Dr. Aki Lehtinen
The welfare consequences of strategic voting
prof. Uskali Mäki and prof. Jack Vromen
I investigate social choice theory and the theory of strategic voting from a methodological and philosophical point of view. The main finding from the strategic voting model can be put briefly as follows: strategic voting can be expected to lead to better results than sincere voting in majority rule under reasonable assumptions. The methodological importance of this result is clear, but the philosophical and methodological basis of the model that produce this result are not widely accepted among philosophers and economists working in social choice theory. I therefore need to argue for this philosophical basis. Doing so requires a philosophical investigation of utility theory.
Research interests: Rational choice theory; Philosophical foundations of game theory; Economics-inspired research in political science; Voting theory and normative issues in economics; The role of simulation in economics.
October 10, 2007
E-mail: aki.lehtinen@ helsinki.fi