How can we prevent sanctioned goods from travelling to Russia via the Netherlands?

What is a crime script? 

To bridge that gap, the researchers used a crime script – a method that breaks down a crime into scenes, each with its own roles and actions. “This isn’t about why someone commits a crime, but how that crime can be committed,” explains Van Santvoord. By systematically mapping this out, individual scenes become apparent, in which different actors operate with their own roles and tools. This approach makes it possible to identify preventive measures, something that a standard description of a crime does not provide. 

For their analysis, Van Santvoord and Visser examined three Dutch court cases from the period 2022 to 2024, supplemented by news articles and five interviews with investigating officers. This resulted in a script comprising five scenes. “It begins with setting up, taking over or adapting a Dutch company, in which the Chamber of Commerce plays a key role. Legal entities are, in fact, increasingly being misused for criminal activities, and extra supervision of crime-prone sectors could make a difference here,” explains Van Santvoord. 

The perpetrator, who often has a knowledge of the Russian language and culture, then seeks out buyers in Russia. The requested goods are subsequently purchased on the European or North American market, after which a diversion route via a third country is identified. The process concludes with the actual shipment, during which false documents are used to conceal the goods’ true destination. Similar investigations elsewhere in Europe reveal largely the same roles and routes, although the type of goods varies by country: in the Netherlands, the maritime sector and the semiconductor industry play a particularly significant role, whilst countries bordering Russia are more frequently confronted with physical smuggling.  

Demand rather than supply 

One of the most striking findings is that the trade in sanctioned goods is demand-driven, in contrast to, for example, the drug trade. “In the case of sanctions, we see orders being placed from Russia for specific goods, which are then purchased by perpetrators in the Netherlands and delivered via transit countries,” says Van Santvoord. According to him, there is a logical explanation for this difference. Shipping highly specialised electronics without there being any demand for them is simply not profitable. This dynamic also means that manufacturers and suppliers of sought-after goods have a major influence on the survival of the illegal trade, as they can prevent their products from falling into the wrong hands. 

The analysis also reveals an intertwining of corporate crime, organised crime and state actors. Some perpetrators breach sanctions purely to make more money, others see an opportunity within organised crime, and still others act on behalf of the Russian state, for example by acquiring goods or knowledge and transferring them to Russia via an extensive network of companies. The latter type poses a relatively new challenge for law enforcement. “The state actor is a new breed,” says Van Santvoord. “The intelligence services have traditionally been active in this area, so there will need to be greater coordination between the investigative authorities and these services.” 

The key role of gatekeepers 

The research shows that banks are leading the way in identifying suspicious transactions, whilst other parties such as the Chamber of Commerce and customs agents are more often lagging behind. According to Van Santvoord, it would help if it were clearer to these parties when a product is subject to sanctions. “Trade in goods is complex; for example, it may be unclear what the commodity code is for a particular product. If manufacturers make this clearer, gatekeepers will be better able to determine whether the products in question are subject to sanctions.” 

The researchers also advocate for a central sanctions authority, such as the one already in place in Latvia. The Netherlands does not yet have such a body, which means that reports of possible breaches end up being scattered across various agencies. The Central Sanctions Reporting Centre (CMS) is now being set up. “This will also give the CMS a better overview of possible breaches taking place and enable it to pass this information on to regulators and the investigating authorities,” explains Visser. 

Towards a simpler system? 

With 21 rounds of sanctions now in place, the sanctions landscape has, according to the researchers, become increasingly complex. In their article, they therefore propose a radical alternative: banning all trade with Russia except for medical and food-related goods. “Giving the sanctions against Russia the widest possible scope would thus send a strong signal and emphasise the importance the EU attaches to upholding international law,” says Van Santvoord. At the same time, he acknowledges the downside. “Such a far-reaching trade ban could have major negative consequences for the Russian population and the European economy.” 

A starting point for a more effective approach 

Almost all sanctions against Russia have been imposed because of the invasion of Ukraine. “Violating these sanctions is not only a breach of the international legal order and security; it also poses a direct threat to lives during this invasion.” 

With their ‘crime script’, Van Santvoord and Visser not only provide insight into how sanctions are circumvented, but also offer a concrete starting point for policymakers, regulators and investigative authorities to combat such circumvention more effective.