PhD defence J.A. (Jan) de Ruiter

Below is a brief summary of the dissertation:

In 1889, an extensive debate that was accompanied by a lot of emotion finally resulted in
the adoption of the labour law. Little or no support had been gained from the conservative
side. Nevertheless, this law represented an important step forward in the protection of
the workers. However, its implementation and enforcement continued to pose problems,
mainly because of the reluctance of conservatives to set up an adequate civil service for
control and enforcement. The Labour Act of 1919 of Minister Aalberse, the establishment
of the High Council of Labour (1919) and the Labour Disputes Act of 1923 therefore
meant major steps forward in the field of the regulation of labour in general and the
prevention of exclusion and strikes in particular.
Despite this legislation, Minister Piet Aalberse was confronted with the problem of
persistent labour disputes, a problem that harmed not only the economy, but also
national interests. In response, he proposed to abolish the Chambers of Labour and
instead to appoint state mediators through the Labour Disputes Act of 1923. This
decision was motivated by both financial considerations and the need to promote more
effectively that labour disputes did not result in lockouts and major strikes. However,
Aalberse's motive for coming up with the Labour Disputes Act was not only to limit the
economic damage. He also wanted to curb the advance of the socialists.
It took some time before the Labour Disputes Act was introduced, also because various
draft laws were circulating and there was discussion about the best approach to the
problem. Employers and employees had different views on the bill, but both were
reluctant. The employers feared an increasing influence of the government in labour
disputes, while the employees hoped for better protection of their interests, but feared
restricting their freedom to strike. These conflicting interests contributed to the delay in
the introduction of the law. The employers mainly objected to the possibility offered by
the Labour Disputes Act to conduct an audit. This meant that in extreme cases,
companies had to provide access to the company's business operations and financial
data. Despite the vehement objections of the business community, parliament has
agreed to this. This happened under the pressure of circumstances, such as the
revolutionary wind that blew through Europe in those years. However, it was mainly the
skill of Minister Aalberse who defended the bill, that the law was adopted by both Houses
despite the many objections.
The Rotterdam port strike of 1920 was also crucial in this. She emphasized the need to
come up with legislation to prevent and settle labour disputes. Due to a lack of authority
and resources, the Chambers of Labour had not succeeded in fulfilling a mediating role
over the years. The large and prolonged textile strike in Twente and the Achterhoek (1923-
1924) emphasized the need for legislation but also brought to the fore the divisions within
the labour movement. The radical trade union movement (Federation) was against a
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compromise, while the confessional trade union movement (Central Union) wanted to
reach a solution through a compromise. Aalberse offered mediation but was criticized by
both employers and workers. The employers feared a possible infringement of their
freedom of negotiation, while the workers were divided on whether to accept arbitration.
During this period, there were three types of government intervention in exclusion and
prolonged strikes, which were practiced in the various countries in the industrial world.
First, there was the freedom of organizations. This was applied in most countries and left
as much freedom as possible to the employers' and employees' organizations to resolve
their disputes without government intervention. In addition, in some countries there was
the obligatory reconciliation, a model that originated in Canada and was later also
introduced in Norway. This required the parties to refrain from strikes unless the dispute
had first been submitted to a conciliation council. The third type, that of binding
government regulation, was the most far-reaching and gave the government the power to
impose the terms of employment in a binding manner, either at the request of one of the
parties or on its own initiative. This system, applied in Australia and New Zealand, could
even prohibit strikes and lockouts. Aalberse leaned towards the first type, with the
emphasis on voluntary mediation and arbitration. He based his design partly on the
Swedish model, with the possibility of submitting disputes to an arbitral tribunal if
necessary. The most resistance, but rarely applied, was against the due diligence offered
by the Labour Disputes Act of 1923.
In the 1920s and 1930s, the actions of the state mediators had been reasonably
successful, although the success remained highly dependent on the actions of the
individual government mediator and his skills and authority. He had to persuade
employers and employees to reach a compromise on a voluntary basis. The state
mediator had little power, but the best among them had a lot of authority. Their
statements were not coercive, but they were public. This publicity could have a coercive
character, because in many cases neither the employer nor the trade union wanted to be
called obstructive.
For a long time, employment contracts and therefore disputes were individual in nature.
