- Speaker
- Date
- Friday 7 Oct 2022, 15:30 - 16:30
- Type
- Seminar
- Room
- 2-10
- Space
- Polak Building
This paper presents a novel bargaining game where every party is proposing only its own contribution, before the set of pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with uncertain tolerance for delay, each equilibrium pledge maximises an asymmetric Nash product.
The weights on others’ payoffs increase in the uncertainty, but decrease in the correlation of the shocks. The weights vary pledge to pledge, and this implies that the outcome is generically inefficient.
The Nash demand game and its mapping to the Nash bargaining solution follow as a limiting case. The model sheds light on the Paris climate change agreement, but it also applies to negotiations between policymakers or business partners that have differentiated responsibilities or expertise.
How to attend the seminar
If you wish to attend the seminar or would like to have a bilateral with the speaker, please contact the seminar organisers Anne Boring (boring@ese.eur.nl) or Robert Dur (dur@ese.eur.nl).
