PhD defence J.K.C. (Jeroen) Koenraadt

Dissertation in short:

Disclosure of financial information by firms is essential for the well-functioning capital markets, but there are several market frictions in the supply and demand of disclosure, and the different aspects of the complex disclosure process, that lead to sub-optimal levels in quantity and quality of disclosure. This dissertation explores three attempts of regulators, gatekeepers, and intermediaries in the financial information environment to address these frictions to improve capital markets. The first part of this dissertation investigates how investors perceive regulation that requires crypto token firms to disclose information, and shows that they perceive it as costly, or burdensome, but less so for crypto token companies that are already transparent. The second part of this dissertation investigates the introduction of the security markets regulator in the U.S. in 1934 and finds a very limited impact of a rule that forces public firms to get an audit on trust in capital markets. The last part of this dissertation finds that capital markets are better off when a platform that pays people for analysing stocks starts paying people more when they analyse a firm that has not received a lot of attention before. Overall, the three studies that form this dissertation build on the understanding of the constantly changing information environment and the role of regulators, gatekeepers, and intermediaries in addressing market frictions that lead to sub-optimal levels of credible and financial information, negatively affecting capital markets.