My research is concerned with the measurement of social preferences of humans. I do this by means of lab experiments where (usually) students are playing a game behind a computer. These games gather insights into the social preferences of the participants. Besides lab experiments, I conduct field experiments in a 'natural environment', with non-student participants. The insights gathered from these experiments show to what degree the social preferences measured in the lab carry over the the real world.
Besides research on social preferences, I study how to design optimal labour contracts. This means that we study when employees exert most effort for their boss. One can think of a contract which pays on a per-unit base, or a scheme in which only the most productive employee receives money. The way in which I study these incentives is by means of lab experiments and field experiments.
J.T.R. Stoop, D.P. Soest, van & J. Vyrastekova (2013). A tale of two carrots: the effectiveness of multiple reward stages in a common pool resource game. In John List & Michael Price (Eds.), Handbook on Experimental Economics and the Environment (pp. 291-318). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing