Not All Repairs Are Equal: Repair Complexity and Competition Under the Right-To-Repair

Abstract

Many household appliances are replaced even though they are still technically repairable. The Right-to-Repair (RTR) aims to increase repairs by improving access to repair services and supporting independent repairers. However, better access does not necessarily make repair economically attractive. Failures differ in the labor and spare parts required to fix them, while the repair decision also depends on when the product fails. During the warranty period, the manufacturer bears the service cost and decides whether to repair or replace the product. After warranty expiration, the consumer chooses among manufacturer repair, independent repair, and replacement. We develop an analytical model to study how repair complexity affects repair decisions under RTR. During the warranty period, manufacturers repair simple failures and replace more complex ones. RTR requires manufacturers to repair all technically repairable products, even when replacement would be cheaper. The additional warranty cost depends on how many extra repairs are required and how costly these repairs are. We show that this burden is generally higher for budget products. After warranty expiration, independent repairers are better positioned for simple, labor-intensive repairs, while manufacturers are more competitive for complex, parts-intensive repairs. By improving independent repair effectiveness, RTR strengthens independent repairers’ competitive position. However, it primarily shifts existing repairs from manufacturers to independent repairers rather than preventing replacement. Evaluating RTR therefore requires considering not only how many repairs occur, but also who performs them and whether they prevent replacement. These findings help manufacturers identify the products most affected by the RTR and show policymakers that success should be measured by repair creation rather than repair reallocation.