In an increasingly globalized world, nation-states are confronted with issues that require international cooperation, expert knowledge and flexibility to resolve. Rather than taking the lead, parliaments are increasingly settling for a managerial position. They are outsourcing their rulemaking powers (and other constitutional responsibilities) rather than exercising these themselves.
Various lists of reasons for the outsourcing of rulemaking powers have been made. The research narrows these motives down to arguably the three main ones: independence as a buffer from politics, expertise or technicality and increased stakeholder input.
Next, the research elucidates the three main techniques that traditional rulemakers (Legislature or Executive) use when they outsource rulemaking powers. The first technique implies the genuine delegation of rulemaking powers. The second technique occurs when the traditional rulemaking actors refer to an external document produced by a standardization organization. The third technique requires the reception, and possible extension by the Legislature or the Executive, of agreements made by professional organizations.
Finally, the study proposes a good practice solution by linking a preferential outsourcing technique to each primary motive for outsourcing rulemaking powers.