Incentives, Performance and Choking in Darts

Incentives, Performance and Choking in Darts

Bouke Klein Teeselink
Start date

Thursday, 12 Sep 2019, 16:00

End date

Thursday, 12 Sep 2019, 17:00

22 on the third floor
Polak Building
Spoken Language

This paper examines the effect of incentives on the performance of darts players. We analyze four data sets comprising a total of 123,402 darts matches of professional, amateur, and youth players.

The game of darts offers an attractive natural research setting, because performance can be observed at the individual level and without the obscuring effects of risk considerations and the behavior of others. We find that amateur and youth players perform better under moderately higher incentives, but choke when the incentives are really high.

Professional players similarly display better performance under higher incentives, but appear less susceptible of choking. These results speak to a growing literature on the limits of increasing incentives as a recipe for better performance.

More information

The ECASE teamĀ 
Jan van Ours, Thomas Peeters, Francesco Principe and Sam Hoey