prof.dr. (Otto) OH Swank

Professor of Microeconomics, in particular organizational economics

Full Professor Erasmus School of Economics Economics
Location
Burg. Oudlaan 50, Rotterdam
Room
E1-13
Telephone
0104081448
Email
swank@ese.eur.nl

More information

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Profile

        • O.H. Swank & F. Lippi (1999). Policy delegation and elections. In F. Lippi (Ed.), Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility (pp. 73-86). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
        • O.H. Swank & F. Lippi (1999). Policy targets, economic performance and central bank independence. In F. Lippi (Ed.), Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility (pp. 121-148). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
        • O.H. Swank & F. Lippi (1999). Distributional motives and the inflationary bias. In F. Lippi (Ed.), Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility (pp. 63-72). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
        • O.H. Swank (2003). A rationale for assessments of election programmes. In J.J. Graafland & A.P. Ros (Eds.), Economic assessement of election programmes: does it make sense (pp. 97-106). Boston/Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers
        • B. Visser & O.H. Swank (2009). Decision Making and Learning in a Globalizing World. (Extern rapport). Florence, Italy: European University Institute
        • S. Dominguez Martinez & O.H. Swank (2006). A simple model of self-assessments. (Intern rapport, TI Discussion Paper, no 2006-010/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • S. Dominguez Martinez, O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2006). Disciplining and screening top executives. (Intern rapport, TI discussion Paper, no 2006-054/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • J. Swank, O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2006). Tranparancy and Pre-meetings. (Intern rapport, TI discussion papers, no TI 2006-051/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • P. Wrasai & O.H. Swank (2004). Policy makers, advisers and reputation. (Intern rapport, Discussion Paper Tinbergen Institute, no 2004-037/1). :
        • O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2004). Sharing information through delegation and collaboration. (Intern rapport, Discussion Paper Tinbergen Institute, no 2004-042/1). :
        • S. Dominguez Martinez & O.H. Swank (2004). Does electoral competition create incentives for political parties to collect information about the pros and cons of alternative policies? (Intern rapport, Discussion Paper Tinbergen Institute, no 2004-133/1). :
        • O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2003). The consequences of endogenizing information for herd behavior. (Intern rapport, TI Discussion Paper, no 03-021/1). :
        • B. Visser & O.H. Swank (2003). Do elections lead to informed public decisions? (Intern rapport, TI Discussion Paper, no 03-067/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • K.J. Beniers & O.H. Swank (2003). On the composition of committees. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2003-006/1). :
        • O.H. Swank & P. Wrasai (2002). Deliberation, information, aggregation and collective decision making. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2002-006/1). :
        • O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2002). Delegation or voting. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2002-005/1). :
        • G. Suurmond, O.H. Swank & B. Visser (2002). Vanity in politics: a problem? (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2002-123/1). :
        • I. Ossokina & O.H. Swank (2001). How polarization and political instability affect learning through experimentation. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2001-040/1). :
        • I. Ossokina & O.H. Swank (2001). The optimal degree of polarization. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no 2001-063/1). :
        • O.H. Swank, W.A. Letterie & H.P. van Dalen (1997). An economic theory of policy advice. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no TI97-090/1). :
        • O.H. Swank (2006). Transparency and Pre-meetings. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Instituut, no 051/1). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
        • O.H. Swank (2006). The self-perception theory vs. a dynamic learning model. (Intern rapport, Tinbergen Instituut, no 92.01). 3000 DR Rotterdam: TINBERGEN INSTITUUT
      • O.H. Swank & I. Ossokina (2008). Adoption Subsidy Versus Technology Standards Under Asymmetric Information. In - Vol. 156. De Economist (pp. 241-267)
  • Micro-economie

    Title
    Micro-economie
    Year
    2019
    Year level
    (bachelor 1) (bachelor 1) (bachelor 1) (pre-master) (pre-master) (bachelor 1)
    • Than Nam Le

      Trade and Economic Development in a Global Production Network

    • Behrang Manouchehrabadi

      Institutions and Organizations: How Institutions Affect Organizational Governance, Scope and Incentives

    • Rutger Kerkkamp

      Optimisation Models for Supply Chain Coordination under Information Asymmetry

  • Full Professor

    University
    Erasmus University Rotterdam
    School
    Erasmus School of Economics
    Department
    Economics
    Country
    The Netherlands
    Telephone
    0104081448

Address

Visiting address

Burg. Oudlaan 50 3062 PA Rotterdam

Postal address

Postbus 1738 3000 DR Rotterdam