PhD defence S.E. (Sara) Madera Gomez

Below is a brief summary of the dissertation:

Do animals feel pain or have complex sensations like humans do? In the seventeenth century, this question divided philosophers who all embraced mechanism, the view that nature operates like a machine. Cartesian philosophy, with its strict substance dualism, led to the doctrine that animals were mere machines without feelings or awareness. But was this conclusion inevitable for all mechanist thinkers?
This dissertation challenges that assumption. Through comparative analysis of five major mechanist philosophers -Descartes, Gassendi, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Leibniz- it demonstrates that mechanism itself didn't determine views on animal minds. Rather, certain Cartesian commitments created restrictive positions on animals. Other mechanists, working within the same mechanical framework but with different philosophical foundations, developed their views in opposition to Cartesian doctrine, maintaining that animals could possess sensation, perception, and sentience.
This research reveals how philosophical systems beyond scientific methodology shape the understanding of animals in the 17th century.