Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion

Françoise Forges (Université Paris Dauphine)
Organisation
Economics
Start date

Friday, 14 Feb 2020, 12:00

End date

Friday, 14 Feb 2020, 13:00

Room
C1-2
Building
Theil Building

Françoise Forges will present her paper called 'Games with incomplete information: from repetition to cheap talk and persuasion'

Abstract:

This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study information transmission in static interactive decision problems, both when the agents monitoring information can lie (“cheap talk”) and when they cannot (“persuasion”).

More information

If you would like a bilateral, join for lunch or dinner on Friday evening, please send an email to boring@ese.eur.nl