomeen noemt. Objecten worden hierbij gereduceerd tot inerte materie, die het projectiescherm vormt voor de normen, ideeën, taal en rituelen die tot het domein van de cultuur horen. Zij verworden tot een product van de menselijke cognitie: 'Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition [...]' (Kant, 1998: 110). Door te stellen dat objecten zich aanpassen aan de menselijke cognitie en we dus deze cognitie moeten onderzoeken willen we de objecten leren kennen, neemt Kant de noodzaak weg om de objecten zelf te raadplegen. Kants hypothese geeft met andere woorden aanleiding tot een zekere onverschilligheid ten opzichte van de materiële wereld en ontnemt deze het vermogen ons te laten verrassen (Bryant, 2010). Hoewel we in de hedendaagse filosofie weinig onvervalste Kantianen aantreffen, beheerst de kloof tussen subject en object en het daarbij behorende antropocentrisme nog steeds het hedendaagse denken. Het moderne denkkader vormt, zo zouden we kunnen stellen met een begrip van Rancière, het zichtbaarheidsregime van deze tijd². Het bepaalt wat zichtbaar wordt en wat niet. Wat niet zichtbaar wordt binnen dit denkkader is het vermogen van objecten om 'iets te doen', te handelen, een verschil te maken. Vrijwel alle hedendaagse handelingstheorieën baseren zich dan ook op het idee van een rationeel, intentioneel, menselijk subject (Bennett, 2010: 28-31).

Met de invoering van de radicale breuk tussen object en subject hebben de modernen aan het zicht onttrokken dat onze wereld in feite een complex weefsel van hybride netwerken is. De term 'hybride' is afkomstig uit de biologie en wellicht enigszins ongelukkig gekozen omdat zij verwijst

naar de kruising van twee zuivere soorten. Het bestaan van zuivere soorten, dat wil zeggen, het bestaan van zuivere objecten en zuivere subjecten, is echter precies wat Latour ontkent. Er bestaan enkel hybriden: netwerken of collectieven waarin objecten en subjecten onontwaaarbaar met elkaar verstrengeld zijn. Om het idee dat we een onderscheid zouden kunnen maken tussen objecten en subjecten te vermijden, spreekt Latour ook wel van quasi-objecten en quasi-subjecten³ of van actanten. Een actant is iedere entiteit die over het vermogen beschikt een verschil te maken binnen het netwerk waar het onderdeel van uitmaakt. Dit kunnen zowel mensen als dieren, dingen, concepten of theorieën zijn. Actanten verbinden zich met elkaar in netwerken, die het hybride weefsel vormen waaruit onze wereld bestaat (Latour, 2004: 237). De categorieën 'object' en 'subject' zijn niets anders dan abstracties, die ontstaan wanneer we een actant onttrekken aan het netwerk waarin deze is ingebed. Dit proces van onttrekken, dat Latour zuiveren noemt, is karakteristiek voor de wetenschap, die fenomenen isoleert om ze te kunnen bestuderen. De abstracties die het resultaat zijn van dit zuiveringsproces kunnen niet worden losgekoppeld van de hybride netwerken waarover zij iets pogen te zeggen. Ook abstracties zijn actanten, die immanent zijn aan de netwerken waaraan zij ontspruiten. De modernen echter, hebben aan deze abstracties een transcendente status verleend. Zij hebben aan de gezuiverde objecten en subjecten een autonome status gegeven, waardoor het lijkt alsof zij de beginpunten vormen van waaruit de hybride netwerken gedacht moeten worden. Zij worden door de modernen gebruikt om deze netwerken te verklaren, terwijl zij juist zelf om een verklaring vragen (Latour, 1993: 11).

In het moderne denken worden de hybride netwerken dus gereduceerd tot het abstracte onderscheid tussen objecten en subjecten. Paradoxaal genoeg heeft deze ontkenning van het hybride karakter van de wereld juist geleid tot een hybridisering van de wereld. Wanneer we de scheiding tussen natuur en cultuur zouden opheffen zou de productie van dergelijke hybriden worden afgeremd. Dit wordt zichtbaar wanneer we kijken naar samenlevingen die uitgaan van een innige verstrengeling tussen natuur en cultuur. Een voorbeeld hiervan is de Peruaanse Achuar stam, die geen natuur in de moderne zin van het woord kent omdat ze deze volledig gesocialiseerd heeft⁴. Hun omgangsvormen met de natuur corresponderen punt voor punt met sociale rollen, waardoor iedere ingreep in

de natuurlijke orde altijd ook een ingreep in de sociale orde is. Ingrepen in de natuur hebben voor de Achuar zodoende een enorme impact, waardoor men terughoudend is met betrekking tot dergelijke ingrepen. Als gevolg hiervan hebben deze samenlevingen vaak een statisch karakter. Zij staan daardoor in schril contrast tot de moderne samenleving met haar radicale scheiding tussen natuur en cultuur. Latour stelt dat deze scheiding het mogelijk maakt voor wetenschappers er vrolijk op los te experimenteren in hun laboratoria zonder dat zij zorg hoeven te dragen voor de gevolgen van hun experimenten. Zij beschouwen wetenschap immers als een domein dat los staat van de samenleving.

Het gevolg hiervan is dat hybriden zich razendsnel hebben kunnen ontwikkelen, waardoor wij in een bijzonder complexe wereld leven. Objecten en subjecten hebben zich altijd met elkaar vermengd en in feite zijn we dus nooit modern geweest, maar vandaag de dag is deze vermenging moeilijker dan ooit te negeren, omdat de netwerken waarin wij leven zo complex zijn geworden (ibid.: 41-43). Natuur en cultuur raken steeds diepgaander met elkaar verstrengeld: 'Whereas at the time of ploughs we could only scratch the surface of the soil, we can now begin to fold ourselves into the molecular machinery of soil bacteria' (Latour, 2008: 6). We raken steeds nauwer verbonden met allerlei complexe entiteiten. Het moderne denkkader stelt ons niet in staat om deze hybriden te denken. Hierdoor verhindert het ons op adequate wijze om te gaan met de problemen waarvoor zij ons stellen. Er is daarom een nieuw denkkader nodig, dat ons in staat stelt om te gaan met de complexer wordende wereld en de daarmee gepaard gaande veranderingen op onder andere ecologisch, economisch en geopolitiek gebied (Latour, 1993: 145)⁵.

Jane Bennett sluit zich aan bij deze gedachte en bespreekt in het boek 'Vibrant Matter' het moderne onvermogen aan de hand van de grootste elektriciteitsstoring in de Amerikaanse geschiedenis, die plaatsvond op 14 augustus 2003. Het elektriciteitsnetwerk is een goed voorbeeld van een hybride. Bennett beschrijft het als een mix van onder meer kool, zweet, elektromagnetische velden, elektronen, winstoochmerken, hitte, levensstijlen, nucleaire brandstoffen, plastic, overheersingsfantasieën, economische theorieën, bedrading en hout (Bennett, 2010: 25). Op de veertiende augustus vielen verschillende generatoren in dit complexe netwerk uit, waardoor

een verstoring ontstond in het patroon van de elektronenstroom. Deze verstoring zette een reeks gebeurtenissen in gang, waaronder een brand in een hoogspanningskabel en ‘botsingen’ tussen door de overbelasting uitgezette stroomkabels en boomtakken, die op hun beurt een overbelasting van andere hoogspanningskabels veroorzaakten, met als gevolg een golf van uitval van generatoren. Doordat de ene na de andere generator uitviel, kwam er steeds meer druk te staan op de overgebleven generatoren. Uiteindelijk leidde dit er toe dat vijftig miljoen huishoudens, verspreid over een gebied van vierentwintigduizend vierkante kilometer, zonder stroom kwamen te zitten. Onderzoekers van de storing weten nog steeds niet hoe de storing zich heeft kunnen ontwikkelen en hoe het kan dat de reeks van storingen uiteindelijk uit zichzelf is gestopt⁶.

Wanneer we vertrekken vanuit het moderne denkkader kunnen we het elektriciteitsnetwerk niet denken als een hybride. Binnen dit kader kunnen objecten namelijk slechts verschijnen als passieve materie, die niet over het vermogen tot handelen beschikken. De mogelijkheid om na te denken over de wijze waarop niet-menselijke entiteiten, zoals de elektriciteit of de nucleaire brandstoffen, het netwerk transformeren verdwijnt hierdoor naar de achtergrond. In een moderne beschouwing zal de aandacht uitgaan naar de wijze waarop menselijke keuzen het gedrag van de objecten beïnvloeden. Hierdoor komt de vraag naar wie er aansprakelijk kan worden gehouden voor de storing centraal te staan: waar ligt dé oorzaak van de storing en wie is er verantwoordelijk voor? Het oplossen van het probleem wordt dan een zuiver menselijke aangelegenheid. Maar kunnen we wel één oorzaak aanwijzen? En is deze oorzaak wel gelegen in het menselijk handelen? Of is er meer aan de hand? Laten we met behulp van het concept ‘ritme’ van Deleuze & Guattari onderzoeken of dit laatste het geval is.

