PhD defence M.P. (Maria) Sacco

Corruption, defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (1) has a very broad scope, which includes bribery, trading in influence, abuse of functions, and various acts of corruption in the private sector. This study focuses on bribery, defined as “the offering, promising, giving, accepting or soliciting of an advantage as an inducement for an action which is illegal, unethical or a breach of trust” (2) . When looking at the data on the enforcement of this cross-border corporate crime, a relevant trend stands out. In three out of four cases, corrupt transactions took place through third-party intermediaries, defined as a person “who is put in contact with or in between two or more trading parties” (3) . 
Notwithstanding these statistics, the law and economics literature has paid little attention to measure how the presence of third-party intermediaries in international business transactions affects the efficiency of the liability regimes imposed on corporate entities. This study aims to fill this gap in order to identify the legislative framework for optimal deterrence of international corporate bribery, when intermediaries are involved. The analysis is conducted from a positive and normative perspective. In the first instance, a comparative analysis of the legislative measures adopted to address foreign corporate bribery committed by intermediaries is undertaken. To this end, two international conventions (the OECD Convention and the United Nations Convention against Corruption) and three national legislations (the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the UK Bribery Act and the Italian Legislative Decree n. 231/2001) are analysed. In the second instance, through the lenses of the economic analysis of corporate crime, the following research questions are explored:
(i)    Assuming the goal of social welfare maximization, should corporations be held vicariously liable for crimes committed by the intermediaries?
(ii)    Is there a difference in effectiveness between anti-bribery compliance (ABC) program addressing employees and those addressing intermediaries? And if so - may this difference justify, from a welfare maximization point of view, a variation between the structure of the corporate liability regime applicable to employee misconduct and the one applicable to misconduct of third parties?
(iii)    What is the role that certifications of ABC programs adopted by third parties may play in improving the efficiency of ABC enforcement policies?
This analysis has shown that, in order to favour the internalisation of the social harm of crime, the vicarious liability of companies should be extended beyond the employment relationship. If the application of vicarious liability is restricted to the ‘master-servant’ relationship, companies may be incentivised to strategically delegate illegal actions. Consistently with this result, all the legislative measures analysed in this study appear to have extended the scope of corporate criminal liability beyond corporate employees. 

The public defence will take place at the Senate Hall, 1st floor Erasmus Building, location campus Woudestein. The ceremony will begin exactly at 13.00 PM. In light of the solemn nature of the ceremony, we recommend that you do not take children under the age of 6 to the first part of the ceremony.