Mutual solidarity could nevertheless lead to larger, often wildcat strikes breaking out. As
the workers became better organized and the unions started to negotiate more often on
behalf of the workers with representatives of the employers, the negotiations about the
working conditions became more serious and the agreements sometimes became
applicable to entire industries. The latter received an enormous boost with the Collective
Employment Conditions Act of 1927 and the Universally Binding Collective Employment
Conditions Act of 1935.
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In Germany, the trade union movement gained enormous influence and a certain degree
of participation in the period of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933). This German history
was important for this research, because elements of it were imported into the
Netherlands during the occupation in 1940. The government of the Weimar Republic,
mostly dominated by the Social Democrats (SPD), carried out modernizations and
stimulated the conclusion of collective labour contracts to obtain peace in the labour
market. The German Mediation Act (Schlichtungsverordnung) of 1923 arose from the
need to deal with the economic crisis and monetary chaos and aimed to bring social
calm to the chaotic post-World War I German society. The working method of the
mediation committees and mediators set up was aimed at promoting collective
bargaining contracts. If no agreement could be reached, the decision of a binding
mediation could be imposed. This system was fundamentally different from that in the
Netherlands. In Germany, mediators could also act on their own initiative, and the focus
was on compulsory arbitration and the promotion of collective bargaining by the
government. The aim was to ensure that mediation decisions were considered fair and
reasonable for both parties and were necessary from a socio-economic point of view.
This approach did show some similarities with the powers and working methods of the
government mediator in the Netherlands but differed greatly due to compulsory
arbitration and government intervention in promoting collective bargaining contracts.
In the interwar period, the Netherlands had the illusion for a long time that it would be
able to maintain a neutral status in the next conflict, just as it did during the First World
War. The preparations for a possible German attack included, apart from the economic
war preparations, mainly the preparation of the Military Authority and the mobilization of
the army. The attack on the Netherlands in 1940 resulted in the capitulation of the Dutch
armed forces as early as 15 May. The government had fled to London and the
commander-in-chief, General Henri Winkelman, was assigned civil authority. Next to him,
a College of Secretaries-General acted as a kind of government for the occupied country
in wartime.
The policy of the Board of Secretaries-General sometimes differed greatly from that of the
commander-in-chief. Winkelman, who adopted a stricter attitude towards the occupying
forces in matters concerning the economic activities that could be accepted under
international law for the benefit of the occupier, was deposed by Reichskommissar
Seyss-Inquart on June 3rd, 1940, after which the College of Secretaries-General
continued its own. The cooperation with the German authorities was necessary to
continue daily life and prevent chaos. Before leaving for London, the government had
given instructions to the civil service, which had to ensure that there would be no chaos
and that daily life would continue as well as possible. In that sense, cooperation with the
Germans was inevitable. The choices and decisions of individual secretaries-general,
such as Scholtens and Verwey, were influenced by the circumstances and pressure of the
German occupier. Some adapted, others tried to stick to constitutional principles, but in
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the end, many had to make compromises in order to continue functioning in the occupied
country.
The role of the state mediators during the occupation and their role after the liberation is
an interesting aspect of the occupation history that has often been overlooked. Although
there were few direct government measures in the field of wages and working conditions
before 1940, the state mediators were suddenly assigned a crucial role in determining
these during the occupation. The German occupation authorities tried to maintain
elements of the Dutch system under National Socialist rule but were confronted with
resistance and escape from the control mechanisms that had been introduced in
Germany. For a long time, the Board of State Mediators tried to navigate between the
coercion of the German system and the freedom of the Dutch negotiation process.
Decree 0.800 of General Henri Winkelman of 28 May 1940 marked the beginning of a new
phase, in which the then formed Board of State Mediators was given a central role in
determining wages and working conditions. The new guidelines, which emphasized the
state's leading role in setting wages and working conditions, were met with concern by
the college. They feared that this would not only sideline the negotiating partners, but also
that it was not in line with their own views or with Dutch interests. The Germans' demand
to provide monthly statements of rejected and granted requests regarding wages and
working conditions was seen as an interference with their autonomy and was rejected by
the college. In the end, however, complete control of the wage policy was organized
according to the National Socialist Leadership principle. The introduction of the
Ordinance 'Law on the Organization of Labour' (at the end of 1942), driven by Berlin,
meant the end of the College of State Mediators and the arrival of the Labour
Representative.
