prof.dr. (Otto) O.H. Swank

prof.dr. (Otto) O.H. Swank

Professor of Microeconomics, in particular organizational economics

Full Professor Erasmus School of Economics Economics
Location
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Room
H 09-25
Telephone
+31 10 4081448
Email
swank@ese.eur.nl

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Profile

        • S.H. Bijkerk, V. Karamychev & O.H. Swank (2018). When Words are not Enough. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 149, 294-314. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.03.009[go to publisher's site]
        • J.J.A. Kamphorst & O.H. Swank (2018). The role of performance appraisals in motivating employees. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy.
        • J.J.A. Kamphorst & O.H. Swank (2016). Don't Demotivate, Discriminate. American Economic Journal. Microeconomics, 8 (1), 140-165. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20140204[go to publisher's site]
        • J. Delfgaauw & O.H. Swank (2016). Task-specific human capital and organizational inertia. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 25 (3), 608-626. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12142[go to publisher's site]
        • O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2015). Learning from others? Decision rights,strategic communication, and reputational concerns. American Economic Journal. Microeconomics, 7 (4), 109-149. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130146[go to publisher's site]
        • B. Visser, O.H. Swank & B.S.Y. Crutzen (2013). Confidence Management: on Interpersonal Comparisons in Teams. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 22 (4), 744-767. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12037[go to publisher's site]
        • J.J.A. Kamphorst & O.H. Swank (2013). When Galatea cares about her reputation: How having faith in your workers reduces their motivation to shine. European Economic Review, 60, 91-104. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.02.004[go to publisher's site]
        • B. Visser & O.H. Swank (2013). Is Transparency to no Avail? Committee Decision- Making, Pre- meetings, and Credible Deals. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115, 967-994. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1001232
        • O.H. Swank (2010). Why are junior doctors reluctant to consult attending physicians? Journal of Health Economics, 29 (2), 191-332. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.12.002[go to publisher's site]
        • O.H. Swank & S. Dominguez Martinez (2009). A Simple Model of Self-Assessment. The Economic Journal, 119 (539), 1225-1241. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02266.x[go to publisher's site]
        • J. Swank, O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2009). How committees of experts interact with the outside world: Some theory, and evidence from the FOMC. Journal of the European Economic Association, 6, 478-486. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/JEEA.2008.6.2-3.478[go to publisher's site]
        • O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2008). The consequences of endogenizing information for the performance of a sequential decision procedure. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 65 (3), 667-681. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.11.003
        • S. Dominguez Martinez, O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2008). In defense of Boards. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 17 (3), 667-682. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00190.x[go to publisher's site]
        • P. Wrasai & O.H. Swank (2007). Policy Makers, Advisers and Reputation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 62, 579-590. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2004.11.015
        • O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2007). Do Elections Lead to Informed Public Decisions? Public Choice, 129, 435-460. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9065-5
        • O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2007). Motivating through delegating tasks of giving attention. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23, 731-742. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewm020
        • B. Visser & O.H. Swank (2007). On committees of experts. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122 (1), 337-372. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/qjec.122.1.337
        • O.H. Swank & S. Dominguez Martinez (2006). Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control. Social Choice and Welfare, 26, 527-545. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0105-3
        • A.J. Dur & O.H. Swank (2005). Producing and Manipulating Information. The Economic Journal, 115, 185-199. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00965.x
        • G. Suurmond, O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2004). On the bad reputation of reputational concerns. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2817-2838. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.10.004
        • I. Ossokina & O.H. Swank (2004). The optimal degree of polarization. European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 255-262. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.02.004
        • K.J. Beniers & O.H. Swank (2004). On the composition of committees. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20, 353-378.
        • O.H. Swank (2003). De Nederlandse economie werkt zo slecht nog niet. Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 88, 63.
        • O.H. Swank (2003). Nederlandse democratie werkt prima. Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 88 (4393), 27.
        • I. Ossokina & O.H. Swank (2003). Polarization, political instability and active learning. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 105 (1), 1-14. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00001
        • O.H. Swank (2002). Budgetary devices for spending prone ministers and bureaucrats. Public Choice, 111, 237-257. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1014903514262
        • O.H. Swank & A.J. Dur (2001). Why do policy makers give (permanent) power to policy advisers? Economics & Politics, 13 (1), 73-93.
        • O.H. Swank (2001). A comment on sequential elections and overlapping terms: voting for US Senate. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 46 (4), 437-440. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00175-5
        • O.H. Swank (2000). Policy advice, secrecy, and reputational concerns. European Journal of Political Economy, 16 (2), 257-271.
        • W.A. Letterie, O.H. Swank & H.P. van Dalen (2000). When policy advisors cannot reach a consensus. Social Choice and Welfare, 17 (3), 439-461.
        • O.H. Swank & A.L. Hillman (2000). Why political culture should be in the lexicon of economics. European Journal of Political Economy, 16 (1), 1-5.
        • O.H. Swank (2000). Why do workers spend so much time on inferior tasks. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 156 (3), 501-512.
        • O.H. Swank, W.A. Letterie & H.P. van Dalen (1999). Het verschil tussen gelijk hebben en gelijk krijgen. Tijdschrift voor Politieke Ekonomie, 58-75.
        • O.H. Swank & R. Eisinga (1999). Economic outcomes and voting behaviour in a multi-party system: an application to the Netherlands. Public Choice, 101, 195-213.
        • O.H. Swank, W.A. Letterie & H.P. van Dalen (1999). A theory of policy advice. The Journal of Law and Economics, 10, 85-103.
        • O.H. Swank, B.D. Peletier & A.J. Dur (1999). Voting on the budget deficit: comment. The American Economic Review, 1377-1381.
        • A.J. Dur & O.H. Swank (1998). The role of governmental agreements in breaking political deadlock. European Journal of Political Economy, 14 (3), 561-572.
        • O.H. Swank (1998). Politiek in Nederland. De Rotterdamse Economist (EFR), 1 (1), 10-12.
        • O.H. Swank (1998). Budgetary decisions. De Economist, 145, 127-129.
        • O.H. Swank, W.A. Letterie & H.P. van Dalen (1998). Economisch advies op het Binnenhof: Een ragfijn spel? Tijdschrift voor Politieke Ekonomie, 20, 58-75.
        • O.H. Swank (1998). Towards an economic theory of ideology. European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 223-240.
        • O.H. Swank (1998). Partisan policies, macroeconomic performance an political support. Journal of Macroeconomics, 20 (2), 367-386.
        • W.A. Letterie & O.H. Swank (1998). Economic policy, model uncertainty and elections. Economics & Politics, 10 (1), 85-103.
        • O.H. Swank & W.A. Letterie (1997). Learning and signalling by advisor selection. Public Choice, 92, 353-367.
        • O.H. Swank (1997). Some evidence on policy makers' motives, macroeconomic performance and output-inflation trade-offs. Applied Economics, 29, 251-258.
        • F. Lippi & O.H. Swank (1996). Do policymakers' distributional desires lead to an inflationary bias? Journal of Policy Modeling, 18 (1), 109-116. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0161-8938(95)00024-0
        • O.H. Swank (1996). Partisan politics, divided government and the economy. De Economist, 144 (3), 510-512.
        • H.P. van Dalen & O.H. Swank (1996). Government spending cycles: ideological or opportunistic? Public Choice, 89, 183-200.
        • O.H. Swank (1995). Waarom Nederland Wim Kok nodig heeft. Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 80 (4002), 286-288.
        • O.H. Swank (1995). Waarom Nederland Wim Kok nodig heeft. Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 286-287.
        • O.H. Swank & H.P. van Dalen (1995). Ideologie en opportunisme bij de overheidsuitgaven. Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 372-375.
        • O.H. Swank (1995). Naschrift. Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 80 (4004), 339-340.
        • O.H. Swank (1995). Uitkeringsniveau en werkgelegenheid, naschrift. Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 339-340.
        • W.A. Letterie & O.H. Swank (1995). Politieke adviseurs. Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 80 (4027), 890-891.
        • O.H. Swank (1995). Rational voters in a partisanship model. Social Choice and Welfare, 12, 13-27.
        • H.P. van Dalen & O.H. Swank (1995). Ideologie en opportunisme bij de overheidsuitgaven. Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 80 (4006), 372-375.
        • O.H. Swank (1994). Te centrale rol voor het CPB? Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 79, 620-622.
        • O.H. Swank (1994). Duisenberg: een kundig acteur. Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 79, 512-514.
        • O.H. Swank (1994). Partisan views on the economy. Public Choice, 81, 137-150. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01053270
        • O.H. Swank (1994). Rational voters in a Partisanship model. Social Choice and Welfare.
        • O.H. Swank (1994). Better monetary control may increase the inflationary bias of policy. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 96, 125-131.
        • F. Lippi & O.H. Swank (1994). Do policy makers' distributional desires lead to an inflationary bias? Journal of Policy Modeling.
        • J.C. Siebrand & O.H. Swank (1994). Partisan profiles in presidential policies. Journal of Macroeconomics, 16, 553-559.
        • O.H. Swank & J. Swank (1993). In search of the motives behind US fiscal macroeconomic policy. Applied Economics, 25, 1013-1022.
        • J. Swank & O.H. Swank (1991). Preferences, perceptions and expectations in the conduct of US monetary policy. Economic and Financial Computing, 1, 375-395.
        • J.J.A. Kamphorst & O.H. Swank (2012). Geloofwaardigheid in functioneringsgesprekken. Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 97 (4646), 626-629.
        • O.H. Swank (2008). redactioneel commentaar. Kwartaalschrift Economie, 5, 1-3.
        • O.H. Swank & F. Lippi (1999). Policy targets, economic performance and central bank independence. In F. Lippi (Ed.), Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility (pp. 121-148). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
        • O.H. Swank & F. Lippi (1999). Policy delegation and elections. In F. Lippi (Ed.), Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility (pp. 73-86). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
        • O.H. Swank & F. Lippi (1999). Distributional motives and the inflationary bias. In F. Lippi (Ed.), Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility (pp. 63-72). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
        • O.H. Swank (2003). A rationale for assessments of election programmes. In J.J. Graafland & A.P. Ros (Eds.), Economic assessement of election programmes: does it make sense (pp. 97-106). Boston/Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers
        • B. Visser & O.H. Swank (2009). Decision Making and Learning in a Globalizing World. (Extern rapport). Florence, Italy: European University Institute
        • S. Dominguez Martinez & O.H. Swank (2006). A simple model of self-assessments. (Intern rapport, TI Discussion Paper, no 2006-010/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • J. Swank, O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2006). Tranparancy and Pre-meetings. (Intern rapport, TI discussion papers, no TI 2006-051/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • S. Dominguez Martinez, O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2006). Disciplining and screening top executives. (Intern rapport, TI discussion Paper, no 2006-054/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2004). Sharing information through delegation and collaboration. (Intern rapport, Discussion Paper Tinbergen Institute, no 2004-042/1). :
        • P. Wrasai & O.H. Swank (2004). Policy makers, advisers and reputation. (Intern rapport, Discussion Paper Tinbergen Institute, no 2004-037/1). :
        • S. Dominguez Martinez & O.H. Swank (2004). Does electoral competition create incentives for political parties to collect information about the pros and cons of alternative policies? (Intern rapport, Discussion Paper Tinbergen Institute, no 2004-133/1). :
        • O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2003). The consequences of endogenizing information for herd behavior. (Intern rapport, TI Discussion Paper, no 03-021/1). :
        • B. Visser & O.H. Swank (2003). Do elections lead to informed public decisions? (Intern rapport, TI Discussion Paper, no 03-067/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • K.J. Beniers & O.H. Swank (2003). On the composition of committees. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2003-006/1). :
        • O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2002). Delegation or voting. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2002-005/1). :
        • O.H. Swank & P. Wrasai (2002). Deliberation, information, aggregation and collective decision making. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2002-006/1). :
        • G. Suurmond, O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2002). Vanity in politics: a problem? (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2002-123/1). :
        • I. Ossokina & O.H. Swank (2001). The optimal degree of polarization. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2001-063/1). :
        • I. Ossokina & O.H. Swank (2001). How polarization and political instability affect learning through experimentation. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2001-040/1). :
        • O.H. Swank, W.A. Letterie & H.P. van Dalen (1997). An economic theory of policy advice. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no TI97-090/1). :
        • O.H. Swank (2006). The self-perception theory vs. a dynamic learning model. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Instituut, no 92.01). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • O.H. Swank (2006). Transparency and Pre-meetings. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Instituut, no 051/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
  • Economic Foundations

    Title
    Economic Foundations
    Year
    2018
    Period
    ERIMB1
    Year level
    master (ERIM - Research Master in Business and Management)

    Micro-economie

    Title
    Micro-economie
    Year
    2018
    Period
    BLOK2
    Year level
    bachelor 1 (Bachelor Economie en Bedrijfseconomie), bachelor 1 (Bachelor Fiscale Economie), bachelor 1 (MrDrs programma), pre-master (Pre-master Fiscale Economie), pre-master (Pre-Master Econometrics and Management Science), bachelor 1 (Leiden: Informatica & Economie)

    Seminar Management Control

    Title
    Seminar Management Control
    Year
    2018
    Period
    BLOK3
    Year level
    master (Master Economics and Business), master (Master Accounting, Auditing and Control)
    • Than Nam Le

      Trade and Economic Development in a Global Production Network

    • Behrang Manouchehrabadi

      Institutions and Organizations: How Institutions Affect Organizational Governance, Scope and Incentives

    • Optimisation Models for Supply Chain Coordination under Information Asymmetry

      Rutger Kerkkamp

      Optimisation Models for Supply Chain Coordination under Information Asymmetry

  • Full Professor

    University
    Erasmus University Rotterdam
    School
    Erasmus School of Economics
    Department
    Economics
    Country
    Nederland
    Telephone
    +31 10 4081448

Address

Visiting address

Burg. Oudlaan 50 3062 PA Rotterdam

Postal address

Postbus 1738 3000 DR Rotterdam