Ritme als tussenruimte

De Franse titel van het elfde hoofdstuk van Deleuze & Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* luidt *De la ritournelle*. *Ritornello*, wat Italiaans is voor ‘kleine terugkeer’, is een stijlform in de Barokmuziek⁷. Een stuk in *ritornello* in zijn meest simpele vorm, begint met een thema dat door alle instrumenten (*tutti*) wordt gespeeld. Vervolgens treedt één instrument op

de voorgrond (*solo*), waarna weer terug wordt gekeerd naar het thema in *tutti*, enzovoorts. De ritornel is dus, net als het refrein, een thema dat gedurende een muziekstuk steeds terugkeert. De ritornel wordt echter nooit in haar oorspronkelijke vorm herhaald, maar komt steeds terug met een variatie. Dit laatste is belangrijk wanneer we het thema van de herhaling in het werk van Deleuze & Guattari willen begrijpen. Herhaling heeft voor Deleuze & Guattari niets te maken met reproductie (de herhaling van hetzelfde), maar is altijd gekoppeld aan een verschil. Het is een productief proces dat variatie produceert in en door iedere herhaling, waardoor nieuwe ervaringen, affecten en expressies gegenereerd kunnen worden.

Deze samenhang van herhaling en verschil is kenmerkend voor ritme. In zijn boek over ritmeanalyse stelt Henri Lefebvre dat er in de herhaling altijd iets nieuws en onvoorziens wordt geïntroduceerd: een verschil (Lefebvre, 2004: 6). En ook John Dewey, in wiens esthetica het begrip ritme een belangrijke rol speelt, stelt dat ritme weliswaar een ordenende beweging is, maar dat zij ook altijd variatie met zich mee brengt (Dewey, 1980: 164). Deleuze & Guattari stellen, net als Lefebvre en Dewey, dat ritme verschil produceert (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 314). Ritme, zeggen zij, moet niet verward worden met het metrum, ofwel de maat van de muziek. Maat, of zij nu binair (tik-tak, tik-tak) of ternair (hoem-pa-pa, hoem-pa-pa) is, heeft altijd betrekking op de herhaling van hetzelfde. De maat is dogmatisch en heeft niets van doen met het creatieve ritme: ‘[...] there is nothing less rhythmic than a military march’ (ibid.: 313). Dat Deleuze & Guattari de maat van een militaire mars opvoeren als voorbeeld en deze contrasteren met een ritmische beweging, is niet zonder betekenis. Met de keuze van dit voorbeeld wijzen zij op het gewelddadige karakter van de maat. De maat onderwerpt alles aan hetzelfde; zij egaliseert en brengt mensen in het gelid. Ritme daarentegen, beantwoordt niet aan de (regel)maat; zij is niet het gelijke, maar het ongelijke of het incommensurabele. Ritme communiceert een verschil.

Het onderscheid tussen maat en ritme is dus verbonden met het onderscheid tussen eigenlijke en oneigenlijke herhaling. In het geval van oneigenlijke herhaling is er sprake van de herhaling van het zelfde. Deze oneigenlijke herhaling is kenmerkend voor maat, gedacht als de reproductie van tijdseenheden. In *Difference and Repetition* spreekt Deleuze ook wel

van cadans-herhaling: '[...] a regular division of time, an isochronic recurrence of identical elements' (Deleuze, 2001: 21). Een tijdseenheid kan echter alleen verschijnen in zoverre deze gedetermineerd wordt door tonische accenten en intensieve verschillen, zo stelt Deleuze. Deze tonische en intensieve waarden genereren ongelijkheid tussen de metrisch equivalente tijdseenheden. Het is hier dat ritme wordt geboren. Ritme als de herhaling van ongelijke punten is dus niet ondergeschikt aan de maat, maar gaat er aan vooraf. Het is constitutief voor de reproductie van homogene elementen. De cadans-herhaling is zodoende niet meer dan een abstract effect van de ritmische herhaling: 'Cadence is only the envelope of a rhythm, and of a relation between rhythms' (ibid.). Deleuze & Guattari ontkennen niet dat maat een functie heeft, maar benadrukken dat deze niet los van ritme kan worden gedacht zonder dat de laatste zijn singulariteit verliest. Wanneer we de maat loskoppelen van de ongelijke ritmes waarmee deze gepaard gaat en behandelen als een op zichzelf staande entiteit, dan hanteren we een metrische conceptie van maat, zo stelt Hulse (2010: 29). In een metrisch systeem gaat de singulariteit van het verschil (het verschil-in-zichzelf) verloren doordat het ondergeschikt gemaakt wordt aan identiteit; de ritmische gebeurtenis wordt onderworpen aan en gefixeerd door de maat. We moeten deze metrische opvatting van maat onderscheiden van een muzikale conceptie van maat: 'What Deleuze is really calling for is the de-metering of meter; for dislodging any conflation of musical meter with metric meter' (Hulse, 2010: 29). De muzikale maat laat, in tegenstelling tot de metrische maat, ruimte voor de ritmische gebeurtenis⁸.

