My research is concerned with the measurement of social preferences of humans. I do this by means of lab experiments where (usually) students are playing a game behind a computer. These games gather insights into the social preferences of the participants. Besides lab experiments, I conduct field experiments in a 'natural environment', with non-student participants. The insights gathered from these experiments show to what degree the social preferences measured in the lab carry over the the real world. Besides research on social preferences, I study how to design optimal labour contracts. This means that we study when employees exert most effort for their boss. One can think of a contract which pays on a per-unit base, or a scheme in which only the most productive employee receives money. The way in which I study these incentives is by means of lab experiments and field experiments.
D.P. Soest, van, J.T.R. Stoop & J. Vyrastekova (2016). Towards a delineation of the circumstances in which cooperation can be sustained in environmental and resource problems. Journal of Environmental Economics & Management, 77 (May), 1-13. doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2015.12.004
C. Noussair & J.T.R. Stoop (2015). Time as a medium of reward in three social preference experiments. Experimental Economics, 18 (3), 442-456. doi: 10.1007/s10683-014-9415-y
C.N. Noussair, D.P. Soest, van & J.T.R. Stoop (2015). Cooperation in a Dynamic Fishing Game: A Framed Field Experiment (AER: Papers and Proceedings). The American Economic Review, 105 (5), 1-7. doi: 10.1257/aer.p20151018
J.T.R. Stoop, D.P. Soest, van & J. Vyrastekova (2013). A tale of two carrots: the effectiveness of multiple reward stages in a common pool resource game. In John List & Michael Price (Eds.), Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment (pp. 291-318). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing