Abstract
This course introduces the basic ideas of mechanism design – the study of how rules and allocation procedures work when participants have private information and act strategically. Using fundamental models and examples, the course covers core concepts such as incentive compatibility, individual rationality, efficiency, implementation, and revenue equivalence. The emphasis is on understanding standard theoretical results and how they are used in economic analysis.
The course is delivered online and consists of four sessions. There are no group projects, student presentations, or guest lectures. Students are expected to prepare by completing the assigned readings, attending all the sessions, and actively engaging during lectures. Learning is based on understanding the theoretical material presented in the sessions and is supported by independent study and reading.
The lectures cover standard topics in mechanism design. These include direct mechanisms and the revelation principle, incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints, and the design of allocation and transfer rules in environments with private information. The focus is on standard models and results used in economic analysis.
Each session combines a two-hour lecture component with a one-hour guided problem-solving session. The lectures introduce the formal theory of mechanism design. The guided problem-solving session focuses on working through selected exercises related to the lecture material.
- Explain core concepts of mechanism design
- Develop and analyze simple models of information asymmetry
- Connect mechanism-design theory to applications in economics, operations research, and information systems
To be announced later
Assessment
Participation: 100%
Workload
Total workload: 56 hours (2 ECTS)
- Online sessions: 12 hours
- Reading exercises: 20 hours
- Self-study and preparation: 30 hours
Attendance
Attendance in all sessions is mandatory. The course certificate will be issued only to participants who have attended all the sessions.
Students are expected to have prior knowledge of basic game theory, including static games of complete information, Nash equilibrium, and dominant strategies. Familiarity with expected utility and basic microeconomic concepts is assumed.
Contact
- Content related questions
Dr. Sameer Mehta
Email address - Enrolment related questions
ERIM Doctoral Office
Email address