De ritmische beweging van herhaling en verschil ligt aan de basis van het leven. Het is, zo stelt Isabelle Stengers, het eerste woord van het leven (Stengers, 2009: 269). Uit de chaos, zeggen Deleuze & Guattari aan het begin van het plateau over het refrein, worden milieus en ritmes geboren (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 313). Chaos is de 'fundamentele' ongrond van onszelf en alle dingen die wij in de wereld aantreffen⁹. Het is het zijn als het worden van het verschil; als heterogeen veld van krachten die met een oneindige snelheid alle kanten uit schieten. In dit veld, dat aan niemand toebehoort, 'is' niets, maar verschilt alles voortdurend. Deleuze & Guattari noemen dit krachtenveld ook wel een lichaam zonder organen (hierna: LzO). Een LzO is een lichaam dat nog niet is onderworpen aan een organische, dat wil zeggen functionele, organisatie. Het is

een affectief, intensief, anarchistisch lichaam, dat doortrokken is van een anorganische vitaliteit: '[...] the Earth is a body without organs. This body without organs is permeated by unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all directions, by free intensities or nomadic singularities, by mad or transitory particles' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 40). Chaos is niet de donkere nacht waarin alle koeien zwart zijn (Deleuze, 2001: 277). Dat wil zeggen dat chaos weliswaar vormloos is, maar niet ongedifferentieerd; niet zonder richtinggevende componenten¹⁰ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 313). De chaotische krachten treden spontaan met elkaar in verhouding en wanneer dit gebeurt ontstaan er milieus.

Milieus zijn blokjes ruimte-tijd die ontstaan in de periodieke herhaling van een bepaald component binnen het chaotische krachtenveld, dat door Deleuze & Guattari ook wel het milieu van alle milieus wordt genoemd (ibid.). In het proces van herhaling vindt er codering plaats. Bepaalde punten in de chaos worden op samenhangende wijze met elkaar verbonden en er ontstaat een zekere ordening. Deze orde houdt zichzelf in stand door de voortdurende herhaling van haar component en is verre van homogeen en bovendien relatief onstabiel: 'Every milieu is vibratory [...]' (ibid.). De code van een milieu is niet gefixeerd¹¹, maar voortdurend onderhevig aan een proces dat Deleuze & Guattari transcoding of transductie noemen. De periodieke herhaling die het milieu constitueert, produceert een verschil, waardoor een milieu zich aan andere milieus kan koppelen. Ritme is het verschil dat wordt geproduceerd in de koppeling van deze milieus: 'There is rhythm whenever there is a transcoded passage from one milieu to another, a communication of milieus, coordination between heterogeneous space-times' (ibid.). Ritme doortrekt de milieus en is in staat om ze te veranderen. Het ontstaat in een tussenruimte; een ruimte tussen chaos en milieu. Daarom noemen Deleuze & Guattari deze ruimte ook wel ritme-chaos of chaosmos: 'Between night and day, between that which is constructed and that which grows naturally, between mutations from the inorganic to the organic, from plant to animal, from animal to humankind, yet without this series constituting a progression' (ibid.). De chaosmos is de grenszone tussen twee intervallen in een gedifferentieerd systeem (Bonta & Protevi, 2004: 137). Ritme bewerkstelligt een verhouding tussen chaos en milieu, zonder dat de laatste door de eerste wordt vernietigd. Zij opent het milieu en maakt communicatie met andere milieus mogelijk.

Ritme is de eerste stap in de vorming van wat Deleuze & Guattari assemblages noemen. Dit zijn complexe samenstellingen van heterogene elementen, die opereren in zones waar milieus gedecodeerd raken. Een assemblage kent drie momenten (infra-, intra- en inter-assemblage) die samen het refrein vormen. Het refrein is het territoriale assemblage, dat het product is van de territorialisering van milieus en ritmes. Het is het zich steeds herhalende thema dat het territorium bij elkaar houdt en tegelijkertijd de mogelijkheid opent om koppelingen aan te gaan met andere territoria (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 312). Een assemblage begint bij het onttrekken van een territorium aan een milieu. Deleuze & Guattari noemen dit eerste moment in de vorming van een assemblage het infra-assemblage. Zij noemen als voorbeeld een kind dat bang is in het donker en een liedje neuriet om zijn angst te bezweren. Door het zingen van een bekend deuntje probeert het kind een veilig milieu voor zichzelf te creëren (ibid.: 311). Het trekt als het ware een cirkel om zichzelf heen, die een territorium markeert. Dit is het moment waarop het ritme expressief wordt: ‘Territorialization is an act of rhythm that has become expressive, or of milieu components that have become qualitative. The marking of a territory is dimensional, but it is not a meter, it is a rhythm’ (ibid.: 315). Een goed voorbeeld is het territoriale gedrag van de Zuid-Afrikaanse blauwaap. Om het territorium van zijn groep af te bakenen laat deze aap zijn felgekleurde geslachtsdelen zien. Op het moment dat hij dit doet wordt zijn penis losgekoppeld van diens organische functie en gerecodeerd in relatie tot een territorium. Het is niet langer een seksueel orgaan, maar wordt de markering van een territorium. Dit territorium bestaat niet vooraf aan deze markering, maar wordt door deze markering geproduceerd. Wanneer we het omdraaien is er niet langer sprake van ritme als territorialiserende expressie, maar van geterritorialiseerde functies. Het gedrag van de aap is niet te herleiden tot een functie van het territorium en kan dus ook niet door dit territorium verklaard worden. De markering is een gebeurtenis, waarbij iets nieuws in bestaan wordt gebracht (ibid.)¹².

Binnen het territorium dat door de markering tot stand wordt gebracht, vindt een reorganisatie van functies en een hergroepering van krachten plaats. De intensieve ritmes van het infra-assemblage organiseren zich in een extensief territorium. De blauwaapjes maken van een boom in het territorium hun slaapplek, ze gebruiken de insecten die hierin

leven als voedsel en ze smeden sociale verbanden door elkaar te vlooien. Het afgebakende territorium wordt georganiseerd; er ontstaat een intra-assemblage: ‘The forces of chaos are kept outside as much as possible, and the interior space protects the germinal forces of a task to fulfill or a deed to do. This involves an activity of selection, elimination and extraction[...]’ (ibid.: 311). Het intra-assemblage heeft een zekere stabiliteit verworven ten opzichte van het infra-assemblage, maar is niet gefixeerd. De geterritorialiseerde functies en krachten van dit assemblage kunnen plots een autonomie verwerven, waardoor ze overgaan in een ander assemblage. Er vormt zich een inter-assemblage: een element uit het territoriale assemblage wordt gedeterritorialiseerd en gaat over in een ander assemblage of constitueert een nieuw assemblage¹³.

Omdat assemblages voortdurend in een proces van de- en reterritorialisering zijn verwickeld, kunnen we stellen dat ze ritmisch zijn. Assemblages zijn open constellaties van heterogene elementen, die ritmische wordingen met elkaar aangaan. Deze wordingen zijn ritmisch omdat ze niet totaliserend zijn. De elementen die aan elkaar gekoppeld worden behouden hun eigenheid. Er is geen sprake van een herleiding van het ene element tot het andere, maar ieder van de elementen geeft zijn eigen betekenis aan de gemaakte koppeling. Deleuze & Guattari geven als voorbeeld de relatie tussen een wesp en een orchidee. De orchidee koppelt zich los van haar territorium om zich aan de wesp te verbinden, die haar stuifmeel zal verspreiden. De wesp wordt dus gedeterritorialiseerd: hij wordt ingevoegd in een ander territorium op het moment dat hij onderdeel wordt van het reproductieve apparaat van de orchidee. De wesp reterritorialiseert vervolgens de orchidee door als insect op de bloem te reageren en deze als voedselbron te gebruiken (ibid.: 10). Het wesp-orchidee assemblage genereert een verschil; een ritme dat beide termen met zich meesleurt. De verhouding tussen de componenten van het assemblage is rizomatisch. Dit geldt eveneens voor de verhouding tussen assemblages. Deleuze & Guattari zetten deze rizomatische structuur af tegen een wortelstructuur die lineair, hiërarchisch en gecentraliseerd is. De consistentie van een assemblage is niet van bovenaf opgelegd, maar komt voort uit de immanente werkzaamheid van het assemblage zelf. Er is samenhang, maar deze is chaotisch, heterogeen en veelvoudig. Ongelijksoortige elementen (planten, dieren,

dingen, mensen) koppelen zich op lokaal niveau aan elkaar en vormen knooppunten, waaruit weer nieuwe heterogene koppelingen kunnen ontstaan (ibid.: 327-329).

Het refrein met zijn drie momenten (de markering, de organisatie en de opening van een territorium) vormt het model voor de rizomatische beweging van het leven, dat zich niet laat onderwerpen aan de maat¹⁴. Het stelt ons in staat het leven te denken als ritmische flux, die organische en anorganische lichamen aan elkaar koppelt. Wanneer we dit model toepassen op het hierboven besproken voorbeeld van het elektriciteitsnetwerk ontstaat er een ander beeld dan wanneer we dit netwerk vanuit het moderne denkkader bezien. Als we dit netwerk beschouwen als een ritmisch assemblage kunnen we de objecten die in dit netwerk circuleren (het plastic, de elektronen, de economische theorieën, enzovoorts) niet langer denken als passieve materie. Het wordt mogelijk om over materie te denken als iets dat beschikt over een vermogen tot handelen (hoewel dit een ander handelen is dan het menselijk handelen) en in staat is om nieuwe en onvoorspelbare gebeurtenissen te bewerkstelligen. De mens staat niet buiten dit netwerk maar is er onderdeel van: zij is ingebed in de zwerm van actanten. Ook wordt zichtbaar dat we materie niet simpelweg kunnen begrijpen in termen van de mechanische herhaling van een lineaire causaliteit, zoals wel wordt verondersteld door het moderne denkkader. Deze klassieke opvatting van causaliteit gaat er vanuit dat er een uniek, noodzakelijk, eenzijdig en proportioneel verband bestaat tussen oorzaak en effect. Zij gaat uit van de formule: ‘Same Cause, Same Effect, Always’ (Delanda, 2011: 383). De werking van het elektriciteitsnetwerk toont dat we in plaats van effecten die voortvloeien uit eenduidige oorzaken, te maken hebben met circuits en feedback loops waarin effecten en oorzaken van positie wisselen en in elkaar overvloeien. Er is sprake van emergente causaliteit (Bennett, 2010: 33). Het elektriciteitsnetwerk toont zich binnen het nieuwe denkkader als méér dan een door en voor mensen ontworpen systeem. Het wordt zichtbaar als een zelfregulerend mechanisme dat iets gedaan heeft dat daadwerkelijk onvoorspelbaar is en dat we niet kunnen reduceren tot een simpele oorzaak-gevolg relatie. Het netwerk is in staat een verschil te produceren; het is ritmisch.

Dit idee staat lijnrecht tegenover het moderne idee van een intentioneel subject dat de materie, die passief zou zijn, naar haar hand kan zetten. Wanneer we gaan kijken naar de wereld in termen van ritmische assemblages dan verliest deze opvatting van de mens aan plausibiliteit. We moeten ons afvragen of het idee van een sterke, autonome intentionaliteit, dat onderdeel is van het moderne denkkader, wel daadwerkelijk bestaat. Latour stelt dat een denkkader waarin het mogelijk is om objecten te denken als actanten, vraagt om een ander mensbeeld. Zolang we ons mensbeeld construeren in contrast met een wereld van levenloze objecten, zullen we mens noch niet-mens kunnen begrijpen. Latour stelt daarom voor de mens te begrijpen als een *weaver of morphisms*:

‘The expression “anthropomorphic” considerably underestimates our humanity. We should be talking about morphism. Morphism is the place where technomorphisms, zoomorphisms, phusimorphisms, ideomorphisms, theomorphisms, sociomorphisms, psychomorphisms, all come together. Their alliances and their exchanges, taken together, are what define the anthropos. [...] The closer the anthropos comes to this distribution, the more human it is. [...] By seeking to isolate its form from those it churns together, one does not defend humanism, one loses it.’ (Latour, 1993: 137)

Ritmisch denken en leven

In het voorgaande heb ik, aan de hand van de Amerikaanse stroomstoring, geprobeerd te laten zien hoe Deleuze & Guattari’s concept van ritme ons inzicht geeft in het hybride karakter van de wereld. Wanneer we Deleuze & Guattari volgen in het idee dat ritme het eerste woord van het leven is, dan moeten we zeggen dat het assemblage het eerste en tevens het laatste woord van het leven is. Dat wil zeggen dat er niets bestaat buiten deze assemblages. Ook de mens niet. Het is niet zo dat wij bestaan en vervolgens worden opgenomen in assemblages: mijn bestaan bestaat in mijn participatie aan assemblages. Sterker nog; ik *bén* een assemblage. Ik ben een complexe samenstelling van organische en anorganische elementen, waarin geen enkel element een geprivilegieerde rol speelt. Bennett wijst ons daarop in een passage waarin zij laat zien dat ons lichaam wordt bevolkt door niet-menselijke entiteiten:

'My flesh is populated and constituted by different swarms of foreigners. The crook of my elbow, for example, is a special ecosystem, a bountiful home to no fewer than six tribes of bacteria. They are helping to moisturize the skin by processing the raw fats it produces. The bacteria in the human microbiome collectively possess at least 100 times as many genes as the mere 20.000 or so in the human genome.' (Bennett, 2010: 112)

Het besef dat de mens voor een groot deel uit niet-menselijk materiaal bestaat en dus zelf een hybride of assemblage is, brengt het moderne antropocentrisme aan het wankelen. Ik ben niet begiftigd met 'agency' of intentionaliteit, maar deze behoren toe aan de assemblages waarvan ik onderdeel uitmaak. Deze assemblages hebben een eigen werkzaamheid; een eigen ritme, dat de elementen die onderdeel zijn van het assemblage met zich meesleurt. Er bestaat daarom niet zoiets als een 'ik'. Dit 'ik' is altijd al een groep; een zwerm, zo constateren Deleuze & Guattari. Wij spreken slechts over een 'ik' uit gewoonte (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 3).

Ook ons denken is een effect van ritmische assemblages. Het is immanent aan de assemblages waaruit het voortkomt; het gaat niet aan ze vooraf en kan niet aan ze ontstijgen. Wanneer we het denken boven of tegenover deze assemblages plaatsen ontstaan er misleidende abstracties, zoals het moderne subject-object onderscheid. Het idee van een object, dat neutraal en passief is, kan enkel ontstaan wanneer we iets loskoppelen van het assemblage waar het onderdeel van is. Hetzelfde kan gezegd worden van het idee van het subject. Het idee van een vrij individu dat intentioneel handelt en de objectieve materie naar eigen inzicht kan bewerken, kan enkel bestaan wanneer we de mens loskoppelen van de assemblages waaraan zij immanent is. Deleuze & Guattari's concept van ritme produceert zodoende een ecologisch bewustzijn dat breekt met het moderne kritische bewustzijn en betrokkenheid bij en verantwoordelijkheid voor de wereld mogelijk maakt. Zij breken de moderne constructie van het autonome individu af en tonen dat wij knooppunten zijn in een hybride netwerk. Hierdoor wordt zichtbaar dat het vermogen tot handelen nooit is toe te schrijven aan een individuele actant, maar een eigenschap is van een netwerk of assemblage, bestaande uit een mix van menselijke en niet-menselijke entiteiten. Het voorbeeld van het elektriciteitsnetwerk

illustreert dit. Het laat zien dat alles gebeurt in het ritmische midden. Dit midden is dan ook de plek waar vanuit wij de wereld om ons heen moeten denken. Het denken moet zelf ritmisch worden; het moet vertrekken vanuit de assemblages waarin het is ingebed en niet vanuit een algemeen denkkader. In dat laatste geval zou er sprake zijn van een metrisch denken, dat de wereld onderwerpt aan abstracte principes. Het moderne denkkader is hiervan het voorbeeld bij uitstek. Wat we nodig hebben zijn geen nieuwe abstracties, maar aandacht voor de concrete assemblages. Alleen dan is het mogelijk voorbij het subject-object onderscheid te denken en nieuwe manieren van leven te exploreren in een aan hybridisering onderhevige wereld.

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Noten

1. Whitehead beschrijft deze bifurcatie in termen van het onderscheid tussen primaire en secundaire kwaliteiten, waarbij de primaire kwaliteiten worden toegeschreven aan de fysieke wereld en de secundaire kwaliteiten aan het menselijk bewustzijn. Het gevolg hiervan is een scheiding tussen enerzijds de levenloze natuur en anderzijds het vrije bewustzijn (Whitehead, 1920: 32).
2. 'Centraal in [Rancières] werk staat [...] de zogenaamde "verdeling van het zintuiglijk waarneembare". Dankzij die zintuiglijke waarneming hebben wij iets gemeenschappelijks, namelijk een zintuiglijkheid of zintuiglijk domein waarin we ons ophouden, waarover we samen debatteren of dat ons aan het denken zet. [...] De politieke gemeenschap bestaat vanuit die gedeelde zintuiglijke gemeenschappelijkheid. Maar de deling betekent niet alleen dat we iets delen maar ook dat het politieke verdeeld, opgesplitst en afgebakend wordt. [...] De deling wordt gereguleerd door regimes die bepalen wat zichtbaar wordt en wat niet. Een regime [...] reguleert de "relatie tussen aanwezigheid en afwezigheid" [...] (Ieven, 2011: 379-380).
3. Latour ontleent deze termen aan Michel Serres: 'This quasi-object is not an object, but it is one nevertheless, since it is not a subject, since it is in the world; it is also a quasi-

subject, since it Marks or designates a subject who, without is, would not be a subject' (Serres, 1982: 225). Serres illustreert dit aan de hand van de rol van de bal in een voetbalwedstrijd. De bal is niet louter een object dat door de voetballers wordt gebruikt om een doelpunt te scoren en de wedstrijd te winnen. De bal heeft subjectieve eigenschappen, omdat hij functioneert als een attractor, die de spelers met zich meetrokt en het spel mede bepaalt: 'The collective game doesn't need persons, people out for themselves. [...] The ball isn't there for the body; the exact contrary is true: the body is the object of the ball; the subject moves around this sun. Skill with the ball is recognized in the player who follows the ball and serves it instead of making it follow him and using it. It is the subject of the body, subject of bodies, and like a subject of subjects. Playing is nothing else but making oneself the attribute of the ball as a substance' (1982: 227).

