PhD defence M.A. (Muhammad) Siddiqi

Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs), such as pacemakers, cardioverter defibrillators, neurostimulators etc., belong to a class of highly life-critical, resource-constrained, deeply embedded systems out there. Their gradual conversion to wirelessly accessible devices in recent years has made them amenable to security attacks from malicious entities. This can lead to serious issues for the implant host, such as private-data theft and physical harm and is also reflected in numerous, successful ethical-hacking attempts, all made possible due to the absence of proper security provisions in these devices. This situation is a direct result of the lack of security standardization in this domain, the highly resource-constrained nature of IMDs, and the steep (re)certification costs of adding security, among others. The main goal behind this thesis is to rethink the way we approach IMD security, and to debunk the prevalent myths in this domain. Specifically, the thesis focuses on securing the communication between the IMD and an external device, which has a direct impact on patient safety and privacy. In addition, the thesis assesses the economic viability of adding security to IMDs. The analysis yields worrying signs down the road for implant manufacturers, as costs do not appear to scale. Clearly, a new approach to secure IMD design is called for.

The public defence will take place at the Prof. Andries Queridoroom, 3rd floor Education Center, location Erasmus MC. The ceremony will begin exactly at 13.00 PM. In light of the solemn nature of the ceremony, we recommend that you do not take children under the age of 6 to the first part of the ceremony.