The Labour Delegate, C.J. van Rijst, tried to fit in with the policy of the Municipal
Executive, but he was faced with an almost impossible task because of his lack of
authority and the lack of cooperation of the parties involved. It is fascinating to see how
different groups, such as the NAF and the Landstand, strived for a different approach to
labour regulation, often in line with their conception of National Socialist principles. The
tensions and conflicts that arose from this show the complexity of the political and social
landscape during the war years. Within National Socialist ranks, both German and Dutch,
there was a continuous internal power struggle. Van Rijst had difficulty getting a grip on
the development of wages and working conditions, partly because the economic
situation deteriorated rapidly due to the war. Production remained reasonably high, but
an increasing part of it was destined for the front, so that fewer and fewer consumer
goods were available to the Dutch population. This put pressure on the artificially low
price level. Despite all the measures, prices and wages continued to rise, mainly due to a
growing black market. Van Rijst tried to prevent total chaos with his policy and took
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measures to control the wage and price spiral, but this was very complicated due to the
limited distribution of consumer goods and the increase in black wages.
The dissolution of the Dutch employers' and employees' organizations and the formation
of the National Labor Front under the leadership of the NSB member Hendrik Jan
Woudenberg caused further complications in the consultations between the
representatives of the employers and the employees. The consultations of
representatives of the abolished employers' and employees' organizations could only be
continued illegally. In this secret meeting, which was led by the Heineken director Dirk
Stikker from 1943 onwards, plans were forged for a new organization called the Labor
Foundation. After the liberation, it would have to play an important role in regulating
wages and working conditions. It is interesting to see how with an external enemy, the
German occupier, the leaders of the employers' and employees' organizations grew
closer together and laid the foundation for the Labor Foundation. Soon after the
liberation, however, their plans appeared to clash with the vision of the government in
London, which wanted to maintain the role of the College of State Mediators, the role it
had acquired during the war.
After the liberation of the south of the Netherlands in the autumn of 1944, the Dutch
Military Authority took over the civil authority and measures were also taken in the field of
wages and working conditions to prevent chaos. The Extraordinary Decree on Labour
Relations (BBA44) led to the appointment of a new government mediator, Mr De Muralt.
However, the cooperation with the Labour Affairs section of the Military Authority was
difficult, which did not benefit the first objective of the policy, the maintenance of order
and peace. It seems that the post-war period in the Netherlands was characterized by a
complex interplay between different parties, both inside and outside the government. The
Labour Foundation strived for a more active role in determining working conditions and
the recovery of the economy after the liberation but encountered several obstacles. The
return of the state mediator and the arrangements that the government had made
surprised them and Stikker and his colleagues, but Stikker was very angry about this. He
feared too big a role for the government in the labour system and preferred to arrange
things himself through the Labour Foundation. A letter that H.H. Maas sent to the
Secretary-General of Social Affairs immediately after the liberation of the south of the
Netherlands provides insight into the lack of clarity and chaos that prevailed there. The
lack of clear guidelines and a lack of continuity in policy after the dismantling of the
Labour Attorney's Office have contributed to these problems. Maas emphasized the need
for a coherent approach to prevent social unrest.
In 1944 Van Rhijn made the statement, "The old, which was wrong, has irrevocably
become obsolete. We are entering a new era." He wrote this in the foreword to New
Labour Relations, a booklet that was published under the editorship of Anton Coolen and
gave the vision of the Dutch government in London on the future after the liberation. It
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provides a summary of the most important laws and regulations in the field of
employment conditions that existed in 1944. What exactly Van Rhijn meant by the old, the
wrong thing that had irrevocably been discarded, was not made clear in the booklet. He
most likely meant social inequality and the contradiction between labour and capital. Van
Rhijn saw a more active role for the government, not only as guardian of the public
interest, but also in economic and employment matters. Until the occupation period, the
government had been extremely reluctant to deal with the economy. With the liberation,
first in the south of the Netherlands and later for the whole country, the government was
given a dominant role, a role that became decisive for the relatively rapid reconstruction
of the country and for a system of measures that gave the welfare state a solid footing.