4. Philippe Descola heeft de kosmologie van de Aguar uitgebreid bestudeerd. Zie bijvoorbeeld: Descola, P. (1996) *In the Society of Nature: A Native Ecology in Amazonia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

5. Dit idee vinden we ook terug bij andere denkers. Het is één van de belangrijkste thema's binnen een recente denkbeweging in de continentale filosofie, die door de denkers die zich met deze beweging associëren wel wordt aangeduid als de *speculative turn*. Wat de denkers binnen deze beweging met elkaar gemeen hebben is een streven om voorbij de moderne kritische filosofie en de postmoderne *linguistic turn* te denken. Dit uit zich onder andere in een wending van epistemologische naar ontologische vraagstukken, een hernieuwde interesse voor materialisme en realisme en een afwijzing van het zogenaamde correlationisme tussen denken en zijn; dat wil zeggen het idee dat we het denken en het zijn enkel in relatie tot elkaar kunnen denken en nooit apart van elkaar (Bryant, Srnicek & Harman, 2011).

6. Zie voor het volledige verslag van de storing het rapport van de U.S.- Canada Power Outage Task Force, dat geschreven werd in opdracht van de Canadese premier Jean Chrétien en de Amerikaanse president George W. Bush. Dit rapport is te raadplegen via: <http://www.nerc.com/docs/docs/blackout/doe121603a.pdf>.

7. Een goed voorbeeld van het gebruik van *ritornello* is te horen in Bachs 'Brandenburg Concerto No.2'.

8. Een voorbeeld van muziek waarin ritme vrij wordt gemaakt van de conventionele maat vinden Deleuze & Guattari in het werk van de Franse componist Olivier Messiaen (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 320). De vrije ritmische vormgeving die we in diens werk aantreffen was geïnspireerd door het gezang van vogels, die hij in een gesprek met Claude Samuel omschreef als: '[...] the greatest musicians existing on our planet' (Samuel, 1976: 51). Dit is uiteraard een interessant gegeven voor Deleuze & Guattari omdat Messiaen hiermee laat zien dat er een continuüm bestaat tussen menselijke en dierlijke creativiteit.

9. Deleuze verzet zich tegen de klassieke metafysica die op zoek is naar de grond van de wereld en ons weten van deze wereld. Hij veruult deze grond voor het concept van het worden, dat de rol die de transcendent grond speelt in de traditionele metafysica in zekere zin overneemt, maar dan wel op een heel andere manier. Het worden is namelijk een on-grond. Deleuze spreekt wel van *effondement*, wat een samentrekking is van de woor-

den *fondement* (fundament) en *effonrement* (instorting). Het begrip verwijst naar: '[...] een grond die gekenmerkt is door een algehele ontgronding. Daarmee bedoelt hij dat de zoektocht van de filosofie naar een grond of een fundament van de dingen uitloopt op het feit dat er geen grond of fundament is' (De Bolle, 2009: 371).

10. Dat de chaos beschikt over een immanent ordeningsprincipe wil zeggen dat zij geen nood heeft aan een transcendente vorm die haar een ordening oplegt (Bonta & Protevi, 2004: 69).

11. Wanneer er sprake is van fixatie van een code spreken Deleuze & Guattari van een overcodering: heterogene codes worden teniet gedaan om een geünificeerde substantie te produceren (Bonta & Protevi, 2004: 122). Dit is het moment waarop ritme maat wordt.

12. Daarom stellen Deleuze & Guattari dat niet alleen mensen, maar alle levende wezens, kunstenaars zijn: '[...] what is called *art brut* is [...] merely this constitution, this freeing, of matters of expression in the movement of territoriality: the base or ground of art. Take anything and make it a matter of expression. [...] Of course, from this standpoint art is not the privilege of human beings' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 316).

13. Inter-assemblages vormen zich middels relatieve deterritorialisering en niet via een absolute deterritorialisering. In het laatste geval onttrekt het element zich aan alle assemblages en wordt er iets absoluut nieuws gecreëerd. Dit is het moment waarop muziek het refrein deterritorialiseert: 'Het transformeren van refreinen tijdens het muzikale schepingsproces, het creëren van iets echt nieuws, is een "ander(s)-worden". Elke muzikale inventie beweegt zich via een dergelijk ander(s)-worden, via een doorbreken van algemeen bekende en aanvaarde coördinaten van tijd en identiteit: de tijd raakt ontwricht en identiteiten worden nog slechts bepaald door snelheden, intensiteiten, beweging en affecten' (Cobussen, 2009: 256).

14. '[...] a rhizome or multiplicity never allows itself to be overcoded, never has available a supplementary dimension over and above its number of lines, that is, over and above the multiplicity of numbers attached to those lines' (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987: 9).

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