prof.dr. (Otto) O.H. Swank

prof.dr. (Otto) O.H. Swank

Professor of Microeconomics, in particular organizational economics

Full Professor Erasmus School of Economics Economics
Location
Burg. Oudlaan 50, Rotterdam
Room
E 1-13
Telephone
+31 10 4081448
Email
swank@ese.eur.nl

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Profile

        • O.H. Swank & F. Lippi (1999). Distributional motives and the inflationary bias. In F. Lippi (Ed.), Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility (pp. 63-72). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
        • O.H. Swank & F. Lippi (1999). Policy delegation and elections. In F. Lippi (Ed.), Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility (pp. 73-86). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
        • O.H. Swank & F. Lippi (1999). Policy targets, economic performance and central bank independence. In F. Lippi (Ed.), Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility (pp. 121-148). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
        • O.H. Swank (2003). A rationale for assessments of election programmes. In J.J. Graafland & A.P. Ros (Eds.), Economic assessement of election programmes: does it make sense (pp. 97-106). Boston/Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers
        • B. Visser & O.H. Swank (2009). Decision Making and Learning in a Globalizing World. (Extern rapport). Florence, Italy: European University Institute
        • S. Dominguez Martinez, O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2006). Disciplining and screening top executives. (Intern rapport, TI discussion Paper, no 2006-054/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • J. Swank, O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2006). Tranparancy and Pre-meetings. (Intern rapport, TI discussion papers, no TI 2006-051/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • S. Dominguez Martinez & O.H. Swank (2006). A simple model of self-assessments. (Intern rapport, TI Discussion Paper, no 2006-010/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2004). Sharing information through delegation and collaboration. (Intern rapport, Discussion Paper Tinbergen Institute, no 2004-042/1). :
        • S. Dominguez Martinez & O.H. Swank (2004). Does electoral competition create incentives for political parties to collect information about the pros and cons of alternative policies? (Intern rapport, Discussion Paper Tinbergen Institute, no 2004-133/1). :
        • P. Wrasai & O.H. Swank (2004). Policy makers, advisers and reputation. (Intern rapport, Discussion Paper Tinbergen Institute, no 2004-037/1). :
        • B. Visser & O.H. Swank (2003). Do elections lead to informed public decisions? (Intern rapport, TI Discussion Paper, no 03-067/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • K.J. Beniers & O.H. Swank (2003). On the composition of committees. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2003-006/1). :
        • O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2003). The consequences of endogenizing information for herd behavior. (Intern rapport, TI Discussion Paper, no 03-021/1). :
        • O.H. Swank & P. Wrasai (2002). Deliberation, information, aggregation and collective decision making. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2002-006/1). :
        • O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2002). Delegation or voting. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2002-005/1). :
        • G. Suurmond, O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2002). Vanity in politics: a problem? (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2002-123/1). :
        • I. Ossokina & O.H. Swank (2001). How polarization and political instability affect learning through experimentation. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2001-040/1). :
        • I. Ossokina & O.H. Swank (2001). The optimal degree of polarization. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2001-063/1). :
        • O.H. Swank, W.A. Letterie & H.P. van Dalen (1997). An economic theory of policy advice. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no TI97-090/1). :
        • O.H. Swank (2006). Transparency and Pre-meetings. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Instituut, no 051/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • O.H. Swank (2006). The self-perception theory vs. a dynamic learning model. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Instituut, no 92.01). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
      • O.H. Swank & I. Ossokina (2008). Adoption Subsidy Versus Technology Standards Under Asymmetric Information. In - Vol. 156. De Economist (pp. 241-267)
  • Economic Foundations

    Title
    Economic Foundations
    Year
    2018
    Year level
    (master)

    Micro-economie

    Title
    Micro-economie
    Year
    2018
    Year level
    (bachelor 1) (bachelor 1) (bachelor 1) (pre-master) (pre-master) (bachelor 1)
    • Than Nam Le

      Trade and Economic Development in a Global Production Network

    • Behrang Manouchehrabadi

      Institutions and Organizations: How Institutions Affect Organizational Governance, Scope and Incentives

    • Optimisation Models for Supply Chain Coordination under Information Asymmetry

      Rutger Kerkkamp

      Optimisation Models for Supply Chain Coordination under Information Asymmetry

  • Full Professor

    University
    Erasmus University Rotterdam
    School
    Erasmus School of Economics
    Department
    Economics
    Country
    Nederland
    Telephone
    +31 10 4081448

Address

Visiting address

Burg. Oudlaan 50 3062 PA Rotterdam

Postal address

Postbus 1738 3000 DR Rotterdam